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Abstract 
 
 
The present work aimed at dealing with two main issues: (a) to contribute to the 
broad debate on the processing of negation trough an ERP investigation of negative 
sentences processing in Italian adults, still lacking in the literature on the topic; and 
(b) to provide further evidence and deepen analysis of dyslexics’ difficulty in the 
comprehension of orally presented negative sentences. To these purposes, the 
results of two behavioral preliminary studies and two main EEG-ERP studies 
(STUDY 1 and STUDY 2) are presented.  
 The two preliminary studies involved a group of 10 adults (mean age 27;9) and 
a group of 33 Italian children (mean age 9;4). These two studies were principally 
intended to assess the experimental settings of the protocol and to evaluate its 
suitability for the performance of an EEG study with the two different populations. 
Besides having led to important adjustments in the experimental design, the results 
of the preliminary studies showed the difficulty of involving children in an EEG 
study of the type planned. As a consequence, the two EEG studies subsequently 
performed exclusively involved adult participants.   
 As mentioned, STUDY 1 aimed at contributing to the broad debate on the 
interpretation on negation. In particular, it was intended to provide further 
confirmation to the non-incremental account, according to which the interpretation 
of negative sentences (e.g. The boy is not running) inherently differs from the 
interpretation of other linguistic structures, in that it requires the comprehender to 
construct two different, subsequent mental simulations: a first representation 
corresponding to the negated state affairs (i.e., a boy who is running), and a second 
referring to the actual, negative meaning of the sentence. This latter proposal is in 
contrast with alternative incremental approaches, according to which the 
processing of negative sentences does not intrinsically differ from that of 
affirmative sentences, except than for higher pragmatic sensitivity, which would 
determine longer processing times in all cases in which the negative sentence to be 
interpreted is not presented in adequately supportive linguistic contexts – as it 
mostly happens in experimental paradigms. Recently, two main EEG studies have 
been performed with the purpose of providing a more precise insight into the 
temporal dynamics of negation processing. Lüdtke, Friedrich, Filippis, & Kaup 
(2008) analyzed ERP effects associated with the execution of a sentence-picture 
verification task including both true and false affirmative and negative sentences. 
The results showed that the early stages of negative sentences verification are not 
influenced by the actual meaning of the sentence, but rather by the 
matching/mismatching between the picture content (e.g., a ghost in front of a 
tower) and the entity mentioned in the preceding sentence, resulting in larger N400 
amplitudes for non-priming conditions (i.e., false affirmative and true negative 
sentences, e.g., In front of the tower there is a lion/there is no lion) than for 
priming conditions (i.e., true affirmative and false negative sentences, e.g., In front 
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of the tower there is a ghost/there is no ghost). The fact that the entity mentioned in 
the sentence was not always depicted in the picture, however, determined a sense 
of pragmatic infelicity, possibly affecting event-related potentials in all cases in 
which the sentences involved predication about an entity not relevant to the 
following picture. To avoid this kind of influence, Nieuwland & Kuperberg 
(2008)’s ERP study focused on the interpretation of pragmatically licensed 
sentences, that is, affirmative and negative sentences introduced by a simple 
proposition restricting the conditions of validity of the target statement (e.g., With 
proper equipment, scuba diving is/is not very dangerous and often good fun). In 
this latter study, N400 amplitudes reflected the actual sentences’ truth-value, 
reporting larger N400 amplitudes for false conditions than for true conditions, 
regardless of sentence polarity. Far from constituting a neutral discourse context, 
however, the short propositions inserted with the aim of ensuring pragmatic 
licensing determined a strong expectation for true sentences and, consequently, a 
sense of unnaturalness for false sentences that might represent the main cause of 
N400 amplitudes. In addition, the use of sentences related to general world-
knowledge did not allow the experimenters to temporally and functionally 
distinguish the cognitive activity connected with the processing of the strictly 
linguistic material from that determined by truth-value evaluation, both crucially 
associated to N400 component. On the basis of these considerations, STUDY 1 
aimed at replicating Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s findings through a sentence-picture 
verification task arguably free from the pragmatic infelicity characterizing that 
previous study. A group of 27 Italian adults (mean age 27;6) took part in STUDY 1. 
The behavioral and EEG results are mainly consistent with the non-incremental 
models of negation processing. In particular, the first stages of sentence 
verification were characterized by a N400 modulations very similar to that 
observed by Lüdtke and colleagues, revealing no initial sensitivity to negation. 
Importantly, the adoption of a pragmatically controlled design prevented the effect 
from being influenced by the simple priming between the picture and the sentence. 
In the following time windows, in addition, the emergence of electrophysiological 
components reflecting the truth-value and polarity effects provided important 
evidence of the successful integration of the negative meaning into the 
interpretative process.  
 The STUDY 2 extended the investigation to a group of Italian dyslexic adults (15 
subjects, mean age 22;4). The non-dyslexic participants of the STUDY 1 were 
included as control group. The rationale for the involvement of dyslexic subjects 
was provided by previous behavioral studies reporting increased difficulty in the 
interpretation of negative sentences by Italian dyslexic children (Vender & 
Delfitto, 2010) and adults (Rizzato, Scappini, Cardinaletti, 2014) in comparison 
with non-dyslexic peers. In order to verify Vender (2011) hypothesis, according to 
which the dyslexics’ difficulties in the spoken language comprehension may 
depend on their poor working memory capacity, a series of working memory tests 
were also included in the experimental protocol for this second study. The results 
of these latter tests highlighted significantly weaker phonological working memory 
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in the dyslexic subjects in comparison with non-dyslexic controls. The analysis of 
the sentence-picture task performance showed an overall slowdown and poorer 
accuracy for dyslexic subjects in comparison with controls, suggesting that the 
dyslexics experienced more troubles in all conditions, most likely deriving from the 
working memory load associated with the execution of the experimental task. 
Although the negative sentences were characterized by slower response times and 
higher error rates than affirmative sentences, the performance resembled that 
observed in the control group. Therefore, no confirmation of specific difficulty in 
the interpretation of negative sentences by dyslexic subjects was reported. Contrary 
to Vender (2011), in addition, no clear evidence of working memory involvement 
in negative sentences interpretation was found. The analysis of the ERPs and, in 
particular, the observation in the dyslexic group of (a) a crucial lack of the N400 
effect characterizing the first stage of sentence verification in the control group, 
and (b) the emergence of an early polarity effect, unreported in the control group, 
suggests that dyslexic adults may rely on different cognitive strategies for the 
interpretation of affirmative and negative sentences in comparison with non-
dyslexic subjects. Worth noting, however, this latter hypothesis is at variance with 
the predictions of the two-step simulation hypothesis by Kaup and colleagues, 
according to which the interpretation of the negative sentences necessarily requires 
the initial simulation of the negated state of affairs.  
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General overview 
 
 
The present work investigates two main issues. On one side, it deals with the broad 
debate about the processing of linguistic negation by providing novel 
electrophysiological data on the interpretation of negative sentences by a group of 
Italian healthy subjects, still lacking in the literature on the topic. On the other side, 
it deepens the relationship between working memory resources, negative sentences 
interpretation and developmental dyslexia, in the line of research initiated by 
Vender and Delfitto (2010).  
 The dissertation is constituted by two main sections. In the first section (PART 
1), the theoretical background of the main experimental studies presented in PART 
2, involving both typically developed and dyslexic Italian students, is provided. In 
particular, Chapter 1 includes a short introduction to the most relevant issues 
addressed by the strictly linguistic studies on negation (§ 1.1) and a detailed 
overview and evaluation of the most important evidence and models reported in the 
psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic investigation on negative sentences (§ 1.2 and 
1.3). Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of the use of the sentence-picture 
verification paradigm in the study of sentential negation (§ 2.3.1), to the 
presentation of the EEG-ERP technique (§ 2.3.2) and to the consideration of the 
main ERP components reported in language comprehension studies in general, and 
in negative sentences interpretation in particular (§ 2.3.1.2). To conclude, Chapter 
3 offers a brief introduction to developmental dyslexia (§ 3.1), followed by a short 
overview of the linguistic and working memory deficits reported in both children 
and adults with dyslexia (§ 3.2 and § 3.3, respectively) 
 The second part (PART 2) of the dissertation is devoted to the presentation and 
discussion of the experimental studies performed during my PhD. After the 
consideration of the evidence emerged in two behavioral preliminary studies 
involving a group of Italian children and a group of Italian adults (Chapter 2), the 
methods and results of STUDY 1 (Chapter 3) and STUDY 2 (Chapter 4) are reported. 
STUDY 1 made use of a pragmatically balanced sentence-picture verification task to 
test the comprehension of affirmative and negative sentences in a group of Italian 
typically developed young adults. As we will see, the results of this first study 
provided behavioral and electrophysiological evidence in support of non-
incremental processing of negation. The STUDY 2 performed the same 
experimental protocol to a group of Italian undergraduate dyslexic students. A 
battery of working memory and writing and reading tasks was also included. The 
results of these latter tests highlighted significant differences between adult 
dyslexics and control subjects both in the phonological component of working 
memory and in most writing and reading tasks. The analysis of the performance in 
the sentence-picture verification task showed that, though the execution of the 
sentence picture-verification tasks was characterized by an overall slowdown and 
poorer accuracy in the dyslexic group in comparison with the control group, adult 
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dyslexics do not seem to present a specific impairment for negative sentences 
interpretation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
Theoretical Background 
 
1 LINGUISTIC ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF NEGATION 
 
The existence of a linguistic entity for the expression of negation represents a 
universal feature in human languages (Greenberg, 1966). Interestingly, beyond 
being universal, negation is also specific to human languages as, as far as it is 
known, “no animal communication system includes negative utterances, and 
consequently none possesses a means for assigning truth value, for lying, for irony, 
or for coping with false or contradictory statements” (Horn, 1989: xiii). What 
human languages all have in common is not only the possibility of expressing a 
negative meaning, but the fact that it is always linked to the presence of an overt 
expression.
1
 This means also that, in all languages, a sentence is considered 
positive by default, unless an overtly expressed linguistic operator marks it as 
negative; in other words, therefore, negative sentences are always considered 
marked in comparison with the unmarked positive sentences. The nature of the 
linguistic elements used for expressing negation has a wide variation across 
languages, ranging from specific verbs to negative participles or affixes.
2
 In most 
languages, in addition, negation is not strictly associated to a single element but, 
rather, to a very large (and, in some cases, redundant) set of linguistic expressions. 
To exemplify, Italian negative sentences can be characterized either by the 
presence of the negative participle non (corresponding to the English not); by 
negative quantifiers such as niente e nessuno (broadly corresponding to the English 
nothing and none); by the so called negative concord, that is, the concurrent use of 
non with a negative quantifier or with a negative polarity item (such as alcuno in 
sentences like ‘Non c’è alcun problema’, There isn’t any problem);3 or by negative 
                                                 
1
 No human language makes exception, including sign languages, in which negation can be 
either expressed by the use of a manual negative sign combined with a non-manual marking 
(a head movement) or by head-movement alone. A cross-linguistic overview of negation in 
sign languages is provided by Zeshan (2004).  
2
 See Miestamo (2007) for a typological review. 
3
 Negative concord and negative polarity items represent two very interesting forms of 
negation. Negative concord expressions, present with different forms in many languages, 
are negative sentences characterized by the presence of two negative elements which do not 
yield to each other cancelation (as it would be expected from a logical point of view), but 
result in one semantic negation, e.g., Italian Non è venuto nessuno, (Neg) - nobody - has - 
come, ‘Nobody has come’. The term Negative Polarity Items refers to a large and 
categorically varied class of linguistic elements (as, for example, verbs, adverbs, 
quantifiers, etc.), whose common feature is the need of being licensed by negation, e.g., 
English any, which is well-formed in negative sentences (I didn’t see any student), but ill-
formed in positives (e.g., *I saw any student); Italian niente (‘nothing’), which is only 
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connective adjuncts (such as nè, nemmeno). It is also possible, however, that the 
negative meaning of a sentence is encoded directly within the single lexical items 
used, as shown by the large number of substantives, adjectives, and adverbs formed 
trough the affixation of the very prolific negative prefixes im-, s-, ir- (e.g., 
impossibile ‘impossible’, sfortuna ‘unlucky’, irrimediabilmente ‘irremediably’). 
All in all, therefore, negation represents a multifaceted and complex linguistic 
phenomenon. Given the applicative nature of the present work, we will not address 
all the theoretical issues which have occupied linguistic investigation on negation; 
rather, we will offer a very preliminary and mainly descriptive introduction to the 
most relevant interpretative and structural features of negation. As a consequence, 
we will not provide much attention to any specific theoretical account, neither we 
will try to solve (and not even to exhaustively mention) those aspects which still 
remain controversial in the linguistic investigation on negation. Among all the 
possible kinds of negative structures, moreover, particular consideration will be 
devoted to the case of Italian sentential negation (that is, the negation of a standard 
declarative verbal main clause), which is the object of the experimental studies 
presented in Part 2. 
 
 
1.1 The interpretation of negation 
 
At a first sight, speaking about the semantics of negation may sounds trivial, as one 
could be tempted to solve the question very hastily by saying that negation 
‘simply’ reverses the polarity of the sentence and, consequently, its truth-
conditions.
4
 Consider, for example, the following sentences as uttered in a situation 
in which John is happy: 
 
(1) John is happy.  
(2) John is not happy.  
 
In such a situation, the positive sentence (1) is true, whereas the negative sentence 
(2) is false, as a consequence of truth-conditions reversal operated by the presence 
of the negative marker not. The truth-conditional semantics notion of negation, 
                                                                                                                            
licensed in negative concord constructions (e.g., Non ho capito niente, ‘I didn’t understood 
anything’). Both negative concord and Negative Polarity Items phenomena have received 
huge attention in the linguistic investigation on negation in the past decades. For brevity 
convenience, however, we will not deal with these two topics. For a more detailed 
introduction to negative concord see Zeijlstra (2004); for an introduction to negative 
polarity items see Ladusaw (1997) and Giannakidou (2008). 
4
 Truth-conditions are defines as the conditions the world must meet for a sentence to be 
true. The consideration of truth-conditions is at the basis of truth-conditional semantics, 
according to which the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to its true-conditions. The major 
objection to this approach is represented by the fact that two sentences can have equivalent 
true conditions though having different meaning. As a consequence, true-conditions are 
generally considered to be only a part of the meaning of a sentence.  
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according to which negation is defined as a truth-reversal propositional operator, is 
based exactly on this idea.
5
 A similar idea is present, however, in all theoretical 
accounts – logical, philosophical and linguistic – which have dealt with negation. 
As we will consider more in detail in the next paragraphs, however, the semantics 
of negation is not only limited to this most apparent meaning.  
 
1.1.1 The scope of negation 
 
As briefly mentioned above, negation reverses the polarity of the sentence in which 
it occurs and, as a consequence, its truth-value. In many cases, however, this 
reversal does not involve the whole sentence, but only a sub-sentential component. 
For this reason, the scope of negation assumes a crucial importance in the 
interpretation of the negative operator, that is, the part of the meaning to which it 
refers – or, more formally, the part of the sentence which is under the domain of 
the negation. Languages such as English and Italian, in which sentential negation is 
expressed through the use of a preverbal negative participle (e.g., English not; 
Italian non), offer clear examples of how the difference in the scopal domain of 
negation yields to difference interpretations of the same sentence. Consider the 
following sentences with regard to a scenario in which a boy, called John, is 
drinking an orange juice: 
 
(3) John is not cooking.  
(4) John is not drinking. 
(5) John is not drinking some beer.  
 
Sentence (3) is true as, in fact, John is not cooking, but he is drinking the orange 
juice. For the same reason, on the contrary, sentence (4) is false. Though sharing 
the same portion of sentence John is not drinking, sentence (5) is true. As easily 
recognizable, what makes the difference between the two sentences is the domain 
of the negative participle not: the falsity of (4) is given by the fact that the negation 
has wide scope, that is, it scopes over the predicate of the sentence, as indicated in 
(6), while the truth of (5) depends upon the fact that negation has narrow scope 
and, therefore, does not scope over the predicate, but only over the complement 
some beer, as illustrated in (7): 
 
(6) ¬ [John is drinking]. 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, negative elements do not only reverse truth-conditions of a certain sentence, 
but also the direction of their entailment. While affirmative sentences are upwards entailing 
(which means that the truth of a proposition about an element, say, an apple, implies the 
same proposition to be true for the superset of that element, e.g., fruit), negation is 
downward entailing, that is, the truth of a negative propositions (e.g., about apples) the 
same will old for the subset of apples (e.g., Granny Smith) but not for the superset of the 
fruit in general. We will not, however, deal with this issue further. 
  
 
 
 
18 
 
(7) [John is drinking ¬ (some beer)].6 
 
Importantly, however, sentence (5) is not prevented from receiving wide scope 
interpretation, as illustrated in (8), sharing the same truth-value conditions of 
sentence (6) above:  
 
(8) ¬ [John is drinking some beer]. 
 
The distinction between narrow and wide scope of negation is also at the basis of 
Klima (1964)’s definition of constituent and sentential negation, according to 
which if the entire proposition falls under the scope of the negative operator, the 
negation yields sentential negation; if the negation only applies to a particular 
constituent, there is no sentential negation, but only constituent negation. Worth 
noting, in most cases both narrow and wide scope interpretations are equally 
plausible. As consequence, the choice between the two can only be determined by 
contextual cues. 
 The sharp contrast between wide and narrow scope interpretation of a same 
sentence has became very popular through Russell (1905)’s example about the king 
of France baldness: 
 
(9) The king of France is bald. 
(10) The king of France is not bald. 
 
As explained by Russell, sentence (9) assumes that there is an entity which is the 
king of France and that this entity has the property of being bald, as expressed 
trough the logical form (11):  
 
(11) ∃ x [K (x) ∧ ¬∃ y[(y≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)]. 
  ‘There is an x such that x is king and there is no y 
   such that y is different of x and king, and x is  
  bald.’ 
 
The negative sentence (10), on the other hand, allows two interpretations. If the 
description ‘the king of France’ has a primary occurrence, that is, stands outside 
the scope of negation, the sentence share the existential presupposition of sentence 
(9), that is, the fact that there is a entity which is a king of France, but it claims that 
this entity does not have the property of being bald (12): 
 
 
                                                 
6
 More formally, wide scope and narrow scope of negation can be defined as follows: 
 a. In wide scope, negation logically dominates propositional material: ¬ [… φ…]; 
 b. In narrow scope, negation logically dominates a less than full-propositional  
 material, for instance a propositional function: […¬ φ…].  
 (definition from Moeschler, 2010: 32). 
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(12) ∃ x [K(x) ∧ ¬∃ y[(y ≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ ¬B(x)] 
 ‘There is an x such that x is king and there is no 
y such that y is different of x and king, and x is 
not bald’. 
  
If, on the contrary, the definite description ‘the king of France’ has a secondary 
occurrence within the scope of negation, the falsity of the sentence is not 
necessarily determined by the un-baldness of the king of France, but it may be 
determined by the fact that there is not an entity corresponding to the definite 
description ‘the king of France’ (13): 
 
(13) ¬ ∃ x [K(x) ∧ ¬∃ y[(y ≠x) ∧ K(y)] ∧ B(x)] 
 ‘There is not an x such that x is king and there is 
 no such that y is different of x and king, and x is 
 bald’. 
 
In this second case, negation cancels the existential presupposition of the entity 
‘the king of France’.7 As it has been noted by Horn (1989), though not representing 
the most intuitive interpretation of a negative sentence in isolation, the wide scope 
interpretation becomes the only possible when the presupposition rejection 
becomes explicit: 
 
(14) The king of France is not bald – there isn’t any 
king of France! 
 
Currently, Russell terminology have been replaced by the distinction between 
internal and external negation, corresponding, respectively, to Russell’s primary 
and secondary occurrence of definite descriptions: external negation has its scope 
over a full logical proposition containing no free variables (e.g., the whole 
proposition ‘The king is not bald’), whereas internal negation has its scope over a 
propositional function, such as a non-propositional form containing free variables 
(e.g., the description of the predicate ‘is bald’).8 As could be easily observed, 
                                                 
7
 For simplicity convenience, we have by now omit to say that, as the king of France 
example clearly shows, negative sentence always carry an implicit positive meaning, that is 
the presupposition of the existence of the entity to which the predicate refers to. Saying, for 
example, that John is drinking presupposed, in fact, at least the existence of an entity 
corresponding to the definite description ‘John’. The presupposition, however, can also be 
extended to the predicate of the sentence. If, for example, one says that John is not drinking 
some beer, she can be presupposing both there is an entity corresponding to John and that 
that entity has the propriety of being drinking something: [John is drinking ¬ (some beer)]. 
As observed by Russell (1905), wide scope interpretation always yields presupposition 
cancelling, while the same does not happen in the case of narrow scope interpretation since 
the negative meaning does scope over the whole sentence. 
8
 This definition is taken from Moeschler (2010). As explained by the same author, “a 
propositional function is a logical form containing at least one free variable, that is, a 
  
 
 
 
20 
 
therefore, internal negation has narrow scope, while external negation has wide 
scope: 
(15) Internal negation = primary occurrence = narrow 
scope. 
(16) External negation = secondary occurrence = wide scope. 
 
The consideration of the different scopal domains of negation is also useful in 
drawing a distinction between different kinds of sentential negation. In most cases, 
as we have seen, the presence of negation modifies the truth-conditions of the 
sentence. These cases are considered cases of descriptive negation, as negation 
modifies the propositional meaning of the sentence. There are cases, however, in 
which the semantic contribute of negation seems to be different. Consider, for 
example, the following sentences: 
 
(17) Chris didn’t manage to solve some of the 
 problems – he managed to solve all of them.9 
(18) He didn’t call the [pólis], he called the [polís]. 
(19) Grandpa isn’t feeling lousy, Johnny, he’s just a tad 
 indisposed. 
(20) No, he’s not meeting a woman this evening  - he’s
  meeting his wife!
 10
 
 
As firstly highlighted by Horn (1989), in these latter examples negation does not 
modify the propositional meaning of the sentence (e.g., claiming that a certain 
entity does not have a particular property), but it is used to communicate an 
objection to the way in which the same propositional meaning had been previously 
expressed. This latter use of negation has been therefore named metalinguistic 
negation, as the scope of negation is not the propositional meaning of the sentence, 
but rather the speech act itself. 
 Another example of non-standard negation scope is represented by illocutionary 
negation, that is, the cases in which negation scopes over the illocutionary force of 
a certain sentence. Consider the sentences below:  
 
(21) I don’t promise I will come. 
(22) I promise I will not come. 
 
As explained by Moeschler (2010), which in turn follows Searle (1969)’s theory of 
speech acts, (21) is an example of illocutionary negation as the presence of 
negation determines the sentence not being a promise. In (22), on the contrary, 
                                                                                                                            
variable that is bound by a quantifier. Taken individually, K(x), ¬ ∃ y[ ( y≠x) ∧ K ( y) ] and 
B (x) are propositional functions” (Moeschler, 2010: 31, note 3).  
9
 Worth nothing, in this sentence negation cancels the universal implicature associated with 
the quantifier some. 
10
 Examples taken from Horn (1989: 370-372). 
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negation does not scopes over the illocutionary marker of the sentence (the verb to 
promise), but over the propositional meaning of the subordinate (I will come). The 
difference between the two sentences is formalized in (23) and (24), where F 
indicates the illocutionary force associated with the predicate to promise and P the 
propositional meaning (to come): 
 
(23) ¬ F (P) 
(24) F (¬P) 
 
The identification of the scope of negation becomes even more intriguing in the 
cases in which the negative element enters in combination with that other scope-
bearing elements, such as universal quantifiers:  
 
(25) All that glitters is not gold. 
(26) All vegetarians do not eat meat. 
 
While in the former sentence negation scopes over the universal quantifier all 
yielding the meaning that is not the cases that all that glitters is gold (26), in the 
second sentence, it is conversely the universal quantifier which have scope over the 
negative operator not (27): 
 
(27) ¬ (All that glitters is gold). 
(28) All vegetarians ¬ (eat meat). 
 
 To conclude, the scope of negation can be further marked by focus, generally 
defined as the part of the scope that is most prominently negated and indicated by 
the speaker through the assignment of a particularly marked stress on the word/the 
constituent at issue (underlined in the examples below). Although the relationship 
between focus and scope is in some cases quite intricate, the recognition of the 
focus helps in understanding the intuition that in a sentence like (29) it is in some 
sense only Mary that is negated, although negation scopes over the whole sentence. 
Similarly, in sentence (30) the negative marker -n’t scopes over the whole 
constituent intentionally delete the backup file, but it has clear focus on 
intentionally: 
 
(29) I didn’t get that book from Mary. 
(30) Liz didn’t intentionally delete the backup file.11 
 
As it has been observed, negation focus can absolve different communicative 
functions, the most frequent of which is rendering negative sentences more 
informative by indicating which of the sets of conditions that determines the truth 
                                                 
11
 Example (29) is taken from Partee (1993: 1), example (30) from Huddleston and Pullum 
(2002: 799). 
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of a sentence has necessarily to hold for that clause to be true. In sentence (29), for 
instance, the indication of Mary as the focus of negation allows the comprehender 
to understand that what is false is not the fact that the speaker received a book, but 
only the indication of the person from which she has received it: the condition 
which has to hold for the sentence to be true is, therefore, that the book was not 
given by Mary, not that the speaker didn’t received any book.12 Another 
communicative purpose of negation focus, identified by Rooth (1997: 294), is that 
of evoking alternatives without commitment to any alternative being true: 
 
(31) A: Is anyone going to the dinner with the 
 colloquium speaker? 
B: I don’t know. I’m not going. 
 
1.1.2 Contrariety, contradiction and uninformativeness of negation  
 
The consideration of the meaning of negation has a very long tradition, dating back 
– at least – to the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle formulated two 
laws governing negation from a strictly logical point of view, the Law of 
Contradiction and the Law of the Excluded Middle. The first law demands that two 
opposite propositions cannot be true simultaneously; the Law of the Excluded 
Middle requires that of any two opposite propositions, one is true: 
 
(32) Law of Contradiction: ¬ (p and ¬ p). 
(33) Law of the Excluded Middle: ¬ p ˅ p. 
 
The applicability of the two laws has traditionally constituted the basis for the 
distinction between contradictory negation and contrary negation, exemplified in 
(34) b and (35) b respectively: 
 
(34) a. John is older than 18. 
   b. John is not older than 18. 
(35) a. John is friendly. 
  b. John is not friendly. 
 
Contradictory negation obeys both laws: as expected from the Law of the Excluded 
Middle, in fact, it is not possible that John is contemporary older and younger than 
18; as asserted by the Law of Contradiction, at the same time, one of the two 
sentences in (34) has to be necessarily true. In the case of contrary negation, on the 
                                                 
12
 As this example clearly shows, in some cases the focus of negation simply overlaps the 
narrow scope domain of negation. Due to time and space limitations, however, we will not 
deal with this topic in all its complexity, limiting our consideration to the fact that negation 
is a focus-sensitive operator.  
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other hand, only the Law of the Excluded Middle holds, as the two sentences cannot 
be simultaneously true in the same situation. The Law of Contradiction, however, 
is contradicted by the fact that John could be neither friendly nor unfriendly, but 
something in the middle. Horn (1989) gives to similar cases the name of scalar 
predicates, indicating that they denote a scale from one extreme (e.g., friendly) to 
the other (e.g., unfriendly). When used in scalar contexts, therefore, negation seems 
to express either a ‘in between’ or a ‘less than’ meaning, as shown by sentence 
(36), which probably means that John has one or two children: 
 
(36) John does not have three children. 
 
 As it can be noted, in many cases negative statements declare what it is not 
without precisely expressing what it is. This fact has been formalized by the 
Principle of Negative Uninformativeness proposed by Leech (1981), according to 
which “negatives, all things been equal, are less informative than their positive 
counterpart”. Consider, for instance: 
 
(37) Bogotá isn’t the capital of Peru. 
(38) Bogotá is the capital of Colombia. 
 
Even though both sentences are true, (37) is far less informative than (38), as it 
does not provide any information about the actual capital of Peru, apart from 
excluding one of many possibilities, the city of Bogotá. The contrast between 
positive sentences’ informativeness and negative sentences’ uninformativeness is 
also very evident in negative sentences containing quantifiers:  
 
(39) Many people saw the movie.  
(40) Not many people saw the movie.  
 
Interestingly, while in (39) the quantifier many can receive specific reference, this 
is not possible for (40):  
 
(41) Many people (namely, John, Bill, Mary, etc.) saw 
 the movie. 
(42) Not many people (*namely….) saw the movie.13 
 
According to Leech (1981), the under informativeness of the negative sentences is 
due to the fact that “the population of negative facts in the world is far greater that 
of positive facts” and, therefore, “we must assume a context in which the negation 
of X is precisely as informative as it is required”.14 Worth noting, the only cases in 
which negative sentences give an equally informative meaning as their positive 
                                                 
13
 Examples (39)-(42) and relative considerations are taken from Lasnik (1975: 22-23). 
14
 The important role of the linguistic context for the interpretation of negative sentences 
will be the object of § 1.1.3. 
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counterparts are represented by the sentences containing contrary predicates (such 
as open/close, of/on, etc.), which cannot receive the scalar interpretation in the 
sense of Horn (1989), that is, situations in which the population of negative facts 
and that of positive facts can be considered equal, as exemplified in the sentences 
below: 
(43) The radio is on. 
(44) The radio is not off.  
 
If the radio is not off, in fact, there are not other possibilities that being on. Very 
differently, if one says that Bogotá is not the capital of Peru, she gives very little 
information for the identification of which of the many alternatives represents the 
true one. 
 
1.1.3 Notes on the pragmatic sensitivity of negative sentences 
 
As we have seen, Leech (1981) attributes negative sentences uninformativeness to 
the fact they need to be uttered in appropriate contexts. According to Horn (1989: 
198), such contexts are those in which the negation of X is motivated by previous 
assertions about X. Consider, for example, the two sentences we have presented 
below:  
(45) Bogotá isn’t the capital of Peru. 
(46) Not many people saw the movie.  
 
Though being not very informative in isolation, the two sentences become much 
more informative if uttered in an appropriate context, e.g., to correct a previous 
believe or assertion stating that Bogotá is the capital of Peru, for sentence (45), or 
that many people had saw the movie, for sentence (46). This observation stays at 
the basis of Horn (1978)’s definition of the markedness implicature for canonical 
negation, stating that “there should be reason to utter a sentence and, for a negative 
sentence, that reason (…) is generally the earlier consideration of its affirmative 
counterpart” (Horn 1978: 203).15 In other words, canonical negative sentences are 
not used for simply conveying a piece of information, as it is the case for positive 
sentences, but they are expected to be uttered with the purpose of expressing an 
additional communicative effect.  
 A very similar intuition has been captured by Wason (1965)’s notion of the 
context of plausible denial, according to which the plausibility of a negative 
sentence is indissolubly connected to (a) the presence of a prior expectation that 
has to be denied, and (b) the plausibility of the prior statement itself.
16
 To 
                                                 
15
 As explained by the same author, this implicature derives from Grice’s Maxim of 
Relation, according to which speaker utterances are asked to be relevant to what is at issue 
in the conversational context (Grice, 1975: 45-46). 
16
 Wason focuses more on the second of the two constrains, observing that the sense of 
appropriateness of a negative sentence is strongly dependent on the plausibility of its 
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exemplify, none would reasonably utter a sentence like “I did not eat all the cake” 
out of the bleu, without the presupposition that there was a cake which has been 
eaten by someone. As a consequence, negative sentences are not only marked from 
a structural point of view (by the presence, as we said, of an overt linguistic 
operator), but also interpretatively.
17
 It might be worth noting that the prior 
expectation can be either explicitly manifested (for instance, by making the 
question “Who did eat the cake?” or “Did everyone had the cake?”) or only 
implicitly present (by the simple presence of a cake partially devoured, or by the 
well known greediness of a certain person, which is once again suspected of having 
eaten a massive part of the cake). In both cases, however, contextual information 
provides felicitous discourse context for the utterance and the interpretation of a 
sentence like I did not eat the cake. On the contrary, the use of a negative sentence 
in absence of any contextual informational determinates an inevitable effect of 
strangeness and burdens the interpretation with the necessity of solving the 
pragmatic infelicity by ‘filling the gap’ of the missing presupposition.18 As 
Wason’s second constrains underlines, however, the plausibility of the positive 
counterpart which is implicitly presupposed by a negative sentence also represents 
a very important condition for the sense of appropriateness of the negative 
statement itself. The importance of this concept can be easily observed in the 
consideration of the two sentences below: 
 
(47) The whale is not a fish. 
(48) The whale is not a bird. 
 
While the appropriateness of sentence (47) is determined by the fact that it is 
perfectly plausible to wonder whether a whale is a fish or not, the oddness of (48) 
is provoked by the ‘nonsense’ of its affirmative counterpart or, in other words, by 
the fact that it does not have any sense to wonder whether the whale is a bird and 
thus, to negate this possibility. As we will see more in detail in § 2.1.2, the 
consideration of the pragmatic felicity of negative sentences has played a crucial 
role in first psycholinguistic studies on the processing of negation and still 
represents a very debated issue in experimental studies’ design on negation.  
  
                                                                                                                            
affirmative counterpart: while a sentence like The whale is not a fish do not determinates 
any effect of inappropriateness, as it seems perfectly plausible to wonder whether a whale 
is a fish, the oddness a sentence like The whale is not a bird it is indeed provoked by the 
fact that it does not have any sense to wonder whether the whale is a bird (or, in other 
words, by the ‘nonsense’ of its affirmative counterpart). 
17
 The use of negation in combination with scalar predicates seems to be an exception to 
this generalization. Saying that “John is not older than 18”, in fact, may not presuppose that 
John is older than 18; rather, in adequate circumstances, negation seems to be use to 
provide information for exclusion, meaning something like “I don’t know exactly how 
many years John has, but I can exclude that he is older than 18”. 
18
 A similar idea is found in Givón (1978), who argues that negative sentences require a 
particular pragmatic context within which been processed to encounter the presuppositions 
held by the listener. 
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1.2 Structural properties of sentential negation 
 
As we have said, the expression of negation is always associated with the presence 
of an overt linguistic element, whose nature largely varies across human languages. 
The possible forms sentential negation can present have been distinguished in three 
main groups: I) languages which have special verbs that deny a sentence (e.g., 
Evenki language, spoken in Siberia); II) languages which have negative verbs 
taking an entire clause as their complement (e.g., Tongan, spoken in Polynesia); III) 
languages which use participles or affixes (either prefixes, affixes or infixes. e.g., 
Romance and Germanic languages). Within this latter group, two further 
differences can be observed. First of all, in some languages sentential negation is 
expressed by a single negative marker (e.g., Italian non), while in some others it 
has a bipartite structure, either including a pre-verbal negative clitic and a free 
standing negative marker (e.g., French participles ne….pas ) or a combination of 
negative particles/affixes (e.g., Afrikaans). Secondly, while in some languages 
negation markers behave like free standing elements either occupying the preverbal 
(e.g., Italian) and the post-verbal position (e.g., Dutch), in some others it can 
optionally cliticize on the main verb or on the auxiliary (e.g., English).
19
 Whatever 
the way of expressing sentential negation, negative sentences are characterized by 
more syntactic structure than affirmatives since there is a part of the syntactic 
structure dedicated to negation. A first issue for any syntactic approach to negative 
sentences is, therefore, that of identifying the nature of this part of the sentence, the 
syntactic status of the elements from which it is composed and the position they 
occupy within the syntactic structure. A second important issue is represented by 
the fact that, in some cases, negative elements surface in a structural position 
different from the one where they are expected to be syntactically generated. A 
third issue, concerning the syntax-semantic interface level, is represented by the 
fact that, as we have seen in the consideration of the scopal domain of negation, in 
some sentences negation occupies a position different from that in which it is 
interpreted by the semantic component. In the next paragraphs, we will endeavor to 
offer a brief consideration of these three main issues within the tradition of the 
generative studies on negation.  
                                                 
19
 Worth noting, the way of expressing negation is not only cross-linguistically different, 
but it also varies diachronically within the same language. More specifically, as observed 
by Jespersen (1917), the evolution of the ways in which negation is expressed seem to 
follow a general tendency, known as Jespersen Cycle, according to which in all languages 
the expression of negation would be characterized by a first phase in which a single 
negative adverb is used, after which, as a consequence of the weakening of it, sentential 
negation would be concurrently associated to some other additional word. Further on, this 
latter would become the only way of expressing negation, until when it would undergone 
the same development of the original word it was originally intended to be used in 
combination with, that is, it would start to be felt, in turn, as too weak and, therefore, to be 
accompanied by another negative marker, which would then follow the same destiny. 
Although having found support from the analysis of the evolution of Latin, French, and 
English negative expressions, Jespersen’s proposal has never being compared to a larger 
sample of languages and is still taken, therefore, with some caution. 
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1.2.1 The syntactic status of negative markers 
 
Zanuttini (2001) and Merchant (2001) have elaborated a series of tests to determine 
the syntactic status of negative elements. Zanuttini (2001)’s work focus on the 
blocking effect of negative elements to provide evidence in favor of the head status 
of preverbal negative markers.  
 The first interesting observation made by Zanuttini (2001) concerns cliting-
climbing, the movement phenomenon as a consequence of which the pronominal 
object of an embedded infinitive appears attached to the main verb, as frequently 
happens in Romance languages (49). As French examples below clearly show, 
clitic-climbing is not possible in presence of a negative marker (50), requiring the 
clitic object to remain in its canonical position (51): 
 
(49) Jean la fait manger à Paul. 
  Jean - it - makes - eat - to - Paul. 
  ‘Jean makes Paul eat it’. 
(50) *Jean l’a fait ne pas manger à Paul. 
  Jean - it - has - made - neg - neg - eat – to - Paul. 
  ‘Jean has made Paul not eat it’ 
(51) Jean ne l’a pas fait manger à Paul. 
  Jean - neg - it - has - neg - made - eat - to - Paul. 
  ‘Jean has made Paul not eat it’.20 
 
Another cue in favor of the assignment of head status to preverbal negative 
markers is represented by the blocking effect negative elements exercise to long 
clitic-climbing, a phenomenon which is allowed, for example, in Italian, where the 
object can move from the complement position of an infinitive to the position in 
front of the finite verb (52). As shown in (53), however, such a movement is 
prevented by the presence of the negative marker non:  
 
(52) Gianni li vuole vedere. 
 Gianni - them - wants - to see. 
 ‘Gianni wants to see them’. 
(53) *Gianni li vuole non vedere. 
 Gianni - them - wants - neg - to see. 
 ‘Gianni does not want to see them.21 
 
A third syntactic movement which has been found to be sensitive to negative 
elements is verb movement, a phenomenon characteristic, for example, of Paduan 
dialect.
22
 In this Northern Italian variety, yes/no interrogatives require the C
0 
head 
to be overtly filled; as a consequence, therefore, the verb moves from V
0
 to C
0
, as 
                                                 
20
 Examples taken from Zanuttini (2001: 524), cited in Zeijlstra (2004: 153).  
21
 The observation of this phenomenon goes back to Rizzi (1982). 
22
 See Poletto (2000). 
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exemplified in (54). If, however, the verb has to cross over another head, verb 
movement is made illicit by the Head Movement Constrain.
23
 Precisely this latter 
case is found in negative interrogatives, where the negative marker intervenes as 
blocking element (55), allowing only the negative construction without verb 
movement (56): 
 
(54) Vien lo? 
    Comes - he? 
    ‘Is he coming?’ 
(55) *Vien lo no? 
   Come - he - neg? 
   ‘Isn’t he coming?’ 
(56) No vien lo? 
   Come - he - neg? 
   ‘Isn’t he coming?’ 
 
To conclude, the application of Merchant (2001)’s why not test provides final 
confirmation for the head status of preverbal negative markers.
24
 Given that the why 
not construction is considered to be a form a phrasal adjunction, it is expected not to 
be allowed in those languages in which negative markers are syntactic heads as it 
happens, in fact, e.g., in Italian (57) and in Greek (58): 
 
(57) *Perchè non? 
  ‘Why not?’ 
(58) *Giati dhen? 
  ‘Why not?’25 
 
The tests we have just considered have been successfully applied for the diagnosis 
of the head status of the negative markers which are syntactic words. According to 
Zanuttini (2001) and Zeijlstra (2004), nevertheless, the same syntactic status has to 
be assigned to all non-adverbial negative markers, including weak negative 
markers (that is, negative markers that need to be accompanied by another negative 
element)
26
 and negative affixes. Leaving a host of the details of their 
                                                 
23
 The Head Movement Constraint, firstly formulated by Travis (1984: 131), states that “an 
X
0
 may only move into the Y
0
 which properly governs it”. In other words, head movement 
is limited in distance by the prohibition of skipping another governing head position. 
24
 Rowlett (1998) presents two main possible contra-arguments to the assignment of the 
head status to preverbal negative markers; Zeijlstra (2004), however, provides convincing 
analysis in favor of the fact that this arguments are in real opposition with the treatment of 
negative elements as syntactic heads. The reader who is interested to a discussion of this 
latter issue is referred to the original works.  
25
 Notice that, as observed by Merchant (2001), in these languages the same meaning can 
be grammatically expressed by using the no word, as exemplified by the grammaticality of 
the Italian question ‘Perchè no?’ (= Why no?) and of its Greek correspondent ‘Giati oxi?’. 
26
 Most Slavic languages, for example, express negation by means of a negative marker 
attached to Vfin, in a very similar fashion to weak preverbal negative markers. The main 
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argumentations aside, we limit our consideration to the observation that, in fact, 
though the application of the head movement tests is made impossible by the fact 
that weak negative markers as affixes are attached to the finite verb (and therefore 
cannot block any head movement themselves), the application of the why not test 
support this conclusion. As shown by the Russian (59) and West Flemish (60) 
examples, in fact, the adjunction of weak negative marker or of a negative affix to 
XP is forbidden, giving evidence in favor of their head status: 
 
(59) *Pochemune? 
  Why-neg 
  ‘Why not?’ 
(60) *Waarom en? 
  Why-neg 
  ‘Why not?’ 
 
Zeijlstra (2004) makes use of the same head movement and why not test we have 
already considered in the assessment of the head status of non adverbial negative 
elements (be it strong, weak or affixal elements) to show that adverbial negative 
markers do not belong to the same syntactic category, but to that of maximal 
projections. A first support to this classification is provided by verb movement 
analysis in V2 languages, whose main clause structures are characterized by the 
fact that the verb has to occupy the second position in the clause. As exemplified 
by Swedish (61) and Dutch (60), adverbial negative markers do not exercise the 
verb movement blocking effect which would be expected in the case in which they 
were syntactic heads:  
 
(61) Jan köpte inte boken. 
 Jan - bought - neg - books. 
 ‘Jan didn’t buy books’.  
(62) Jan liep niet. 
 Jan - walked - neg. 
 ‘Jan didn’t walk’.27 
 
A further confirmation of the non-syntactic head status of adverbial negative words 
comes from the application of the why not test, which is allowed in all languages 
which have adverbial negative marker: 
  
                                                                                                                            
difference between weak and strong negative markers concerns the occurrence of clitics 
and other functional markers that are attached to the verb (as the so-called weak markers) 
and occupy a lower position in the clause than strong negative markers. We will not deep 
into this distinction, but we will assume Zanuttini (2001) and Zeijlstra (2004)’s 
classifications, referring the interested reader to these latter works for a more detailed 
analysis. 
27
 Examples taken from Zeijlstra (2004: 161). 
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(63) a. Why not?  (English)28 
  b. Warum nicht?  (German) 
  c. Waarom niet?  (Dutch) 
  d. Varför inte?  (Swedish) 
  
1.2.2 The syntactic position of negative markers and phrase 
 
As we said, in all world languages the expression of negation requires an overt 
negative element, whose presence determines the existence of more syntactic 
structure in negative sentences with respect to affirmative sentences. The piece of 
syntactic structure that is unique to negative clauses has been traditionally labeled 
Negation Phrase (NegP for short). The position it occupies within the clause, 
however, is far from receiving general consensus, and is currently object of a larger 
number of works, an ordinate review of which will lead us far from our main 
interests. We will thus limit our consideration to most generally accepted 
conclusions on both the position of negative markers and the position of NegP 
within the clause, without entering in too many details.  
 As observed by Haegeman (1995), a first aspect to be considered in relation 
whit the position negative elements occupy within the syntactic structure is that 
languages differ with respect to the place of origin of the negative marker: strong 
preverbal negative markers are base-generated in Neg
0
, whereas negative markers 
that require a second negative marker are generated in the lower position Vfin, as a 
V-adjoined clitic or as verbal inflection. The distinction between strong preverbal 
negative markers and weak preverbal negative markers/negative affixes we have 
outlined above, therefore, might be simply the result of the position in which they 
generated. Negative adverbs, differently, are generally assumed to originate in 
Spec,NegP, but this assumption is not uncontroversial: accordingly to Rowlett 
(1998), for example, the French negative adverb pas is base-generated in a vP 
adjunct position and then moved overtly to Spec,NegP. As underlined by Zeijlstra 
(2004), however, though it is seems plausible that negative adverbs are base-
generated in a vP adjunct position and only then moved to Spec,NegP position, this 
latter movement is a characteristic of all languages with adverbial negative 
markers.  
  The second important issue concerns NegP’s position within the clause. Three 
main hypotheses have been advanced in this respect. The first proposal, outlined by 
Ouhalla (2003), assumes that the position of NegP is the result of a single 
parameter, as a consequence of which NegP can either occupy the top of TP or the 
top of VP. The second hypothesis, put forward by Zanuttini (1998), is based on the 
                                                 
28
 Worth noting, the adverbial status of the English not does not hold for the weaker form of 
not, n’t. According to Haegeman (1995), while not is a specifier, n’t is a syntactic head. 
Though widening the class of preverbal negative markers – as n’t is strictly speaking not 
preverbal –, this classification is compatible with the distinction between XP negative 
markers (corresponding to adverbial negative markers) and X
0 
negative markers (including 
all the non-adverbial forms of negative markers). 
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idea that there are multiple NegP’s in the clausal domain which potentially could 
all host a negative marker. The third hypothesis, to conclude, has been developed 
by Zeijlstra (2004) on the ground of two main other works: (a) Nilsen (2003)’s 
suggestion that functional categories in the clause are not syntactically but 
semantically driven; (b) Ramchand (2004)’s observation that sentential negation 
introduces an operator which binds free variables, the nature of which varies across 
languages, but also intra-language.
29
 As a consequence, Zeijlstra (2004) suggests 
that the positions of NegP are derived from the semantic properties of the negative 
operator and, in particular, from the nature of the variables it binds: in those 
languages in which NegP dominates TP, the negative operator binds temporal 
variables; in languages in which NegP is below TP, the negative operator binds 
event variables. Though a deep consideration of the two hypothesis goes beyond 
the scope of the present study, it is worth noting that Zeijlstra (2004)’s assumption 
of the semantic derivation of the NegP position has the advantage of accounting for 
the variety of the negative markers positions without presupposing multiple 
syntactic positions for the NegP, as every NegP in the syntactic clause is assumed 
to be derived by exactly one semantic negation.
30
 
 
1.2.2.1 The concept of Negation Raising 
 
As we have said, the negative marker can occupy a position different from that 
where it is generated, as it happens, for example, in those languages in which the 
negative adverb is generated in a vP adjunct position and then moved overtly to 
Spec, NegP. Another case of overt movement of negation is represented by the 
case of negation raising (alternatively termed attraction of negative), indicating all 
the cases in which the negation in the matrix clause of a sentence it is interpreted as 
negating the complement clause. This peculiarity has been observed, in particular, 
in negative sentences including psychological verbs (such as believe, believe, want, 
seem, suppose, likely, ought to; but not know), exemplified in sentence (64), whose 
meaning is considered equivalent to that expressed by (65): 
 
(64) I don’t think he will come. 
(65) I think he will not come. 
 
This phenomenon has been object of a large number of works, providing both 
syntactic and pragmatic analysis, a detailed (though not extremely updated) 
consideration of which can be found in Horn (1989: 308-330).
                                                 
29
 Ramchand illustrates the case of Bengali language, which has two different negative 
markers, ni and na, the first one binding event variables, the second binding time variables. 
30
 Prior to introduce its own proposal, Zeijlstra (2004: 176-180) provides a quite detailed 
consideration of Ouhalla (2003)’s and Zanuttini (1998)’s suggestions as well. The reader 
which is interested is referred to this latter review, together with the original works. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2 THE PROCESSING OF NEGATION: EVIDENCE AND MODELS 
 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have tried to define the linguistic features of 
negative elements. Much more intricate is defining how the presence of a negative 
marker affects language processing and comprehension processes. In this second 
part of the chapter, we will extend our consideration to this very fascinating and 
debated issue. In doing that, we will firstly provide an overview of cross-linguistic 
studies on the processing of negative sentences (§ 2.1); secondly, we will offer an 
overview of the main psycholinguistic models proposed for negative sentences 
processing (§ 2.2).
31
 To conclude, in the final paragraphs of this section we will 
discuss the advantages of the use of the picture-sentence verification paradigm (§ 
2.3.3) and of EEG technique (§ 2.4.4) in the investigation of negative sentences 
processing to motivate their adoption for the present research on the processing of 
negation (see STUDY 1 and STUDY 2 in the second part of this dissertation). 
 
 
2.1 Psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies  
 
Among the many directions an overview of current evidence on negation 
processing may take, we choose to organize the studies according to three broad 
classes of evidence: 1) studies which report that interpretation of negative 
sentences requires extra time and extra effort (in comparison with that of 
affirmative sentences); 2) studies which show that the processing of negation is 
highly sensitive to prior (and late) contextual information; 3) studies demonstrating 
that negative elements act as accessibility-reducing operators on the terms within 
their scopes. 
 
2.1.1  Negation processing requires extra time and extra ‘effort’ 
 
Since the very first studies on negation processing, the interpretation of negative 
sentences has been largely reported to induce longer processing times and higher 
error rates in comparison with non-negated sentences, independently from the 
experimental task used. Early studies employed different kinds of sentence 
verification tasks to investigate the impact of negation on simple sentences 
interpretation. The results consistently showed that the execution of the task at 
                                                 
31
 As we said before, we will restrict our consideration to sentential negation, intended as 
the negation of a standard declarative verbal main clause. From this moment on, therefore, 
unless otherwise specified, we will use the expression ‘negative sentences’ to refer to this 
specific kind of sentence, thus excluding negative polarity items expressions, negative 
concord sentences and all the other non-standard negative structures.  
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issue was slowed down and more error prone for negative sentences in comparison 
with structurally similar affirmative sentences (Clark and Chase, 1972; Carpenter 
and Just, 1975; Trabasso et al., 1971, Carpenter et al., 1999). Wason (1961), in 
addition, showed that not sentence polarity, but also its truth-value determines 
important effects on response latencies. Participants were asked to judge the truth-
value of four kinds of world-knowledge related sentences: true affirmatives (e.g., 
24 is an even number), false affirmatives (e.g., 25 is an even number), true 
negatives (e.g., 27 is not an even number), and false negatives (e.g., 26 is not an 
even number). The results showed that while the evaluation of an affirmative 
sentence took longer when the sentence was false in comparison with when it was 
true, negative sentences verification followed the inverse pattern, with true 
negative sentences reporting slower response times than false negative sentences:  
 
(66) True Aff < False Aff < False Neg<True Neg.  
 
Though Wason (1961)’s work has been object of many methodological 
criticisms,
32
 subsequent studies have nevertheless confirmed both that negative 
sentences are processed significantly slower than affirmative sentences (Carpenter 
et al., 1999; Kaup et al., 2006; Kaup et al. 2007) and true negative sentences 
require more time to be interpreted than false negative sentences (Vender and 
Delfitto, 2010; Kaup et al. 2005; Dale and Duran, 2011).
33
  
 Longer reaction times for negatives in comparison with affirmative sentences 
have also been reported in studies employing other kinds of experimental tasks. 
Hasegawa et al. (2002) developed a target-to-probe matching study to test 
affirmative and negative sentences comprehension in a group of Japanese subjects 
speakers of both Japanese and English. The stimuli consisted in both English and 
Japanese target sentences of the form The worker read a magazine and showed 
some pictures to the brother (target), each of which followed by a mono-clausal 
probe sentence, affirmative or negative, of the type The worker read/does not read 
a magazine. The participants’ task was to judge the truth-value of the probe 
sentence. The results showed that subjects had longer response times with negative 
than with affirmative negative probes, independently from the language used. 
Christensen (2009)’s very similar designed study with a group of Danish speakers - 
tested with Swedish materials only – provided further evidence that the evaluation 
of negative probe sentences requires significantly more time than that of 
affirmative probes, regardless of whether the target sentence was affirmative or 
negative.
34
 Paradis and Willners (2006) presented their participants with 
                                                 
32
 Main criticisms of this study are discusses in Horn (1989: 172-176).  
33
 As we will discuss later, these counterintuitive data have been accounted for within the 
Two-Step Simulation hypothesis formulated by Kaup and colleagues (see, for example, 
Kaup et al., 2007). 
34
 Both Hasegawa et al. (2002) and Christensen (2009)’s studies also included 
neuroimaging recordings through fMRI. We will consider fMRI evidence in the next 
paragraphs.   
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affirmative and negative statements involving scalar adjectives (e.g., narrow, in a 
sentence like The road along the coast is/is not narrow) and, then, to mark the 
position of the target noun presented in the sentence (e.g., road) on an 11 point 
scale (e.g., with path and motorway as extreme terms). Also in this study, the time 
needed for executing the task, i.e. scaling the items, was longer when the target 
noun to be evaluated had been previously defined by a negated adjective (e.g., not 
narrow) than in the case in which it had been presented in association with a non-
negated adjective (e.g., narrow).  
  
2.1.1.1 Negation late integration 
 
Another important class of data is constituted by studies indicating that negation is 
not immediately incorporated during sentence interpretation, but only some 
thousands of milliseconds after sentence presentation. An extensive number of 
studies have shown, in fact, that initial processing of a negated sentence is not 
influenced by the presence of negation. Giora (2005)’s study, for example, reported 
that reading affirmative (e.g., This dress is pretty) or structurally similar negative 
(e.g., This dress is not pretty) sentences equally primed related concept (e.g., nice), 
independently from sentence polarity. This result thus suggests that – at very early 
stages of sentence interpretation – negative markers do not have any effect on the 
accessibility of lexical items under their scope. Giora (2005)’s findings have been 
confirmed and extended by Hasson and Glucksberg (2006)’s study focusing on the 
interpretation of affirmative and negative metaphors. In this latter study, 
participants had to read affirmative and negated metaphors such as This lawyer is/is 
not a shark and to make lexical decisions to terms related either to the meaning of 
the affirmative sentence (e.g., vicious), or to that of the negative sentence (e.g., 
gentle), or completely unrelated from both of them. Three different conditions were 
created with respect to the delay between the onset of the metaphorical sentence 
and the presentation of the target word, which thus differentiated the participant 
within three groups: participants who were presented the target word 150ms after 
sentence onset; participants who were presented the target words 500ms after 
sentence onset; and participant who were presented the target word 1000ms after 
sentence onset. The results of the participants who performed the lexical decision 
task in the very early stages of the interpretation of the metaphorical sentence (i.e., 
150ms/500ms conditions) replicated Giora (2005)’s observations, reporting no 
effect of negation. After both affirmative and negative sentences, in fact, lexical 
decisions were facilitated in case of affirmative-related terms in comparison with 
negative-related terms, suggesting that negative sentences are still processed ‘as’ 
affirmatives at this stage. The participants who were presented to the target word 
1000ms sentence onset, on the contrary, reported no facilitation for affirmative-
related terms when they followed negative metaphors, but only when they were 
presented after affirmative metaphors, indicating that negation has been meanwhile 
processed and interpreted.  
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 The different sensitivity to negation between early and later stages of sentence 
processing has been object also of a series of studies by Kaup and colleagues. Kaup 
et al. (2005) developed a sentence-picture verification task in which participants 
were presented with affirmative and negative sentences describing the spatial 
arrangement of two entities, e.g., The elephant is/is not above the giraffe and, 
subsequently, with a picture of two cards, standing one above the other and 
illustrating the two mentioned objects. Their task was to decide as quickly as 
possible whether both the objects illustrated had been mentioned in the sentence or 
not. Though the two depicted objects always corresponded to those mentioned in 
previous sentences (and thus the expected answer was always yes), the spatial 
arrangement of the two entities could not respond to participants expectations, 
contradicting the state of affairs described by the sentence, as in the case in which a 
picture of a card illustrating a elephant placed above a card depicting a giraffe was 
presented after the affirmative sentence The elephant is above the giraffe or after 
the negative sentence The elephant is not below the giraffe. Also in this study, the 
time of presentation of the second stimulus (i.e., the picture) was manipulated 
between subjects: half of the participants saw the picture with a delay of 750ms 
after the sentence; the other half with a delay of 1500ms. The results of the 
intermediate-delay group (750ms) were characterized by shorted response times for 
pictures matching the entities disposition described by sentence than for 
mismatching ones in the case of affirmative sentences, but by the inverse pattern in 
the case of negative sentences, after which pictures matching the actual spatial 
arrangement expressed by the sentence elicited longer response times than pictures 
corresponding to the negated state of affairs. Participants of the 1ong-delay group 
(1500ms), on the contrary, showed a main effect of picture-sentence match for both 
affirmative (as it was also in the intermediate-delay) and negative sentences, the 
processing of which at this stage appeared more facilitated by the presentation of a 
matching picture than by a picture corresponding to the negated state of affairs (as 
it happened in the intermediate-delay condition). Very similar evidence has been 
reported in Kaup et al. (2006)’s study investigating the interpretation of sentences 
with contradictory predicates. Participants read affirmative and negative sentences 
containing a contradictory predicate (e.g., The door was/was not open) and 
subsequently, after a delay of either 750ms or 1500ms, saw matching or 
mismatching pictures. All the pictures illustrated the entity mentioned in the 
corresponding sentence, but their properties could differ from that described in the 
sentence (e.g., an open door instead of a closed door). The results confirmed Kaup 
et al. (2005)’s findings: while in the 750ms condition response times for negative 
sentences were shorter in the cases in which the picture illustrated the negated state 
of affairs (e.g., a closed door following the sentence The door is not closed) than in 
those in which the actual state of affairs was depicted (e.g., an open door), in the 
1500ms condition response times for negative sentence were shorter when the 
picture matched the actual state of affairs. Very comparable results have been 
reported in Kaup et al. (2007)’s sentence-picture verification task. After having 
read a definite (e.g., The eagle is not in the sky) or an indefinite sentence (e.g., 
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There is no eagle in the sky), participants of this latter study were shown pictures of 
the entity mentioned in the sentence (e.g., an eagle), whose shape could either 
reflect the described state of affairs (e.g., a crouching eagle) or the negated state of 
affairs (e.g., an flying eagle). Participants’ task was then to judge whether the 
depicted entity had been mentioned in the sentence or not. Since the picture always 
depicted the entity mentioned in the previous sentence, experimental items always 
predicted yes response. As in Kaup et al. (2005), however, the two picture could 
differ from the sentence with respect to the shape and position of the entity. Again, 
shorter response times in the recognition task were reported in the cases in which 
the picture corresponded to the non-negated meaning of the target sentence than in 
the cases in which it matched the actual, negated meaning.
35
 As observed by the 
authors, the otherwise unexplainable facilitation effect produced by the matching 
between a negative sentence and the pictorial representation of its opposite, non-
negated meaning can be accounted for only by assuming that, at the initial stages of 
negative sentence interpretation, the comprehended has not yet integrated the 
meaning of negation and is still committed in mentally simulating the affirmative 
counterpart of the negative sentences under interpretation.  
 Leaving aside the theoretical implications of these latter assumptions (to which 
we will return in more details in § 2.1), it is sufficient for the present purpose to 
note that the findings reported so far clearly speak in favor of a late, non 
incremental integration of negation, which might be by itself sufficient for 
explaining the slowness of negative sentences interpretation in comparison with 
affirmative sentences.  
 Initial insensitivity to negation has been also confirmed by EEG-ERP studies, 
which reported no early differences in brain potentials characterizing first stages of 
affirmative and negative sentences interpretation (Fischler et al., 1983; Lüdtke et 
al., 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008). However, we postpone the presentation of these 
studies to § 2.3.3, which will be entirely dedicated to the use of the EEG technique 
in the investigation of negation processing. 
 
2.1.1.2 On-line measures of negative sentences interpretation processing cost 
 
Though the long-tradition association of longer response latencies and/or reaction 
times with negative sentences interpretation has been largely as an indication of the 
higher processing cost associated with negative sentences in comparison with non-
negated sentences, the recent use of on-line techniques has allowed more direct 
evidence. Dale and Duran (2011) employed an action-dynamic paradigm based on 
the assumption that mouse-tracking trajectories performed during the execution of 
a specific task represent an immediate reflection of the its cognitive cost. 
Participants were asked to silently read some affirmative and negative sentences, 
which could either be world-knowledge congruent (e.g., Elephants are 
large/Elephants are not small) or not (e.g., Elephants are small/Elephants are not 
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 No difference was reported between the definite and the indefinite conditions. 
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large), and to judge each sentence’s correctness by clicking the corresponding 
true/false circle on the screen. Computer mouse movements towards the chosen 
answer have then been analyzed in terms of number of deviations (technically, x-
flips) and acceleration/deceleration alternation in course, two parameters which 
have been found to strictly correlate with processing difficulty.
36
 As expected, the 
interpretation of negative sentences was characterized by more discreteness and 
acceleration/deceleration changes in the mouse course than was observed for 
affirmative sentences. Among negative sentences, moreover, true sentences were 
found to determine higher increase of x-flips and speed alternations than false 
sentences, confirming the polarity by truth-value interaction firstly outlined by 
Wason (1961, see pag. 30 above).  
 Neuroimaging studies have also provided important – though not 
uncontroversial – information on the cognitive processes associated with negative 
sentences interpretation. In particular, the use of fMRI technique
37
 has allowed 
identifying which brain areas are more significantly involved in affirmative and 
negative sentences interpretation. The first fMRI study on negation processing was 
developed by Carpenter et al. (1999) and based on a sentence-picture verification 
task: participants were presented with sentences of the type It is true/it is not true 
that the star is above the plus, followed by a picture illustrating a plus sign ‘+’ 
standing above or below an asterisk sign ‘*’, and were asked to judge sentence 
congruency against the picture. The behavioral results showed that, as said, 
subjects responded slower after negative sentences than after affirmative ones. 
Neuroimaging data, on the other hand, revealed increased activation in the left 
temporal and biparietal regions for negative sentences than for affirmative 
sentences, an effect which the authors take to reflect the higher linguistic and 
visuo-spatial processing associated with negation. In a posterior study, Hasegawa 
et al. (2002) investigated the interpretation of English and Japanese negative 
sentences by a group of Japanese subjects who were also moderately-fluent 
speakers of English. Participants were presented with bi-clausal target sentences of 
the type The worker read a magazine and showed some pictures to the brother 
(target), each of which was followed by an affirmative or negative mono-clausal 
probe sentence such as The worker read/does not read a magazine, and were asked 
to judge the truth-value of each probe with respect to the preceding target 
sentence.
38
 In line with previous studies, the analysis of behavioral data revealed 
                                                 
36
 For more information on this experimental method see Dale and Duran (2011: 984-985).  
37
 fMRI procedure (short for functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) employs magnetic 
resonance imaging technology to measure hemodynamic response of the brain to specific 
stimuli and cognitive activities. As increased neuronal activity of a specific brain area 
determines enhanced blow flow in the same area, fMRI allows to identify the different 
involvement of brain areas in specific cognitive processes (e.g., negative vs. affirmative 
sentences comprehension). fMRI studies specifically investigating sentence comprehension 
processes, in addition, reported that the amount of activation in a network of areas 
increased as a function of the structural and lexical complexity of the sentence (Just et al., 
1996; Keller et al., 2001).  
38
 We already mentioned this study in § 2.1.1. 
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higher difficulty for negatives in comparison with affirmative sentences, resulting 
in longer reaction times and higher error rates, independently from the language 
used. In contrast, fMRI data showed effects for negation only with subjects’ second 
language stimuli (i.e., English), the processing of which was characterized by 
enhanced left hemisphere activation. Worth noting, in addition, differently from 
Carpenter et al. (1999), Hasegawa and colleagues observed that increased 
activation for negative sentences was significant only in left hemisphere regions 
(and, in particular, in the posterior temporal cortex, in the supramarginal gyrus, and 
in the precentral cortex).  
 A very similar target-to-probe experimental task was adopted by Christensen 
(2009) with a group of monolingual Danish subjects. Participants were first asked 
to read a target sentence, which could either be affirmative (e.g., De sejeste mænd 
kender og bruger også sæbe, ‘The toughest men know and also use soap’) or 
negative (e.g., De sejeste mænd kender men bruger ikke sæbe, ‘The toughest men 
know but don’t soap’). The sentence was immediately followed by an arrow, 
appearing in the centre on the screen, which they were instructed to interpret as 
something like “from this it follows that...”. Afterwards, a probe sentence, which 
could be, in turn, either affirmative (e.g., De sejeste mænd kender sæbe, ‘The 
toughest men know soap’) or negative (e.g., De sejeste mænd kender ikke sæbe, 
‘The toughest men know not soap’) was presented. Participants’ task was to judge 
the correctness of the probe sentence. Again, behavioral data were characterized by 
significantly longer reaction times for negative probes in comparison with 
affirmative probes. Similarly to Hasegawa et al. (2002), imaging results showed 
increased activation for negative sentences in the left premotor cortex, even though 
Christensen (2009)’s subjects were tested exclusively in their native tongue. In 
addition, previously unreported enhanced activation in the right supramarginal 
gyrus for affirmatives sentences was observed. These apparently puzzling results 
have been explained by the author as a consequence of the distinct cognitive 
resources involved in the processing of the two types of sentences: while left 
premotor cortex greater activation during negative sentences interpretation would 
reflect the increased syntactic processing required by the presence of the negative 
phrase, right supramarginal gyrus activation detected during affirmative sentences 
processing would represent the response of the higher semantic processing derived 
from affirmative sentences’ upward entailing nature.39 Regardless the validity of 
this latter interpretation, it is easily notable that the fMRI data of the three studies 
presented so far are only partially convergent: Carpenter et al. (1999) report greater 
activation in the parietal region bilaterally and in left posterior temporal cortex for 
negative sentences and no effect for affirmatives; Hasegawa et al. (2002) found 
enhanced activation only in left hemisphere regions (posterior temporal cortex, the 
supramarginal gyrus, and the precentral cortex), and limited to subjects’ second 
language processing; Christensen (2009) observed a similar activation of the left 
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 We mentioned this aspect in note 5. The reader interested in further explanations of this 
data and on the relative hypothesis is referred to Christensen (2009)’s paper.  
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premotor cortex during the interpretation of subjects’ native language stimuli. As 
noted by Christensen (2009), however, most of these divergences are likely to be 
the consequence of differences in design and procedure, on the one hand, and of 
methodological limits of the three studies, on the other. Carpenter et al. (1999), for 
example, considered a very narrower region, leaving aside some of the areas 
observed in Hasegawa et al. (2002)’s and Christensen (2009)’s study. Carpenter et 
al. (1999) and Hasegawa et al. (2002)’s results, on the other side, might have been 
biased by the relatively low number of participants (8 and 10 subjects, 
respectively). Even if, therefore, no definitive conclusions can be drawn from 
current fMRI findings, it is worth noting that all the three studies mentioned 
associated negative sentences interpretation with enhanced brain areas activation 
and that, in at least two of them, left premotor cortex (B6) has been reported as 
most directly involved in the processing of negation (Hasegawa et al., 2002; 
Christensen, 2009). 
 Completely different results have been reported by Tettamanti et al. (2008), 
Tomasino, Weiss, and Fink (2010), Liuzza, Candidi, and Aglioti (2011), Aravena 
et al. (2012), and Foroni and Semin (2013), which conversely found activation 
decrease for negative sentences in comparison with affirmative sentences. For 
clarity convenience, we postpone the consideration of these studies to § 2.1.3.1, 
dedicated to the consideration of the evidence suggesting that negative elements 
are not responsible of an enhancement of brain areas activation, but rather of their 
inhibition.  
 
2.1.1.3 Negation processing is working memory dependent 
 
As observed by Deutsch et al. (2009), the fact that negation determines slower 
processing of verbal materials and higher error rates in language-related tasks 
suggests that its computation relies on relatively non-automatic processes. This 
observation has lead to the construction of an experimental study specifically 
designed to determine the involvement of working memory resources in negation 
processing. Although not strictly focusing on sentential negation, but rather on the 
computation of single words, Deutsch et al. (2009)’s study deserve some attention 
as it provides first evidence of working memory involvement in negation 
processing, an issue particularly relevant to the experimental study presented in the 
second part of this dissertation. More precisely, Deutsch et al. (2009) investigated 
the effects of the concurrent performance of a working memory task on the 
evaluative priming of negated and non-negated words. Participants were presented 
with negative and positive words (e.g., friends), some of which accompanied by 
negation (e.g., no friends). Each word was followed by a Chinese ideograph, which 
participants were asked to judge as above or below visually pleasant. While half of 
the participants were limited to the execution of this unique task, the other half was 
distracted by the concurrent memorization of 8 number digits. Interestingly, the 
results of the ‘non-distracted’ group showed that subjects’ responses were affected 
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by both words valence (positive vs. negative) and negation: negated positive 
primes, in fact, were judged less positively than non-negated positive primes, while 
negated negative primes received slightly more positive responses than non-
negated negative primes. The responses of the group who concurrently performed 
the digit memory task, on the contrary, reported no effect of negation, but a still 
significant effect of word valence. This latter evidence, therefore, indicates that the 
cognitive loads determined by the simultaneous performance of the working 
memory task specifically interfered only with the possibility of quickly interpreting 
negation, but not with the execution of the evaluative priming task per se, neither 
with those aspects which are not working memory dependent (e.g., word valence). 
The results of the ‘non-distracted’ group, on the other hand, showed that, if 
working memory resources are not otherwise taxed, negation can be processed very 
quickly and almost automatically, as it mostly happens in everyday language 
usage. 
 The observation that, under particularly demanding conditions, negation is not 
computed automatically but depends on ‘conscious’, effortful processing 
constitutes a central findings of Herbert and Kübler (2011)’s study as well. In this 
latter study, participants were presented with both semantically congruent (e.g. no 
summer-winter) and incongruent words-pairs (e.g., no summer-sun) and sentences 
(e.g., Dogs cannot fly vs. Dogs cannot bark), and were asked to mentally evaluated 
the truth-value of each statement on the basis of their factual knowledge. During 
the execution of the task, event-related potentials were recorded trough EEG.
40
 
Brain potentials analysis showed that the detection of the incongruence between 
the stimuli and subject’s factual knowledge associated with the raising of the P600 
brainwave, which have been connected with memory-based stimulus encoding and 
post-semantic reintegration processes. P600 amplitudes, in addition, were larger 
when the words were preceded by semantically congruent negated primes (e.g. no 
summer-sun) than when they were accompanied by semantically incongruent 
nouns (e.g., no summer-winter) and, correspondingly, in the cases in wich false 
sentences contained two related words (e.g., Dogs cannot bark) than in the case of 
true sentences constituted by unrelated words (e.g., Dogs cannot fly). This latter 
observation, therefore, shows that P600 was not determined by the simple 
automatic priming of the verbal materials, but rather by higher-order processing 
determined by the interpretation of negation, as demonstrated by its sensitivity to 
sentence truth-value.  
 Implicit evidence of memory resources involvement in negative sentence 
interpretation comes from Christensen (2009)’s fMRI study. As said, the study 
reports negative sentence interpretation to be characterized by a greater activation 
of by left premotor cortex than that of affirmative sentences, a data which may 
reflect the major syntactic processing required by the presence of negation. As 
observed by the author himself, however, left premotor cortex is not only 
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 We do not provide an introduction to the EEG technique at this point as we will devote § 
2.3.1 to this purpose. The reader in need of information about event-related potentials, 
therefore, is referred to dedicated section below. 
  
 
 
 
42 
 
responsible for the execution of structure-dependant non-motor mental tasks (such 
as syntactic processing), but it has also been found to be highly involved in high-
ruled governed working memory processes. In this latter view, therefore, left 
premotor enhanced activation during negative sentences processing would be 
clearly in line with Deutsch et al. (2009)’s and Herbert and Kübler (2011)’s 
observations.  
 
2.1.2 Negation processing context sensitivity 
 
While easily recognizable in experimental studies, the processing difficulty of 
negation appears much less evident in everyday communication, where negative 
sentences are used with almost the same frequency than affirmatives and seem to 
be processed with the same easiness. This asymmetry is determined, as we will see, 
by the different contexts in which the sentences are uttered. In natural language 
situations, in fact, independently from their truth-value, negative sentence are 
generally used – as we said – to correct an expectation (Wason, 1965; Givón, 
1978), or to deny an information already presented in the discourse context (Horn, 
1989). In most experimental studies, on the contrary, the use of negative sentences 
is not pragmatically justified and determines a sense of strangeness which burdens 
the ‘normal’ process of interpretation. Moving from this observation, numerous 
studies have shown that the processing cost associated with the negative sentences 
may be extremely reduced if they are uttered in a context of plausible denial.  
 Wason (1965) investigated a corollary hypothesis of the notion of plausible 
denial,
41
 the exceptionality hypothesis, according to which – if it is true that the 
plausibility of a negative sentence depend upon both the presence of a prior 
expectation and the plausibility of its positive counterpart – negation might be most 
naturally used to predicate about a dissimilar item set off against a class of similar 
items, rather than about one of the items similar to all the others. To test this 
hypothesis, he presented the participants with a picture of eight numbered circles, 
of which seven colored red and one colored blue (circle 7), and asked them to 
complete a series of fragments concerning the circles’ properties. The results 
showed that, although completing negative fragments (e.g., Circle 4 is not…) took 
generally longer than completing affirmative fragments (e.g., Circle 4 is...), the 
difference was significantly smaller when the negative sentences referred to the 
circle with the exceptional color (e.g., Circle 7 is not red) than when they referred 
to one of the seven other circles (e.g., Circle 4 was not blue). The results, therefore, 
reflected the predictions of Wason’s notion of plausible denial: while the seven vs. 
one proportion of red and blue circles, in fact, could give the participants the 
expectation of circle 7 to be red and make it plausible to use negation for correcting 
it, the context provided no expectation of circle 4 to blue, a correction of which 
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 As we said, the notion of context of plausible denial recognizes the plausibility of a 
negative sentence in (a) the presence of a prior expectation that has to be denied, and (b) the 
plausibility of the prior statement itself. 
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resulted, therefore, pragmatically inappropriate. Similarly, while the plausibility of 
the sentence Circle 7 is not red relied in the plausibility of its affirmative 
counterpart (i.e., Circle 7 is red), the implausibility of Circle 4 is not blue was an 
effect of the implausibility of its affirmative correspondence. Wason (1965)’s 
results have been confirmed by Villiers and Flusberg (1975)’study on the 
interpretation of negative sentences by children between 2 and 4 years. Children 
were presented with a stimulus set of seven cars and one bottle and were asked to 
judge the correctness of related sentences. As expected, participants needed more 
time and made more errors in the verification of the implausible negative sentence 
This is not a bottle in comparison with the more plausible This is not a car.  
 Many studies, on the other hand, focus on Wason’s first constrain, showing that 
the processing difficulty traditionally associated with negative sentence 
interpretation disappears when there are accompanied by an adequately informative 
context, instead of being presented in isolation. Glenberg and Robertson (1999) 
compared the time needed for reading affirmative and negative sentences following 
a supportive (e.g. sentences like The couch was/wasn’t black after a context 
discussing the choice of color for a new couch,) and a non supportive context 
(similar sentences preceded by context lacking relevant information). The results 
showed that, when sentences were accompanied by an adequately informative 
context, affirmative and negative versions took equally long to be read; when the 
same sentences were presented in a non-supportive context, on the contrary, 
negative sentences were read more slowly than affirmative sentences. Such 
findings, therefore, confirm the different pragmatic requirements of affirmative and 
negative sentences, showing that the absence of an adequately supportive context 
represents an impediment for negative sentence interpretation, but not for 
affirmative sentences interpretation. Glenberg and Robertson (1999)’s observation 
has been confirmed and extended in two experiments by Lüdtke and Kaup (2006). 
In the first experiment, participants were asked to read affirmative and negative 
sentences (e.g., The water was/was not warm) concerning a target entity (e.g., 
water) which had been previously introduced in a prior text that provided – in all 
cases – in an adequate context for sentence interpretation. Nevertheless, the text 
introducing the target entity could differ along two directions: first, the proposition 
that was affirmed or negated by the experimental sentence could be explicitly 
mentioned or not (e.g., She wondered whether the water would be warm vs. She 
wondered what the water would be like); second, the same characteristic could 
presented as the only possibility or as one of two alternatives (e.g., She wondered 
whether the water would be warm vs. She wondered whether the water would be 
warm or cold). The results of this first experiment replicated Glenberg and 
Robertson (1999)’s findings showing that the reading time of negative sentences 
benefits from the prior explicit mention of the negated proposition, independently 
of whether it was presented as the only possibility or as one of two possibilities, 
whereas the reading times of the affirmative sentences were not affected by context 
manipulations. In the second experiment, the experimental sentences were also 
introduced by a short narrative story aiming at constituting a felicitous pragmatic 
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context for the negative sentences interpretation, but the property concerning the 
target entity (e.g., a boy’s T-shirt dirtiness after he played outside in the backyard) 
was never explicitly mentioned, and could only be inferred – more or less strongly 
– by the text. Experimental sentences, then, represented a correction of this 
inference either by means of an affirmative statement (e.g. The T-shirt was clean) 
or by means of an explicit negation (e.g., The T-shirt was not dirty). Interestingly, 
the results of this second study showed that contexts strongly implying a prior 
expectation facilitate the interpretation of negative sentences correcting that 
expectation exactly as it happened in the cases in which the prior context explicitly 
mentioned the relevant property of the target entity (Exp.1). When the context did 
not strongly suggest the negated proposition, however, negative sentences required 
more processing time than their affirmative counterparts. As explained by the 
authors, therefore, the results of the two experiments further confirm that the 
presence of a prior expectation to be denied makes negative sentences 
pragmatically even more adequate than affirmative and, thus, very much easily 
interpretable. 
 Similar evidence of the facilitative effect of contextual information have been 
reported in two action-dynamic follow-up studies by Dale and Duran (2011), which 
compared the mouse-trajectories associated with the interpretation of affirmative 
and negative sentences presented out of the context (Experiment 1, see § 2.1.1) 
with those connected to the interpretation of sentences inserted in a context of 
plausible denial. In Experiment 2, the same sentences used in Experiment 1 (e.g., 
Elephants are/are not small) were tentatively made more plausible through the 
insertion of a preceding simple question (e.g., You want to lift an elephant? 
Elephants are not small). In Experiment 3, richer contextual information are 
provided, as both the question introducing the experimental sentence and the 
sentence itself were described as a statement of an adult correcting a child. In both 
experiments, participants were asked to judge whether they consider the final 
statements to be sensible or nonsense by clicking a circle corresponding to yes/no 
appearing on the screen. As in Experiment 1, mouse-trajectories were analyzed in 
terms of discreetness and acceleration/deceleration patterns and interpreted as 
measures of the processing difficulty. Unexpectedly, Experiment 2 reported higher 
discreetness in the mouse-trajectories for negatives than for affirmative sentences, 
indicating that the sentences were still perceived as pragmatically implausible. In 
Experiment 3, on the contrary, sentences’ pragmatic felicity determined by richer 
contextual information was reflected in a significant reduction of mouse-
trajectories’ discreetness and speed alternations.   
 Tian, Breheny, and Ferguson (2010) investigated negative sentences contextual 
sensitivity from a completely different perspective by comparing the interpretation 
of simple negative sentences (e.g., Jane didn’t cook the spaghetti) and cleft 
sentences with negative clauses (e.g., It was Jane who didn’t cook the spaghetti). 
The choice for this latter kind of sentences was motivated by the fact that, 
differently from simple sentences, cleft sentences are considered to be 
presupposition triggers. In this view, therefore, while the interpretation of simple 
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negative sentence in isolation is expected to be burdened by the need of resolving 
the sense of inappropriateness determined by the lack of contextual information, 
the use of negative cleft sentences interpretation in isolation should result in 
effortless comprehension processes. To illustrate, while a sentence like Mike didn’t 
hire his shirt presented out of an adequate context (e.g., a discourse yielding the 
presupposition that Mike should have hire his shirt) is inevitably perceived as 
inappropriate to some extent, a sentence like It was Mike who didn’t iron his shirt 
brings by itself the implicit presupposition that someone did not hire his/her shirt, 
resulting pragmatically more appropriate even when presented out of any 
supportive context. To test this hypothesis, the authors designed an experiment 
very similar to Kaup et al. (2007): 250ms after having read a sentence of the type 
Mike didn’t hire his shirt/It was Mike who didn’t iron his shirt, participants saw a 
picture either matching the actual meaning (e.g., a crumpled shirt) or the negated 
meaning of the sentence (e.g., an ironed shirt), and were asked to decide whether 
the depicted item (i.e., the shirt) had been mentioned in the sentence they read or 
not. Response times after simple negative sentence were longer when the picture 
matched the negated state of affairs than when it matched the actual state of affairs, 
indicating that the comprehenders have not yet integrated negation into the 
interpretation process. Response times with cleft sentences, on the contrary, were 
characterized by the inverse pattern, with shorter reaction times when the image 
matched the actual meaning of the sentence than when it mismatched it, indicating 
that the interpretation process was faster in this condition in comparison with 
simple negative statements. As expected by the authors, the pragmatic properties of 
cleft sentences had a significant facilitative effect on the interpretation of negative 
statements in isolation. 
  As we will discuss more extensively in § 2.1.3, to conclude, a large extent of 
studies have shown that contextual consideration have an important influence on 
the possible suppression or retention of the concepts under the scope of negation 
(see, for example, Giora et al., 2007). 
 Studies employing neuroimaging techniques and, in particular, EEG-ERP 
recording, however, have only partially confirmed previous behavioral findings. 
Fischler et al. (1983) analyzed the event-related potentials associated with the 
interpretation of affirmative and negative sentences predicating the membership of 
a concrete noun (e.g., bird) to a superordinary category name (e.g., bird/vehicle). 
Contrary to Fischler and colleagues’ predictions, N400 potential (generally 
associated to the detection of semantic anomalies and violations) resulted more 
sensitive to the relationship between the concrete noun and the category name, than 
to sentences’ effective meaning. To exemplify, N400 was larger for true negative 
sentences containing two incongruent nouns (e.g., The robin is a vehicle), than for 
false negative sentences predicating about two semantically proximal nouns (e.g., 
The robin is not a bird). In the subsequent literature on the pragmatics of negation, 
Fischler et al. (1983)’s data have been taken as a confirmation of Wason (1965)’s 
constrains on the context of plausible denial, according to which the plausibility of 
a negative statement is strictly connected to both its relevance to the prior linguistic 
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context and the plausibility of its affirmative counterpart. As explained by Staab et 
al. (2008), since sentences were presented in isolation, participants’ expectations 
were inevitably related with the semantic category of the concrete noun opening 
each sentence; as a consequence, statements which involved a category with no 
semantic relationship with the concrete noun mentioned were therefore perceived 
pragmatically more infelicitous than those predicating about a semantically related 
class of entities. Regardless of the appropriateness of this latter explanation, 
Fischler et al. (1983)’s results provided important confirmation that pragmatic 
aspects have strong effects on negative sentences interpretation, at the point of 
exercising – when not controlled – an even major influence than sentences’ truth-
value. As clearly demonstrated by Staab et al. (2008)’s and Nieuwland and 
Kuperberg (2008)’s subsequent studies, however, when negative sentences are 
presented in appropriate linguistic contexts, sentences truth-value has also an 
influence on N400 component. Staab et al. (2008) recorded even-related potentials 
during the verification of both affirmative and negative sentences (e.g., … so he 
bought/he didn’t bought the pretzels/the cookies), which had been previously 
introduced by a short story (e.g., During his long flight Joe needed a snack. The 
flight attendant could only offer him pretzels and cookies) and by a bias sentence 
which had the purpose of orienting participants’ expectations (e.g., Joe wanted 
something salty…/Joe wanted something sweet….). To simplify, a whole story 
ending by a true negative sentence would be constituted as follows (the target 
sentence is underlined): “During his long flight Joe needed a snack. The flight 
attendant could only offer him pretzels and cookie. Joe wanted something salt, so 
he didn’t bought cookies”. N400 analysis showed that false sentence endings 
elicited larger negativities than true ones, although the effect reached significance 
only for affirmative sentences. Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) compared event-
related potential elicited by the interpretation of pragmatically licensed and 
pragmatically unlicensed sentences. Pragmatically felicitous sentences were 
introduced by a single statement (e.g., With proper equipments...) relevant to the 
target affirmative or negative sentence, which could be either true (e.g., With 
proper equipments, scuba-diving isn't very dangerous/scuba-diving is very safe) or 
false (e.g., With proper equipments, scuba-diving isn't very safe/scuba diving is 
very dangerous). Pragmatically infelicitous sentences were introduced by the same 
statements used for the pragmatically felicitous sentences, although in these cases 
the introductive statement was almost irrelevant to the meaning of the following 
sentence (e.g., With proper equipments, bullet-proof vest are/aren’t very 
dangerous/safe). The results showed that, when sentences had been appropriately 
introduced, N400 activation was modulated by the truth-value of the final word of 
each sentence for both affirmative and negative sentences, with false words 
enhancing larger N400 than true words. When sentences were not presented in a 
pragmatically felicitous context, very differently, N400 increased activation was 
observed after false words in affirmative sentences, but also after true words in 
negative sentences (e.g., With proper equipments, bullet-proof vest aren’t very 
safe). Ferguson et al. (2008), nevertheless, reported evidence indicating that, in 
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sharp contrast with Staab et al. (2008) and Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), 
event-related potentials are not immediately affected by prior contextual 
information’s manipulation. Ferguson et al. (2008) investigated the interpretation 
of sentences introduced by a negated-world context (e.g., If cats were not 
carnivores they would be cheaper for owners to look after). Subsequent sentences 
could represent a congruous continuation (e.g., If cats were not carnivores, they 
would be cheaper for owners to look after. Families could feed their cats a bowl of 
carrots and listen to it purr happily) or an incongruent continuation of the negated-
world prior assumption (e.g., If cats were not carnivores, they would be cheaper 
for owners to look after. Families could feed their cat a bowl of fish and listen to it 
purr happily). The results showed that inconsistent continuations elicited a more 
negative-going N400 potential (typically revealing semantic and pragmatic 
anomalies) than context-consistent sentences. Despite the prior negated-world 
context, therefore, brain potentials were modulated on the basis of subjects’ real-
world knowledge, suggesting that the interpretation process was not immediately 
updated with the contrafactual context introduced by the if sentence. Given the 
complexity of the issue, however, we postpone a more detailed discussion of these 
conflicting ERP results to § 2.3.3, specifically dedicated to the consideration of the 
EEG in the investigation of negation processing. 
 Taken all together, the available evidence speaks in favor of important 
differences in the processing of negative sentences when presented in 
isolation/irrelevant context and in supportive contexts, mostly confirming Wason 
(1965)’s predictions on the plausibility of negative sentences. It remains unclear, 
however, whether the context provides a facilitation of the processing of linguistic 
structures which are, per se, difficult, or whether, on the contrary, presentation of 
negative sentences in isolation induces difficulty on an otherwise smooth linguistic 
operation. Ferguson et al. (2008) have provided interesting observations in this 
regard. Beyond the EGG study we considered above, the same authors performed a 
eye-tracking experiment to compare the processing of sentence either introduced 
by a real-world congruent utterance (e.g., If cats are hungry…) or by a statement 
contradicting general world-knowledge (e.g., If cats were not carnivores…). In 
both cases, the first sentence was followed by a sentence which could be either 
consistent or inconsistent with the given context yielding four possible situations: 
real-world consistent sentences (e.g., If cats are hungry, they usually pester their 
owners until they get fed. Families could feed their cat a bowl of fish and listen to 
it purr happily); real-world inconsistent sentences (e.g., If cats are hungry, they 
usually pester their owners until they get fed. Families could feed their cat a bowl 
of carrots and listen to it purr happily); negated-world consistent sentences (e.g., If 
cats were not carnivores, they would be cheaper for owners to look after. Families 
could feed their cat a bowl of carrots and listen to it purr happily); negated-world 
inconsistent sentences (e.g., If cats were not carnivores, they would be cheaper for 
owners to look after. Families could feed their cat a bowl of fish and listen to it 
purr happily). The analysis of eye-movements showed that sentences incongruent 
with real-world based contexts had longer reading times, more fixations and a 
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higher incidence of regressions to the critical noun (namely, the words which 
determined sentence congruency or incongruence with the previous context, i.e., 
carrots/fish) than real-world congruent sentences. Sentence introduced by a 
negated-world context, on the other hand, were characterized by a delayed 
integration of the critical word (i.e., carrots/fish), reflecting subject’s need to 
resolve the conflict between her factual knowledge and the prior-context 
information. According to the authors, precisely this need would induce the 
comprehender to override automatic language processing and to activate a 
reflective, memory-based component, resulting in delayed inconsistency detection. 
Very similarly, it could be argued that, when negative sentences are interpreted in 
isolation, the comprehender has to resort to non-automatic, working memory based 
processes to compensate for the lack of contextual information, taxing working 
memory resources of an extra effort beside that of processing negation (with an 
effect very similar to that induced by Deutsch and collegues trough the insertion of 
a secondary, concurrent task during sentence processing, § 2.1.1.3). The 
interpretation of negative sentences in isolation, therefore, would simply highlight 
the nature of negation processing, showing its non-full automaticity. 
 To conclude, therefore, while it seems fundamental that experimental studies 
provide sufficient contextual information to make the utterance of a negative 
sentences pragmatically not completely implausible, it seems equally important 
that the embedding context does not produce a stronger expectation for a negative 
sentence than for a positive one, thus having the effect of overriding eventual 
differences between the two types of sentences.
42
 
 
2.1.3 Negation effects on negated concepts accessibility  
 
A last issue which has been extensively investigated since very early studies on 
negative elements concerns the consideration of negation as an operator that shifts 
attention away from the information mentioned within its scope, reducing the 
accessibility of this information. First data in this direction have been reported in 
MacDonald and Just (1989)’s probe-recognition task, in which subjects were asked 
to decide whether a certain probe (e.g., cookies) was present in a previously read 
sentence or not (e.g., Almost every weekend Mary bakes some bread but no 
cookies). The results showed that subjects were significantly slower in recognizing 
the probes which had appeared under the scope of a negative element (e.g., 
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 From the methodological point of view, it must also be pointed out that, as Dale and 
Duran (2011)’s second experiment clearly shows, some attempts of creating adequate 
linguistic contexts for the utterance of negative sentences in experimental studies produce 
the contrary effect, rendering the use of some sentences even more absurd, e.g., Flying 
cars? - Cars have no wings! (Dale and Duran, 2011, Experiment 2). As the third 
experiment performed by the same authors suggests, therefore, it seems easier to give to the 
experiment  a completely ‘artificial’ setting (e.g., presenting the statements as pronounced 
by an adult to a child), rather than attempting to make natural the elicitation of true negative 
sentences based on world-knowledge in experimental settings. 
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cookies), in comparison with non negated probes (e.g., bread), a fact that which 
have been traditionally interpreted as an effect of the reduced lexical accessibility 
of negated terms.
43
 Subsequent studies, however, have better clarified this 
observation, showing that the inhibition power associated with negation is also 
strongly influenced by the situational context in which the negative sentences are 
presented. This latter aspect have been made particular evident by two studies by 
Kaup (1997; 2001), partially replicating MacDonald and Just (1989)’s conditions. 
More precisely, Kaup suggested that the different accessibility of negated and non-
negated terms may also be determined by the fact that, while the non-negated 
words (e.g., bread) corresponded to concepts which were present in the described 
situation, the negated words did not (e.g., cookies). To demonstrate this hypothesis, 
Kaup (1997; 2001) developed two target-to-probe recognition tasks involving both 
negative sentences referring to constructing actions (e.g., Every weekend Mary 
bakes some bread but no cookies baking) and negative sentences based on 
deconstructing actions (e.g., Peter burns the old bed but not the big cupboard). The 
choice of these verbs permitted a control of the effects of the probes’ presence in 
the described situation: while, in fact, the lexical properties of constructing verbs 
determined the presence in the situation of the non-negated objects of the predicate, 
but not that of the negated terms, deconstructing verbs allowed the presence in 
discourse of the negated terms (e.g., the big cupboard), but not that of non negated 
concepts (e.g., the old bed). The results confirmed the author’s expectations. In the 
cases of constructing verbs sentences, in which the presence/absence of negation 
was the only variable influencing words accessibility, negated probes were 
recognized slower than non-negated ones. When, however, the lexical properties of 
the verb also had an effect on the representation on the entities in the described 
situation, as it happened with deconstructing verbs, no differences in the 
accessibility of negated and non-negated term were observed, reflecting the fact 
that, in this latter condition, the two variables counter acted each other.
44
 
 Similarly, Giora and colleagues (2007) reported various evidence indicating that 
the suppressing effect of negation is inhibited when the retention of the negated 
meaning it is functional to global discourse considerations. The first experiment 
investigated the influence of late contextual information on the possible 
suppression/retention of previous negated information. The same metaphorical 
expression used in Hasson and Glucksberg (2006)’s study (e.g., The train was no 
rocket) were followed by wither congruent (e.g., The trip to the city was fast 
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 Correspondingly, studies investigating the interpretation of quantifiers reported that 
negative quantifiers determine a similar inhibitory effect (Sanford, Moxey, and Paterson, 
1996). 
44
 Kaup and Zwaan (2003) further examined the influence of the presence of the negated 
concepts in the described situation on the processing of negative sentences, reporting 
results mainly in line with the two previous studies mentioned above. As recognized by the 
authors themselves, however, important differences in the lexical properties of the verbs 
used and in the resulting inferences make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions from 
this study. The reader interested in more information is therefore referred to the original 
work.      
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though) and or incongruent continuation strings (e.g., The old man in the film spoke 
fast). The results showed that, when negative metaphors were followed by coherent 
strings, the negated concept (e.g. fast) was non suppressed, but it primed the next 
discourse segment even when the second fragment was presented with a delay of 
1,000ms. On the contrary, when the sentences were continued by an incongruent 
continuation, no facilitation of the related concepts (e.g., fast) was observed, 
suggesting that the irrelevant late context invited the suppression of the preceding 
negated concept (e.g. rocket). A second experiment performed by the same authors 
showed that, similarly, prior relevant contextual information (e.g., I live in the 
neighborhood of millionaires who like only their own kind. Nonetheless on 
Saturday night, I also invited to the party at my place a woman who is not wealthy) 
allowed retention of the negated concept (e.g., wealthy) even as long as 750ms 
following the sentence onset. The third experiment reported within the same study 
showed that negated information relevant to prior concept, however, loses 
accessibility between 750 and 1000ms after the sentence onset. These latter 
findings confirm previous studies’ results showing that, even when no contextual 
cues invite to the retention of the negated concept, accessibility-reduction is not 
immediately observable, but it occurs in later stages of sentence comprehension. 
Hasson and Glucksberg (2006), for example, demonstrated that, when subjects 
were asked to perform a lexical decision task either 150 or 500ms after the onset of 
a negative sentence (e.g., The train to Boston was no rocket), lexical decisions on 
incompatible concepts (e.g., fast) were easier than those on compatible concepts 
(e.g., slow), reflecting – as we already said – initial insensitivity to negation. When, 
however, the execution of the task was postponed at 1000ms after sentence onset, 
this facilitative effect disappeared, since negation had now prompted the inhibition 
of the term under it scope. When the task was performed with affirmative 
sentences, on the contrary, the facilitation effect associated with compatible 
concepts was maintained even in the 1000ms condition. Interestingly, in addition, 
Kaup et al. (2006), suggested that, in the case in which the alternative meaning it is 
clearly deducible from the negative sentence (as it happens, for example, in the 
case of contradictory predicates) the negated term is suppressed around 1500ms 
after the sentence onset in favor of the activation of the alternative meaning. This 
observation was made clear by the result of a study in which participants had to 
silently read affirmative and negative sentences in which a target entity and a 
contradictory predicate were being mentioned (e.g., The door was open/not open) 
and to name out as quick as possible the name of the entity appearing in the 
subsequent picture. The pictures, which could match or mismatch the entity’s 
properties, were presented at two different delays: 750ms or 1500ms after sentence 
onset. The result showed that, when the picture was presented after a delay of 
1500ms, participants had shorter response times when the picture matched the 
actual meaning of the sentence (e.g., a close door after having read the sentence 
The door was not open) then when it matched the negate term (e.g., an open door), 
reflecting the suppression of the negated meaning and the activation of actual one.  
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 Very similarly, Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) and, more recently, Orenes, 
Beltrán, and Santamaría (2014) showed that the availability of a complement term 
facilitates the rejection of a negated term. In Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004)’s 
study, participants were asked to judge whether a character’s description (e.g., 
Tom’s clothes are folded neatly in his closet) was either congruent or incongruent 
with a previous description (e.g., Tom is not a tidy person). The results indicated 
that participants were faster to judge a description congruent with the complement 
meaning of a previous bipolar description (e.g. Tom forgets where he left his car 
keys, compatible with the ‘messy’, after having read the sentence Tom is not a tidy 
person) rather than descriptions incongruent with it (e.g., Tom’s clothes are folded 
neatly in his closet), suggesting that they had suppressed the meaning of the 
negated term and activated its alternative antonym. The evaluation of sentences 
referring to unipolar descriptions (e.g., Rosy is not an adventurous person), on the 
contrary, was facilitated when the statement to be evaluated was related with the 
negated term of the previous sentence, although being incongruent with the 
meaning of the first description (e.g., the adventurous-congruent description Roy 
loves to travel to distant places), than when it was congruent with the actual 
meaning of the sentence (e.g., Roy is stressed by any change in his life). This 
difference has been interpreted as an indication that the suppressive effect of 
negation is strongly influenced by the nature of the term under the scope of 
negation: while the availability of a complement concept induces a focus shift from 
the negated concept to its alternative opposite (as shown by the facilitative 
evaluation of congruent descriptions), its unavailability invites to retention of the 
meaning negated. Orenes, Beltrán, and Santamaría (2014)’s visual word paradigm 
study reported very similar results. In this latter study, participants were firstly 
presented with a verbal description of a binary (e.g., The figure could be red or 
green) or multary context (e.g., The figure could be red, or green, or blue, or 
yellow). After which, they listened an affirmative or negative target sentence (e.g., 
The figure was/was not red) while four figures of different colors were presented 
on the screen. Eye movements were recorded to control for subjects’ attention 
shifts. The analysis of the data showed an increased fixation on the mentioned 
color for affirmatives in both binary and multary contexts. Differently, negative 
sentences presented different pattern of eye movements in the two conditions: 
negative sentences following multary descriptions were characterized by an 
increased fixation on the mentioned colored around 400ms after the end of the 
sentence, similar to that observed with affirmative sentences; negative sentences 
introduced by multary contexts, on the contrary, reported increased fixation on the 
alternative color that varied with respect to the baseline around 1340ms after the 
end of the sentence. This difference, therefore, confirms that suppression of the 
negated term is not the default strategy for negative sentence interpretation, but that 
it is the preferred option if a complementary term is available. The significant 
difference in the time course of fixations in the two conditions, in addition, 
suggests that the suppression of a complementary negated term and the attention 
shift toward its alternative represent a demanding, time consuming operation. 
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 To conclude, Giora et al. (2005) and Paradis and Willners (2006) showed that, 
in many circumstances – even in presence of bipolar terms – negation does not 
determine a suppression of the concept under its scope, but rather its mitigation. 
Evidence in this direction comes by two very comparable studies in which subjects 
were asked to mark the position of a target noun (e.g., road) on a scale ranging 
from two extreme points (e.g., narrow-wide).
45
 All the target terms had been 
previously introduced within a sentence in which they could either being definite 
by a negated scalar adjective (e.g., The road along the coast is not wide) or by a 
non-negated one (e.g., The road along the coast is narrow). Interestingly, targets 
which were presented in negative statements were mostly marked with non-
extreme positions on the scale, suggesting that an expression as ‘not wide’ was 
interpreted as more close to ‘less than wide’ than to ‘narrow’ (as it would be if 
negation had completely suppressed the meaning of wide). Conversely, affirmative 
items were most frequently assigned to scalar end positions.
46
 
 
2.1.3.1 Negation inhibition of neuronal activation  
 
Recent research investigating brain areas involvement in language processing has 
provided important neurological confirmation of the inhibitory effect of negation. 
In particular, a growing number of studies have shown that negative elements 
determine a reduction of the activation of the brain areas associated with the 
simulation of the linguistic concepts under the scope of negation. As we 
mentioned, first evidence in this direction have been reported by Tettamanti et al. 
(2008). This fMRI study was designed in continuity with Tettamanti and Buccino 
(2005), which compared cerebral activations determined by the action-related 
sentences (e.g., Ora io mordo la mela, ‘Now I bite the apple’) with that associated 
to abstract sentences interpretation (e.g., Ora io apprezzo la fedeltà, ‘Now I 
appreciate the loyalty’). The results of this latter study show that the different 
properties of the words within the sentences are also reflected in different neuronal 
activations: although all stimuli enhanced left premotor cortex activity, the 
processing of action-related words additionally involved the entire left fronto-
parieto-temporal system, including the inferior parietal lobule and the posterior 
temporal cortex. The interpretation of sentences containing abstract content words, 
                                                 
45
 The examples are taken from Paradis and Willners (2006)’s study, which we mentioned 
also in § 2.1.1. Analogous materials have been used by Giora et al. (2005). 
46
 Another piece of evidence which, according to Giora et al. (2005), speaks against the 
consideration of suppression as the default effect of negation is represented by the fact that, 
when asked to judge the global acceptability of a sentence, subjects are sensitive also to the 
meaning of the negated terms contained in it. To illustrate, the results of the study showed 
that participants consider sentence containing two items categorizable in the same set  (e.g., 
What I bought yesterday was not a bottle but a jug) significantly more acceptable than 
sentences constituted by items from different sets (e.g., What I bought yesterday was not a 
bottle but a closet). As observed by the authors, if – on the contrary – the meaning of the 
negated term had been suppressed altogether, no effects of it should have been found in the 
evaluation task. 
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on the other hand, associated with the activation of the posterior cingulate cortex. 
On the basis of this findings, Tettamanti et al. (2008) presented their participants 
with both the affirmative and the negative versions of the action-related and 
abstract sentences employed by Tettamanti and Buccino (2005). The results of this 
second study show that negative sentences determine a reduction of brain activity 
in comparison with their affirmative counterparts. In particular, the processing of 
both action-related and abstract related negative sentences was characterized by a 
reduced activation of the pallido-cortical areas. In addition, the two types of 
sentences tested determines the deactivation of the representation systems 
correspondent to the semantic properties (concrete vs. abstract) of the concept 
expressed: while action-related negative sentences associated with a reduction of 
the hemodynamic response in the left fronto-parietal regions, abstract related 
sentences were accompanied by a hemodynamic deactivation of posterior 
cingulated cortex.  
 Subsequent studies further investigated the effect of negation on motor circuitry 
activity associated with action-related verbs and, in particular, with verbs referring 
to hand activities. Tomasino, Weiss, and Fink (2010) analyzed the different brain 
activation elicited by the interpretation of affirmative and negative imperative 
sentences, either composed by hand action-related verbs (e.g., Do write/Don’t 
write) or by meaningless pseudo-verbs (e.g., Do gralp/Don’t gralp; control 
condition). After having silently read each imperative statement, participants were 
asked to judge whether they consider the verb to make sense or not. Beside 
neuronal activation related to the execution of the lexical decision task (the 
consideration of which goes far beyond the interest of the present discussion), 
Tomasino et al. (2010) reported significant activation of motor areas during the 
processing of affirmative action-related imperatives, and decreased primary motor 
and premotor cortex activation for negative action-related negative imperatives, 
suggesting that linguistic negation exercises – as we said – an inhibitory effect on 
brain activations. Behavioral results of action-related verbs were similarly 
modulated by sentence polarity, with negative imperatives reporting longer 
response times to the lexical decision task than affirmative imperatives, a data that 
the author interpret as a consequence of the reduced lexical accessibility of the 
negated terms. Neuronal activity associated with non-existing verbs, on the 
contrary, was not influenced by sentence polarity. Importantly, even though in 
some cases pseudo-verbs also determined an activation of motor areas, neither this 
association was systematic, nor negated version of the same pseudo-verbs 
determined the inhibition of those areas. 
 Similarly to Tettamanti et al. (2008), two subsequent studies by Liuzza, 
Candidi, and Aglioti (2011) and Alemanno et al. (2012) further investigated motor 
areas activation during affirmative and negative hand action-related sentences in 
comparison with affirmative and negative abstract sentences. Liuzza and 
colleagues made use of the TMS technique (and, in particular, to the recording of 
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motor-evoked potentials from a specific hand muscle)
47
 to measure motor system 
excitability during sentence interpretation. The analysis of the results confirmed 
that while reading affirmative action-related sentences (e.g., Io spremo il limone, ‘I 
squeeze the lemon’) induces the activation of sensorimotor neuronal systems, 
affirmative abstract sentences (e.g., Io ricordo il passato, ‘I remember the past’) do 
not produce the same affect. Most relevant to our purpose, in addition, 
sensorimotor modulation were not observable when action-related verbs were 
accompanied by negation (e.g., Non spremo il limone, ‘I don’t squeeze the lemon’), 
providing further confirmation of the inhibitory effect of negation. Alemanno et al. 
(2012) employed EEG to record mu ERD associated to silent reading of four 
different types of sentences: affirmative hand-action related sentences (e.g., Io 
scrivo, ‘I write’), negative hand action-related sentences (e.g., Non scrivo, ‘I don’t 
write’), affirmative abstract sentences (e.g., Io penso, ‘I think’), and negative 
abstract sentences (e.g., Non penso, ‘I don’t think). After having read each 
sentence, the subjects were asked to decide whether the verb they had just read has 
high or low frequency in Italian. Mu ERDs are patterns of electrophysiological 
waves reflecting the motor cortex activity which occurs during movement 
execution or visualization of performing a motor action. More precisely, motor 
cortex areas activity can be measured in terms of mu waves suppression or 
desynchronization, as a consequence of the large numbers of neurons forming EEG 
waves and firing in synchrony.
48
 In line with previous finding on motor areas 
involvement in action-related concepts processing, Alemanno et al. (2012) reported 
significant mu rhythm desynchronization over the left motor and pre-motor areas 
(usually involved in uni and bi-manual programming and execution) during the 
reading of affirmative hand-action sentences, compared with abstract sentence 
reading. Negative hand-action sentences, in addition, were characterized by 
delayed mu ERD and by mu waves of larger amplitudes, reflecting the minor 
involvement of cortex areas determined by sentence negative polarity.  
 Aravena et al. (2012) and Foroni and Semin (2013) provided even more direct 
measures of negative sentences motor deactivation thanks to experimental tools 
able to record the activity of very specific muscles. Aravena et al. (2012) analyzed 
the force with which participants hold a grip-force sensor while listening 
affirmative sentences containing hand actions (affirmative condition; e.g., At the 
Gym, Fiona lift the dumbbells), negative sentences with hand actions (negative 
condition; e.g., In the plane, Laura doesn’t lift her luggage), and affirmative 
sentence composed by abstract verbs plus concrete nouns (control condition, e.g., 
In the spring, Edmond loves the flower bush in the garden). As explained by the 
authors, enhanced motor activity was expected to produce an immediate increase in 
                                                 
47
 TMS (short for Transcranial Magnetic Simulation) is a non-invasive method which 
allows the activation of specific areas of the brain through the alteration of their 
electromagnetic field. More precisely, short magnet pulses are administered through an 
electromagnetic coil held against the forehead and cause small electrical currents which 
stimulate the nerve cells in the specific or general parts of interest in the brain. 
48
 For more information and references on mu-waves see Alemanno et al. (2012: 42). 
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grip-force. The results confirmed this expectation showing that action-related 
sentences enhanced a significant increase of the grip-force in the affirmative 
condition, but not in the negative condition. Interestingly, in addition, control 
condition sentences did not produce any modulation in grip-force modulation, 
confirming previous studies’ observation that the processing of abstract verbs does 
not result in enhanced motor areas activation. Furthermore, the fact that abstract 
verbs were immediately followed by a concrete noun also demonstrated that motor 
areas activation is neither simply associated with concrete words, but only with 
words specifically expressing some kind of motor activity. Parallel, Foroni and 
Semin (2013) investigated the effect of negation on the interpretation of emotional 
expression either directly referring to zygomatic activity (e.g., I’m smiling vs. I’m 
not smiling) or not (e.g., I’m frowning vs. I’m not frowning). During sentence 
interpretation, zygomatic muscle activity was continuously measured on the left 
side of the face through Electromyography technique (EMG).
49
 Again, while 
reading affirmative versions of zygomatic expressions lead to the activation of the 
zygomatic muscle, the negative versions of the same expressions determined 
inhibition of the same muscle already 500-700ms after stimulus onset.  
 To conclude, Bartoli et al. (2013) hypothesized that, if it is true that processing 
of linguistic expressions describing motor activity depends upon the same neuronal 
circuits employed for its actual execution, the concurrent interpretation of a 
sentence describing a specific activity and execution of that action should be 
facilitated with negated sentences rather than with affirmative ones. In the first 
case, in fact, the inhibitory effect of negation should free the neuronal recourses 
responsible of the concerned activity from the computational load derived from the 
processing of the relevant concept, thus facilitating the execution of the concurrent 
task. In the second case, on the contrary, the simultaneous dependency of the two 
tasks on the same cognitive resources should overload the correspondent neuronal 
circuits, resulting in a more effortful execution of the motor activity. To verify this 
hypothesis, two connected experiments were performed. In the first experiments, 
participants were presented with affirmative and negative abstract verbs (e.g., Io 
auspico/Io non auspico, ‘I wish/I don’t wish), affirmative and negative proximal 
activity sentences (involving shoulder and arm muscles; e.g., Io afferro/Io non 
afferro, ‘I grasp/I don’t grasp), and affirmative and negative distal activity 
sentences (involving hand and finger muscles; e.g., Io pizzico/Io non pizzico, ‘I 
pinch/I don’t pinch’). While listening to the sentences, in addition, they were asked 
to perform proximal reach-to-grasp movement with their thumb and index fingers 
toward a sphere, in response to a visual go-signal presented either immediately or 
500ms after the end of the sentence. In the second experiment, participants were 
presented with the same set of stimuli, but were asked to performed a grasp distal 
movement (grasping without reaching) with their thumb and index fingers towards 
                                                 
49
  Electromyography is used to record the electrical potential generated by muscle cells 
when they are electrically or neurologically activated. For this reason, it is an extremely 
useful technique for the identification of the activation level of voluntary controlled 
muscles. 
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one of two possible target objects (a coffee cup or a screw). The result of the first 
experiment showed that, as expected, the interpretation of negative proximal 
sentences had reduced interference on the execution of the reach-to-grasp proximal 
movement, resulting in faster reaction times and delayed grip aperture for negative 
versus affirmative proximal sentences, compared to both negative and affirmative 
abstract and distal sentences. Correspondently, the results of the second experiment 
(requiring the execution of a distal grasp movement) reflected interference 
reduction only for negative distal sentences, but not for the sentences of other 
conditions. Beyond confirming the authors’ hypothesis, therefore, overall results 
show that the effect of negation is concept-specific, as demonstrated by the fact 
that its presence determines facilitation only for the execution of tasks closely 
related to the semantics of the negated concept.  
 
 
2.2 Models and theories on the processing of negation 
 
As is inevitable, the emergence of conflicting evidence on the interpretation of 
negation has lead researchers to the formulation of different and, in some cases, 
contrasting hypotheses on the processing of negation. Besides relying on different 
models of language processing and focusing on partially diverse aspects, current 
theories can be divided into two main groups accordingly to two considerations: (a) 
the moment of integration of negation into the sentence’s interpretative process, 
and (b) the processing cost attributed to the interpretation of negative sentences. 
On the one side, in fact, non-incremental models assume that, differently from 
most of the other elements of the sentence, the interpretation of negation occurs 
only after the consideration of the negated meaning of the sentences and that, 
consequently, it requires extra time and extra processing resources in comparison 
with the interpretation of structurally similar, non-negative sentences. On the other 
side, incremental models suggest that the semantic contribution of negation is 
immediately incorporated into the interpretative process, exactly as it happens for 
non-negative words, and that, therefore, no second stage of sentence interpretation, 
and no extra time or extra effort is required for the processing of negative 
sentences.  
 Though many other – and possibly more subtle – distinctions could be drawn in 
parallel to this very general subdivision, we will rely on this classification as it 
reflects, as it will become clearer in the second part of this dissertation, a quite 
relevant issue with respect to the goals of the present study (and, in particular, to 
STUDY 1, see Chapter 3, Part 2). 
 
2.2.1 Non-incremental models  
 
As briefly mentioned, non-incremental models are characterized by the assumption 
that the meaning of sentential negation is not integrated right away into the 
  
 
 
 
57 
 
 
interpretative process. More precisely, they all share the idea that the interpretation 
of negative sentences pass through the consideration of its affirmative counterpart. 
Beyond this common feature, non-incremental models differ with regard to two 
main aspects (a) the theory of language comprehension assumed; (b) the way in 
which negation is being applied to the ‘affirmative’ representation of the situation 
described or, in other words, the way in which the negative meaning is ‘captured’.  
 
2.2.1.1 Propositional theories: Negation as a ‘tag’ on the proposition 
 
Propositional theories (Kintsch & Dijk, 1978; Kintsch, 1988; McKoon & Ratcliff, 
1992; Trabasso et al., 1971) represent the first model which has suggested that a 
negative sentence is encoded as an affirmative core. According to these account, 
the interpretation of linguistic material is based on the creation of a ‘propositional’ 
representation, that is, the representation of every informational unit large enough 
to carry a truth-value. Each proposition is defined as being composed by a relation 
and one or more arguments between which that relation holds. To exemplify, in 
propositional terms a sentence like Sam wears a hat would receive the 
interpretation: there is a person named Sam, there is a hat, and a particular relation 
holding between them (namely, that of ‘wearing’), as illustrated below.50 
 
 
FIGURE 1. The propositional representation of an affirmative sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Negation is considered as an overt linguistic operator taking a whole proposition as 
its argument. The presence of negation, therefore, is conceived to determine the 
construction of a higher level of propositional representation in which the 
proposition to be negated represents the argument, and the negative meaning 
represents the relation, as exemplified by the propositional representation of the 
sentence Sam doesn’t wear a hat (FIGURE 2). 
  
                                                 
50
 Examples and relative representations are taken from Kaup (2006: 315,317). 
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FIGURE 2. The propositional representation of a negative sentence. 
 
 
 
As a consequence, the interpretation of a negative sentence is considered to be 
necessarily more demanding than the interpretation of the corresponding sentence 
without negation, since the former is characterized by a more complex 
propositional representation than the latter.
51
  
 Within this theoretical framework and on the basis of experimental data 
reporting reduced accessibility of the negated concepts,
52
 MacDonald & Just 
(1989) have formulated the so-called search-for-alternatives account. According to 
this latter proposal, the encapsulation of the concept under the scope of negation 
into a higher propositional level (expressing negation) would induce the 
comprehender to shift focus away from the negated concept towards an alternative 
replacement. As a consequence, after an initial processing insensitivity to the 
negative markers, the concept within the scope of negation would become very less 
accessible, as confirmed by the results of many studies on the issue (e.g. Giora, 
Balan, Fein, & Alkabets, 2005; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, 
Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2006; MacDonald & Just, 1989). More recently, the 
same hypothesis has been advanced by Ferguson, Sanford, and Leuthold (2008). 
Importantly, however, experimental evidence suggesting that the accessibility 
suppression of the negated term is not automatic, but highly depending on the 
discourse situation in which the negative sentence is uttered have also been 
reported (see, for example, Giora, Fein, Aschkenazi, & Alkabets-Zlozover, 2007). 
                                                 
51
 A similar explanation of the processing difficulty associated with negative sentences 
interpretation has been suggested by the proponents of the syntactic account who, however, 
do not attribute the major complexity of negative sentences to their interpretational 
structure, but rather to their structural properties. Most precisely, as explained by Horn 
(1989), early syntactic account’s proponents assumed that negatives, such as other non-
standard kinds of sentences (e.g., passives, interrogatives), might be characterized by 
relative transformational complexity, resulting in additional processing time. More recently, 
Christensen (2009) also empathized the structural difference between negative and 
affirmative sentences as the possible cause of the increased activation of left premotor 
cortex during negative sentence vs. affirmative sentence processing.  
52
 See § 2.1.3 for a short description of MacDonald and Just (1989)’s study. 
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We will return to this point in § 2.2.2.2, dedicated to the discussion of suppressive 
and suppressive-like accounts of negation processing.  
 
2.2.1.2 Early representational models: Negation as an operator applying to 
mental representations 
 
The idea that negative sentence comprehension is characterized by the application 
of a negative ‘operator’ to the representation of the situation negated has been re-
proposed by early representational models of language comprehension, such as the 
so-called situational-mental models (Dijk & Kintsch,1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1990, and Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), and Kamp 
(1981)’s discourse-representation theory (DRT). Differently from propositional 
theories, representational approaches are characterized by the assumption that the 
comprehension process is grounded on the construction of mental, rather than 
propositional representations. As underlined by Kaup (2006), the difference is not 
simply terminological, but it is crucially connected to the nature of the linguistic 
representations assumed: while propositional representations were intended as a 
description of the state of affairs in a mental language, referential representations 
are conceived to be the representation of the state of affairs itself. More precisely, 
according to situational-mental models, the sentences to be interpreted are 
converted in a referential level composed by mental tokens (representing the 
relevant referents), and propositions (assigning properties and relations to these 
tokens). Very similar assumptions are made by DRT theory. To exemplify, under 
representational and DRT models the affirmative sentence Sam wears a hat 
receives a referential representation including two tokens, x and y, with x specified 
to be named Sam and y to be a hat. The fact that the hat is worn by Sam, in 
addition, is represented as a relation between the two tokes, as illustrated below. 
 
FIGURE 3. The DRT representation of an affirmative sentence. 
 
  
 
Similarly to propositional theories, early representational models consider negation 
as a linguistic operator which is applied to a subordinate representation), as 
illustrated in FIGURE 4, corresponding to the representation of the sentence Sam 
does not wear a hat. 
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FIGURE 4. The DRT representation of a negative sentence. 
 
 
 
 
As in propositional theories, therefore, the comprehension of a negative sentence is 
predicted to be more difficult than that of affirmative sentences as a consequence 
of the more complex representation involved. In contrast with propositional 
representations, nevertheless, negation does not apply both to the two tokens and to 
the relation between them (that is, the whole situation described, as it happened in 
propositional theories, but only to the relation of wearing and to the token 
corresponding to the referent hat. As a consequence, the two models make different 
predictions with respect to the availability of the two referents of the sentence. 
Though sharing the assumption that the accessibility of the referent hat is reduced, 
being in both cases under the negative proposition, the referents Sam is considered 
to be relatively inaccessible (exactly as hat) by propositional theories, but not by 
representational models, in which the same referent is not introduced within the 
scope of negation. Beside minor differences, therefore, propositional theories and 
situational-mental models seem equally suitable to account for experimental data 
reporting increased difficulty in negative sentence comprehension in comparison 
with affirmative sentences interpretation and evidence showing negated concepts’ 
reduced accessibility.  
 
2.2.1.3 The experiential-simulation model of language comprehension: The two-
step simulation hypothesis  
 
Last decades’ comprehension researches have provided large evidence in favor of 
the experiential view of language comprehension, according to which the mental 
representations underlying language comprehension are grounded on non-linguistic 
cognitive processes, such as perception, action, imagery, etc. (see Zwaan, 2004 and 
Pecher and Zwaan, 2005 for an overview). The experiential-simulation view has 
gained strength also from important findings in neurological studies, which have 
confirmed the existence of a considerable overlap between the mental subsystems 
in which linguistically conveyed situational information is represented and those 
that are involved when these situation are directly perceived or enacted 
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(Pulvermüller, 2002; Rolf Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Recent studies, in addition, 
have shown that motor processes are active during online comprehension (Ghio & 
Tettamanti, 2010; M Tettamanti & Buccino, 2005).
53
 As repeatedly observed by 
Kaup and colleagues (see, for example, Kaup, Lüdtke, and Zwaan 2007), however, 
negative sentence pose a potential challenge to the experiential-simulation view. 
On the one side, in fact, negative sentences do not have by definition an equivalent 
in experience and, therefore, cannot receive a direct representation. On the other 
side, the assumption that language comprehension made use of non-linguistic 
representations made it not possible to consider negation as a linguistic operator 
explicitly tagging a certain representation as being false, as proposed by 
propositional theories and early representational models. For this reason, Kaup and 
colleagues have proposed the so-called two-step simulation hypothesis, according 
to which negative sentences pass through two temporally distinct stages: a first 
stage during which the comprehender constructs a mental representation 
corresponding to the negated situation described in the sentence (the ‘negated state 
of affairs’), and a second stage in which she switches to a simulation matching the 
actual meaning of the sentence (the ‘actual state of affairs’, see Kaup, 2006 and 
Kaup et al. 2007).
54
 While the assumptions concerning the first step of negative 
sentences interpretation have received, as we have seen, abundant empirical 
confirmation (see § 2.1.1.1), the mechanisms underlying the second stage are still 
not clear. In particular, many questions have arisen with respect to how the prior 
simulation is rejected, whether a representation corresponding to the actual 
meaning of the sentence is constructed and whether negated representations can be 
simulated in a format similar to affirmative propositions. According to Kaup and 
Zwaan (2003) and Kaup et al. (2007), the presence of negation is captured in the 
deviation between the two simulations: the representation of the negated situation, 
which would be simulated in an auxiliary representational system, and the 
representation of the described state of affairs, juxtaposed to the first. Differently 
from the simulations corresponding to affirmative sentences, in fact, the 
representation of the negated state of affairs would not be integrated within the 
representation of the described world and would be, therefore, rejected. Once the 
representation of the negated situation has been rejected, the comprehender may 
turn to integrate the negation into the comprehension process and to modify his/her 
representation accordingly. As we have seen, Kaup, Lüdtke, and Zwaan (2006)’s 
study on negative sentences with contradictory predicates provided interesting 
results in this respect. In particular, the study has shown that, when a negative 
sentence of the type The door was not close is followed by representation of the 
actual situation (e.g. an open door) after a sufficiently long time (e.g., 1500ms), a 
matching effect between the sentence and the picture is observable, resulting in 
shorter latencies than in those cases in which the picture matched the negated 
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 The consideration of the same neuro-imaging findings have been more recently put at the 
basis of the so-called Embodiment Cognition theory, that will be discussed in § 2.2.2.2.1. 
54
 A two-step account of negation processing had been previously proposed also by 
Carpenter and Just (1975) and Fischler, Bloom, and Childers (1983).  
  
 
 
 
62 
 
situation (e.g. a close door).
55
 However, these findings provide only partial answer 
to the question of whether – and eventually how – the actual meaning of negative 
sentence can be mentally represented, being it valid only for the cases in which the 
situation which is negated corresponds to a highly predicable ‘positive’ situation 
(as it mostly happens with contradictory predicates, e.g. not open > close) or in 
which the discourse context provides enough information to allow the mental 
representation of the actual state of affairs (e.g., by presupposing an alternative 
situation). In order to account for all other cases in which neither the sentence nor 
the context provide any information with regard to the actual state of affairs (e.g., 
There was no eagle in the sky), therefore, Kaup and colleagues hypothesized that 
the comprehender may contrast the simulation of the negated situation created in 
the auxiliary representational system (e.g., the presence of an eagle) with an 
“empty” simulation of the actual situation (Kaup, Yaxley, et al., 2006).56  
 Whatever mechanisms underlie the second step of the process, the assumption 
itself that the processing of negation consists of two temporally distinct and 
subsequent passages is, anyway, sufficient to account for the fact that, as largely 
attested, negative sentences generally require a much more costly processing than 
their affirmative counterparts and seem to rely on non-automatic, working memory 
dependent processes (see § 2.1.1.3). The two-step simulation model, in addition, 
implicitly provides an explanation of the difference in reaction times between true 
and false negative sentences reported in sentence-picture verification task studies 
(see, for example, Kaup and Ludtke, 2008 and Vender and Delfitto, 2010). As 
explained by Kaup et al. (2007), the assumption that the first step of negative 
sentence comprehension is characterized by the construction of a simulation 
corresponding to the negated state of affairs, in fact, implicitly predicts that during 
the first stages of sentence processing the comprehender can take more advantage 
from the visualization of a picture illustrating the negated state of affairs (and 
therefore matching the mental simulation she is constructing at this stage of 
sentence processing) rather than from a picture corresponding to the actual 
meaning of the sentence under interpretation. As easily observable, this is exactly 
the case of false negative sentences, whose falsity is determined by their 
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 On the contrary, when the picture was presented with a delay of 750ms after the 
sentence, a match effect between sentences (e.g. The door was open/The door was not 
closed) and pictures representing the actual simulation (e.g. an open door) was observable 
only in the case of affirmative sentences, confirming that the first stage of negative 
sentence processing is not ‘sensitive’ to the negation (see § 2.1.1.1 for a description of the 
study). 
56
 Interesting considerations with this respect have also been raised by Orenes, Beltrán, and 
Santamaría (2014)’s visual-word study, whose results have shown that, though 
comprehenders switch their attention to the alternative affirmative whenever possible (e.g., 
in binary contexts), they keep focusing to the negated situation in the cases in which it is 
not possible to imagine the correct alternative (e.g., multary contexts, see § 2.1.3 for a 
description of the study). In contrast with the predictions of the two-step simulation 
hypothesis, therefore, it may not be always necessary for the comprehender to construct a 
second mental simulation corresponding to the actual state of affairs in order to reject the 
representation of the negated state of affairs. 
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association with a picture not corresponding to their actual meaning but, rather, 
corresponding to the state of affairs which is negated by the sentence (e.g., the 
picture of a flying eagle following a sentence like The eagle was not in the sky, 
Kaup et al., 2007). In the case of true negative sentences, on the contrary, the 
visualization of a picture representing the actual state of affairs is in contrast with 
the mental simulation the comprehender is focusing her attention to during the first 
stages of sentence comprehension and does not produce any facilitation to the 
processing (on the contrary, it probably interferes with it). The different reaction 
times associated with the processing of true and false negative sentences, therefore, 
would be determined by the effect of facilitation or impediment produced by the 
match/mismatch between the picture and the mental simulation involved during the 
first stages of sentence verification.
57
  
 Though well-predicting increased difficulty in the comprehension of negative 
sentences in comparison with affirmative sentences, the two-step simulation 
account seems to be hardly compatible with other types of findings, such as the 
evidence showing that, when uttered in an adequately supportive discourse 
contexts, negative sentences seem to be interpreted with the same speed and 
easiness as affirmative sentences. According to Lüdtke and Kaup (2006), however, 
the fact that increased processing cost are reported only in those cases in which 
negative sentences have to be interpreted out of a pragmatically felicitous context 
has not to be considered in contrast with their model but, on the contrary, it can be 
considered totally in line with its predictions. According to two-step simulation 
hypothesis, in fact, the processing of a negative sentence has always, necessarily, to 
pass through the representation of the negated situation, independently from the 
context of utterance. When the sentence is used in a supportive support, 
nevertheless, the first step of the process is extremely facilitated by the fact that the 
context strongly suggests the negated situation, freeing the comprehender from the 
more processing time required for simulating ex novo the negated state of affairs. 
As reported by Lüdtke and Kaup (2006), in addition, in particularly felicitous 
context where it appears very natural that a prior expectation needs to be corrected, 
even the representation of the actual state of affairs seems to be ‘elicited’ by the 
context, further reducing the processing time. In the extreme cases in which a 
negative sentence is uttered in isolation or does not result immediately relevant to 
discourse context, on the contrary, the comprehension process is slowed down by 
the necessity of constructing the first mental representations from the scratch. 
Although resulting in very different behavioral responses, therefore, the processing 
of negation is not assumed to be qualitatively different under differently pragmatic 
circumstances, but only to be differentially influenced by the information provided 
by the context. Worth noting, this latter analysis is also in line with Deutsch et al. 
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 A similar effect of facilitation has been reported for the processing of affirmative 
sentences when followed by a picture representing the actual situation (true affirmative 
conditions), in comparison to the cases in which the sentence were associated to a sentence 
mismatching the meaning of the sentence (false affirmative condition; see Zwaan, 
Stanfield, and Yaxley, 2002).  
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(2006)’s observation that, in spite of the fact that in many circumstances negation 
is processed very easily when working memory resources are not otherwise taxed, 
its consideration becomes crucially more difficult when the concurrent execution of 
working-memory based tasks is required (see § 2.1.1.3). While the interpretation of 
negative sentences presented in felicitous pragmatic contexts may be considered to 
be a not very demanding operation in terms of working memory resources (as the 
context provides very much support to the simulation of the negated state of affairs, 
masking the inherent processing difficulty of negation), the absence of an adequate 
context of utterance is likely to tax working memory resources with the 
construction and mental comparison of two different mental representations, 
resulting in a higher processing difficulty.
58
  
 Potential criticisms to two-stage based account of negation processing may also 
come from the consideration of studies showing that negation has a (possibly) 
immediate suppressive effect on the lexical accessibility of the concepts under its 
scope (§ 2.1.3). As MacDonald & Just (1989)’s search-for-alternatives model 
clearly shows, however, the consideration of the suppressive nature of negation is 
not totally at odds with a two-step based account of negation processing, as 
suppression may represent the result of the ‘rejection’ of the negated state of affairs 
or, eventually, the mechanism itself at the basis of the integration of the negative 
meaning during the second stage of negative sentence comprehension. The lack in 
behavioral studies of precise information on the exact moment in which negated 
terms become inaccessible, however, makes it impossible to establish whether the 
suppressive effect of negation has to be considered incompatible with the temporal 
predictions made by Kaup and colleagues’ model or not. More fine-grained 
analyses of the temporal dynamics underlying the interpretation of negation have 
been offered by recent fMRI studies, which reported a reduction of the cortical 
activation already before 500ms after negative sentence presentation (Alemanno et 
al. 2012; Bartoli et al. 2013; Tettamanti et al. 2008). Nevertheless, fMRI studies 
have so far limited the investigation to a very restricted set of sentences (simple 
and short declarative sentences only including action verbs and in most cases, 
hand-related ones) and to the execution of very simple tasks (in most cases, a 
passive listening task, with no need of evaluating the truth-value of the sentences 
presented). As a consequence, it turns out very difficult to compare recent neuro-
imaging findings with behavioral studies adopting more complex verification 
paradigms. As observed by Bartoli et al. (2013), the execution of more complex 
tasks involving truth-value verification may make it necessary to engage the 
explicit and temporally disjoined simulation of both the negated and the actual state 
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 Worth nothing, this latter observation may also explain why significant differences in the 
reaction times associated to the interpretation of negative and affirmative sentences are 
more ‘visible’ in those tasks in which working-memory load is more taxed (e.g., sentence-
picture verification task), than in those which require no working memory involvement 
(e.g., passive reading tasks). Experimental studies are needed, however, to test the 
plausibility of these very intuitive considerations. 
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of affairs, resulting in more time dilated processing of negation during which motor 
deactivation could, possibly, follow an initial phase of motor activation.  
 
2.2.2 Incremental models 
 
Incremental models of negation processing are characterized, as we said, by the 
assumption that the negation is integrated right away during sentence 
comprehension and that, therefore, the interpretation of negative sentences is not 
different, in this respect, from that of affirmative ones.  
 Differently from the section dedicated to non-incremental models, we will not 
adopt as main criterion of classification of incremental models the reference to one 
or another theory of language comprehension but, rather, the consideration of 
which aspect is assumed to constitute the main feature of negation. On this basis, 
we will distinguish between pragmatic accounts, which emphasize the high 
pragmatic sensitivity to the processing of negation, and suppressive-like accounts, 
which focus on the inhibitory nature of negative markers. 
 
2.2.2.1 Pragmatic accounts: The contextual nature of negation 
 
As discussed above, negative sentences’ context sensitivity has represented a 
central issue in the investigation on the processing of linguistic negation since very 
early psycholinguistic studies. The consideration of experimental evidence 
showing that, when negative sentences are uttered in pragmatically felicitous 
contexts, negative sentence comprehension does not seem to require much effort in 
comparison with that of structurally similar affirmative sentences (see, for 
example, Dale and Duran, 2011 and Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008) has lead to 
the formulation of different types of pragmatic account, characterized by the 
assumption that the increased difficulty associated with negative sentences has to 
be attributed, in all cases, to the absence of a felicitous context of utterance, as is 
particularly evident in many experimental paradigms.  
 While there are some supporters of the idea that negation is intrinsically 
contextual (e.g., Glenberg et al., 1999), most pragmatic accounts’ proponents 
recognize that negation processing may have diverse cognitive dynamics in 
supportive and non-supportive contexts. As observed by Dale and Duran (2011), in 
fact, it does not seem plausible to assume that every-day communicative situations 
always provide the appropriate context for the utterance of a negative sentence. On 
the contrary, it seems likely that, at least in some cases, comprehenders have to 
face the interpretation of negation in non-supportive contexts. For this reason, Dale 
and Duran (2011) have proposed that the dynamic structure of negation change 
contextually, standing on the border between ‘discrete’ (or, in other words, non-
incremental) and ‘continuous’ (incremental) processing. Very similar conclusions 
have been drawn by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), according to which the fact 
that negation is incrementally incorporated when used in adequately supportive 
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contexts does not necessarily exclude the possibility that negative sentence may 
receive a two-stage based interpretation under other circumstances. Similar 
hypotheses are also well in line with studies showing that, though in many cases 
negation is processed very quickly and unintentionally, such as when it is presented 
in non-anomalous pragmatic contexts (e.g., real-world condition, Ferguson et al. 
2008), its interpretation clearly engages non-automatic, memory-based processes 
and it appears extremely slow down when discourse circumstances does not 
represent a plausible context of denial (e.g., non-world condition, Ferguson et al. 
2008, see § 2.1.2 for a description of the study).  
 An alternative explanation has been offered by Tian, Breheny, and Ferguson 
(2010)’s dynamic pragmatic account. According to this view, the interpretation of 
isolated negative sentences does not rely on different cognitive processes with 
respect to that of pragmatically licensed sentences, though the former would be 
burdened by an additional process of pragmatic ‘accommodation’. According to 
Tian and colleagues, this process would pass through the creation (and afterwards 
rejection) of a mental representation corresponding to the negated state of affairs, 
as predicted by the two-step simulation model, but through the projection of likely 
‘questions under discussion’- that is, questions which situate the segment in a 
common ground that could motivate the use of a negative sentence. To exemplify, 
the presentation of a sentence like The bird is not in the air in isolation would 
invite the comprehender to project the positive question Is the bird in the air?, 
reflecting the lacking presupposition that the negative sentence would be expected 
to address.
59
 
 Beside these minor differences, it is important to note that incremental 
pragmatic accounts assumes that negative sentences are not inherently harder than 
affirmative sentences, and that the absence of an adequate context is responsible 
for making an otherwise simple process more difficult. On the contrary, non-
incremental models put emphasis on the fact that the interpretation of negative 
sentences relies on cognitive process partially different from those employed 
during the comprehension of affirmative sentences, and that felicitous pragmatic 
contexts have the effect of facilitating a process in itself difficult. As it can be 
easily noted, therefore, the two perspectives represent, at least to some extent, the 
two faces of the same coin, nevertheless reflecting very different assumptions on 
the nature of negative sentences. 
 
2.2.2.2 Suppression and suppression-like based accounts 
 
A second incremental approach to the processing of negation is represented by 
suppressive accounts, that is, models assuming that the main role of sentential 
negation is reducing the later accessibility of the concept within its scope, and that 
this reduction occurs in very first stages of sentence interpretation. More precisely, 
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 Tian, Breheny, and Ferguson (2010) report interesting evidence in favor of the dynamic 
pragmatic account. The reader interested to the details of the study is referred to § 2.1.2. 
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under this view, the comprehender would actively reduce the accessibility of the 
concept within the scope of negation to baseline levels. As we have discussed in § 
2.1.3, a large number of experimental studies have provided support to the idea that 
sentential negation reduces the accessibility of the information to which it refers. 
There is, however, no general consensus with respect to the obligatoriness of the 
process and to the temporal stage in which it occurs. According to the proponents 
of the narrow-view account, suppression represents a default strategy which 
applies in all contexts (Carpenter and Just, 1975; Evans and Over, 2004). 
Nevertheless, counter evidence has been reported showing that the concepts in the 
scope of negation are not unconditionally dispensed with. These latter findings 
have lead to the formulation of the so called retention hypothesis (Giora, 
Aschkenazi, & Fein, 2004; Giora et al., 2007), according to which suppression is 
not automatic, but rather functional: when global considerations, such as relevance 
and coherence maintenance, invite for retention, the negated concepts are 
maintained and modified accordingly to the presence of negation (e.g., receiving a 
mitigated interpretation closer to its the original concept than to its opposite, Giora, 
2006; Giora et al., 2005); when, on the contrary, the concept under negation is not 
useful for coherence purposes and/or global signals (such as, for example, topic-
shift) invite to its deactivation, the accessibility of the negated terms is reduced 
(Hasson and Glucksberg, 2006).
60
  
 According to Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) and Paradis and Willners 
(2006), the possible suppression of negated concepts is also highly dependent from 
the predicates involved. In particular, Paradis and Willners (2006) extend the 
functional approach proposed by Giora and colleagues with the consideration of 
the boundedness and unboundedness of semantic configurations, according to 
which when negation occurs in combination with unbounded adjectives (such as, 
for example, narrow), it has the role of an attenuating degree modifier (expressing 
a meaning somehow different from not narrow = wide), while when it accompanies 
a bounded antonymic term (e.g. dead) it acts as a suppressive operator translating 
the term under its scope into the absolute opposite meaning (e.g., not dead = alive). 
 A second piece of evidence which seems to contradict incremental 
interpretations of negation based on its suppressive capacity is represented by 
psycholinguistic studies showing that the suppression of negated terms’ 
accessibility would not be effective during very early stages of sentence 
interpretation, but even various hundreds of milliseconds - between 500ms and 
1000ms – after sentence presentation (Kaup and Zwaan, 2003; Hasson and 
Glucksberg, 2006). These latter data, therefore, seem to speak in favor of the 
possibility that suppression may follow an initial stage of negation insensitivity, or 
may represent the second stage of a two-stage process of interpretation.  
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 Similar considerations on the accessibility of the information have been put forward by 
Kaup and Zwaan (2003), according to which concepts’ accessibility is determined by its 
presence in the situation model (or, in other words, into the global context under 
consideration),  independently from its being negated or not. 
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2.2.2.2.1  The Embodiment Cognition Theory and the ‘disembodiment’  
  effect of negation   
 
More persuasive evidence of the inhibitory effect of linguistic negation has 
recently come from neuro-imaging studies developed within the Embodiment or 
Grounded Cognition theory, according to which language comprehension activates 
the same neural structures that enable the effective execution of the action 
described. Based on growing evidence confirming the involvement of specific 
sensorimotor neuronal systems in language processing,
61
 embodiment cognition 
studies on negation have aimed at verifying whether linguistic negation may have 
an inhibitory effect on concept-specific neuronal activation typically involved in 
language processing. More precisely, as we have seen, neuro-imaging studies have 
focused on the interpretation of action verbs (and, in particular, on hand-related 
action verbs), which have been largely reported to induce activation of motor and 
premotor areas (Ghio & Tettamanti, 2010; Ghio, Vaghi, & Tettamanti, 2013). 
Interestingly, as mentioned before, the use of different experimental paradigms and 
techniques has brought converging evidence of the inhibitory effect determined by 
the interpretation of negation to the cortical activations typically elicited by the 
concepts within its scope (Tettamanti et al., 2008; Tomasino, Weiss, and Fink, 
2010; Liuzza, Candidi, and Aglioti, 2011; Alemanno et al., 2012; Bartoli et al., 
2013; Foroni and Semin, 2013; see § 2.1.3.1 for an overview). The combined use 
of neuro-imaging techniques with behavioral measures allowing high temporal 
sensitivity, such as the analysis of grip-force (Aravena et al. 2012) and of 
kinematic variations (Bartoli et al. 2013), in addition, has led to the observation 
that the effect of sentential negation on reaction times can be detected very early in 
the processing of simple, declarative negative sentences (already within the first 
500ms after stimuli onset). 
 Nevertheless, embodiment cognition studies have provided – so far – only 
limited information on the processing of negation. ‘Disembodiment’ findings on 
negation, in fact, have concerned only a restricted range of verbs and negative 
constructions and, therefore, can only partially be compared with the rich tradition 
of the studies performed within the representational framework. In particular, 
evidence on the processing of non-actional concepts and sentences not referring to 
the first person are still almost completely lacking. These limitations reflect to 
some extent the limits of the embodiment cognition theory itself, in which some 
fundamental issues – such as a precise description of the crosstalk between 
language and motor systems, and of the conditions under which motor systems are 
recruited during language comprehension – have not been defined yet. As observed 
by Aravena et al. (2012), in addition, the evidence reported may receive alternative 
interpretations leading to a reconsideration of the functional role of sensori-motor 
systems in language processing. According to the grounding by interaction view 
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 See Jirak, Menz, and Buccino (2010) for a review. 
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proposed by Mahon and Caramazza (2008), as an example, the activation of the 
motor areas would represent an integration of abstract conceptual representations 
underlying language comprehension. Similarly, according to the so-called 
secondary embodiment hypothesis, language-induced sensori-motor activity may 
represent the result of the ‘spreading activation’ from other neuronal regions 
responsible of the amodal representations underlying language comprehension 
(Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). To conclude, alternative models propose that 
sensori-motor systems are not obligatory for the retrieval of the word meaning, and 
that they may be involved only when motor features of meaning are required by the 
context (Aravena et al., 2012).  
 Despite these limitations, embodiment cognition studies represent a promising 
and important approach in the investigation of sentential negation (and of language 
comprehension in general) and have, therefore, to be taken into the proper 
consideration. 
 
 
 
2.3 The use of sentence-picture verification paradigms and EEG in the 
study of negation: A closer look 
2.3.1 The sentence-picture verification task and the processing of negation 
 
The use of sentence-verification tasks in the investigation of language 
comprehension has a very long tradition. As it is well known, in this task subjects 
are presented with a sentence which can be followed either by a picture matching 
or mismatching the meaning of the sentence. The participants’ task is that of 
determining whether the sentence represents an accurate description of the 
following pictures or, in other words, whether the sentence has to be considered 
true or false on the basis of the ongoing picture. Traditionally, the time required to 
make the truth-value verification is assumed to indirectly reflect the processing 
cost determined by sentence interpretation. The first adoptions of this paradigm for 
the investigation of negative sentence interpretation coincides with very first 
employments of the paradigm itself in the mid-sixties and seventies (Gough, 1966; 
Slobin, 1966, Just and Carpenter, 1971; Trabasso, Rollins, and Shaughnessy, 1971, 
Clark and Chase, 1972). In most cases, the stimuli were composed by standard 
sentences describing the physical characteristics (e.g., The dots are/aren’t red, Just 
and Carpenter, 1971) or the spatial arrangement (e.g., The star is/is not above the 
plus, Clark and Chase, 1972) of very simple graphic signs. As already mentioned, 
the analysis of response times consistently revealed two main patterns of 
verification: (i) a sentence type effect, determining overall longer response times 
with negative sentences in comparison with affirmative sentences, and (ii) a truth-
value effect different for sentence type, resulting in faster verification for true 
affirmative in comparison with false affirmative sentences and slower reaction 
times for true negative in comparison with false negative sentences. Clark and 
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Chase (1972) proposed one of the first models to account for this asymmetry 
relying on the assumption that linguistic and pictorial sources are mentally encoded 
in the same interpretative format, that is, as assumed by propositional theories of 
language comprehension, propositional units. As a consequence, according to 
Clark and Chase (1972), sentence-picture verification processes are assumed to 
involve the mental conversion of both the sentence meaning and the depicted 
situation into the same general, propositional format. The comparison between the 
two stimuli (necessary to determine the truth-value of the sentence) is therefore 
expected to be facilitated in those cases in which the underlying propositional 
representations of the two stimuli are matching from the ‘representational’ point of 
view. To exemplify, consider the affirmative sentence The dots are red to be 
followed by a picture illustrating either only red dots or only black dots. In the 
former case, the verification of the congruency between the two propositional 
representations (one corresponding to the sentence, the other to the picture) is 
facilitated by the fact of being both converted into the propositional concepts ‘dots’ 
and ‘red’. In the latter case, on the contrary, the representation of black dots 
initiated by the picture conversion into propositional units makes the comparison 
with the sentence-related representation significantly more difficult. In parallel, the 
corresponding negative sentence The dots are not red is assumed to be converted 
into a representation including the concepts ‘red’ and ‘dots’, together with the overt 
linguistic operator ‘negation’. As a consequence, its verification against the picture 
is expected to be easier in the case of a red dots containing picture (false condition) 
than when accompanied by an illustration of black dots (true condition). Very 
similarly, Carpenter and Just (1975) suggested that increased verification times 
could be determined by the number of mental ‘revisions’ required by the 
matching/mismatching between the two stimuli. 
 More recently, sentence-picture verification tasks have been repeatedly 
employed in the investigation of negation processing and, in particular, within the 
two-step simulation hypothesis (Kaup, Lüdtke, and Zwaan, 2007; Kaup, 2006; see 
§ 2.2.1.3). As briefly reviewed above, in fact, the manipulation of the temporal 
delay between the two stimuli, on the one hand, and of their interpretational 
congruency, on the other, has allowed to provide important empirical support to the 
model proposed by Kaup and colleagues. In particular, the facilitation effect 
determined by the visualization of a picture corresponding to the negated state of 
affairs (e.g., the picture of a flying eagle 250ms after having listened to the 
sentence The eagle is not in the sky) during the first hundreds of milliseconds after 
sentence onset has been interpreted as a confirmation of the idea that the initial 
stages of negative sentence comprehension are characterized by the construction of 
a mental simulation not corresponding to the actual meaning of the sentence but, 
rather, to its affirmative counterpart (i.e., the representation of an eagle flying in 
the sky). Alongside, the observation that in later stages of sentence comprehension 
(e.g., 750ms after sentence onset) a similar facilitation effect is instead provided by 
the visualization of a picture illustrating the actual state of affairs has been taken as 
a proof of the fact that, at that point, the comprehender has switched to the 
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simulation of the actual meaning of the sentence. Though sharing with Clark and 
Chase (1972) and Carpenter and Just (1975) the idea that the different patterns of 
verification times characterizing affirmative and negative sentences depend on the 
presence or absence of a correspondence between the two stimuli, the two-step 
simulation hypothesis presents important differences with respect to the previously 
proposed sentence-picture verification models. First, as we have said before, 
language comprehension is not considered to involve propositional-like 
representations but, rather, non-linguistic grounded mental simulations. Second, 
visual stimuli are not assumed to be in need of being converted in any 
representational format. Third, two temporally distinct mental representations of 
the sentence presented are thought to be involved. Accordingly, therefore, the 
easiness of sentence verification would not depend from the comparison between 
two different mental representations but, rather, from the match/mismatch between 
the mental representation engaged in that specific stage of sentence interpretation 
and the pictorial source itself. More simply, the relation between the mental 
situation simulated by the comprehender and the picture presented can be described 
in terms of priming, as clearly exemplified by Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s stimuli 
(TABLE 1, next page). While in the case of affirmative true sentences, in fact, the 
picture primes the mental representation under construction (i.e., a ghost in front of 
a tower), in the case of false affirmative sentences the former (i.e., a picture of a 
lion in front of a tower) is in clear contrast with the latter (i.e., the representation of 
a ghost in front of a tower). Similarly, while in the case of false negative sentences 
the mental representation constructed during the first stages of sentence 
comprehension, corresponding to the negated state of affairs, is ‘primed’ by the 
following picture (e.g., the picture of ghost in front of a tower after the sentence In 
front of the tower there is no ghost), in the case of true negative sentences there is 
no matching between the mental simulation created by the comprehender 
(corresponding to the negated situation, i.e., a ghost in front of a tower) and the 
picture presented (i.e., a lion in front of a tower).  
 According to Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), however, the different 
processing cost associated to affirmative and negative sentences during the 
execution of sentence-picture verification tasks could also be due, at least to some 
extent, to the very low pragmatic felicity characterizing this kind of experimental 
paradigms. In spite of most authors’ unawareness, in fact, the properties of the 
pictures employed have important consequences on the naturalness of the different 
experimental conditions 
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TABLE 1. Examples of the Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s stimuli (English 
translation of the original German sentences). 
 
Sentence  Picture 
 
True affirmative (TA) 
In front of the tower there is a ghost. 
 
 
False affirmative (FA) 
In front of the tower there is a ghost. 
 
 
 
True negative (TN) 
In front of the tower there is no ghost. 
 
 
False negative (FA) 
In front of the tower there is no ghost. 
 
 
 
Consider, again, Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s materials above. As it can be observed, the 
four pictures significantly differ with respect to their relevance to the previously 
presented linguistic stimuli: in the case of true affirmative and false negatives, the 
representation of both the entity and the background mentioned in the sentence 
makes the picture highly relevant to the prior linguistic stimuli (though 
determining, in the case of the negative sentence, the falsity of the utterance); in the 
case of false affirmative and true negative sentences, on the contrary, the presence 
of an entity not mentioned in the previous linguistic stimuli (i.e., the picture of a 
lion in front of a tower after the sentence In front of a tower there is no ghost) gives 
the picture much less relevance within the discourse context. Though not posing 
problems for the interpretation of affirmatives sentence, this difference results 
crucial in the case of negative sentences, whose processing is characterized - as we 
have seen – by much higher pragmatic sensitivity. In particular, in experimental 
paradigms such as Lüdtke et al. (2008) the denial of a situation neither introduced 
in the previous linguistic context, nor recoverable in the following visual stimuli 
determines a sense of very weak pragmatic adequacy in the true negative condition 
(which, not casually, was reported to represent the most difficult condition in both 
Lüdtke and colleagues’ study and in similar previous works). As we will see in 
more detail during the presentation of the experimental paradigm adopted for this 
dissertation, however, the difference in the experimental conditions’ pragmatic 
felicity can be attenuated by taking specifically into account this critical issue 
during the elaboration of the experimental stimuli.  
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2.3.2 The use of EGG in the investigation of the processing of negation 
2.3.2.1 The event-related potentials technique: A short introduction  
 
Event-related potentials (ERPs, for short) are traditionally defined as very small 
voltages generated in the brain structures as reaction to specific events or stimuli 
(Blackwood and Muir, 1990). ERPs identification is based on the recording of 
neural activity trough electroencephalography (EGG), obtained by placing a series 
of electrodes on the surface scalp.
62
 Electrode positions trough the scalp are 
identified through a standardized naming system composed by letters (indicating 
their proximity to underlying brain regions: F = frontal, C = central, T = temporal, 
P = parietal, O = occipital), and numbers indexing their laterality and distance from 
the midline (odd numbers = left hemisphere, even numbers = right hemisphere, z = 
midline, with greater number indicating greater distance from the midline). A map 
of the electrode montage following the International 10-20 System is reported in 
FIGURE 5 below. 
 
FIGURE 5. International 10-20 system electrode montage. 
 
 
 
 
Generally, the EEG records the differential potential between several active 
electrodes placed at sites of neuronal activity and one common inactive electrode 
placed at a site with no or only little brain activity, serving as reference. The 
ongoing voltage changes captured by the electrodes are amplified, sampled 
(usually at 250, 500 or 1000 Hz), and finally stored on a computer for further 
processing. Due to the relative smallness of ERPs voltage fluctuations in 
comparison with the larger amplitudes of the basal electroencephalographic 
                                                 
62 The position of the electrodes are standardized by international guidelines. The most common 
electrode procedure is defined by the ‘10-20 International system’, according to which electrodes are 
located at distances of 10% or 20% along the longitudinal line across the head. 
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activity,
63
 event-related potentials’ extraction from the general EEG signal requires 
a series of filtering and averaging methods. The most frequent averaging technique 
involves the recording of a high number of EEG epochs, each of which time-locked 
to presentation of the same physically or conceptual identical stimuli, and is based 
on the assumption that the underlying mental process remains equal across several 
stimuli of the same type, while background activity is random. The so-obtained 
ERP waveforms reflect the electrical activity occurring at different points of the 
scalp and most likely derived from the concurrent activity of the postsynaptic 
potentials produced when a large number of similarly oriented cortical pyramidal 
neurons fire in synchrony. By contrast, the electrical activity produced in 
subcortical regions is measurable at the surface of the scalp and, thus, it does not 
fall into the EEG recording.  
 Despite of their very high temporal resolution (resulting to 1ms resolution or 
better under optimal circumstances), event-related potentials spatial origin has to 
be considered largely undefined, as the activity recorded at a certain point of the 
scalp does not necessarily correspond to the brain structures underlying that site; on 
the contrary, it could be originated by infinitely internal configurations. 
Nonetheless, ERPs can be divided into two main classes on the basis of their 
temporal occurrence: exogenous or sensory components, corresponding to early 
waves occurring within the first 80-100ms after stimulus, and endogenous or 
cognitive components, including all ERPs generated in later time windows. As 
indicated by the terms themselves, exogenous components are considered to be 
largely dependent from the physical parameters of the stimulus, whereas 
endogenous ERPs reflect the manner in which the subject evaluates stimuli, 
processes information and perform the task presented. Beyond this general 
classification, ERP components can be further described according to their latency 
(expressed in ms and indicating the point in time at the which the deflection occurs 
relative to the stimulus onset), amplitude (expressed in µV and plotted on the y-
axis and reflecting the ‘size’ of the neural activity generated by a specific stimulus 
or event),
64
 polarity (negative vs. positive deflection, depending on the pole 
orientation of electric voltage measured), and scalp distribution. In particular, 
polarity and peak latency have been adopted as main parameters for ERPs 
nomenclature, as exemplified by the N400 label, indicating a negative going 
deflection peaking around 400ms after stimulus onset. In some other cases, 
however, the site of registration is referred to (e.g., anterior sustained negativity) 
with the purpose of differentiating the EEG component from other same-polarity 
effect occurring within the same temporal window.  
                                                 
63  To exemplify, the amplitude of the effects typically induced by linguistic manipulations is in the 
order of a few µV, while background EEG activity (such as ocular, muscular and cardiac artifacts) is 
generally up to 100 µV. For a complete description of the methodological procedures see Picton et al. 
(2000) and Luck (2014).  
64 In general, components’ amplitude is considered to reflect the processing demand and/or the 
efficiency of the cognitive processes under investigation (the greater the amplitude, major the 
involvement of cognitive processes). From the methodological point of view, ERP components’ 
amplitude is measured in relation to a baseline, constituted by the EEG signal preceding the stimulus-
onset (usually lasting 100 ms), where the mean amplitude is set to zero. 
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2.3.2.2 Event-related potentials in language processing 
 
2.3.2.2.1 Semantic and discourse processing associated ERPs 
 
The wide application – since the early eighties – of ERP methodology in the 
investigation of language processing has allowed the identification of a wide range 
of language processing associated potentials. The first event-related potentials 
elicited through linguistic stimuli manipulation was reported by Kutas and Hillyard 
(1980), which observed a centro-parietal negativity deflection occurring between 
200 and 600ms (and peaking around 400ms) after the presentation of semantically 
implausible sentences. The effect has become popular with the label of N400 and 
has been subsequently associated with a number of semantic operations. In 
particular, it has been shown that, although every content word evoked N400 
modulation to some degree,
65
 its amplitude and latency vary in response to the 
word’s plausibility, expectation (defined in terms of cloze-probability, that is, the 
percentage of individuals who would continue a sentence fragment with that word), 
and frequency in general language use. Significant N400 modulations have also 
been observed in priming paradigms of different types, such as semantic priming 
(with larger N400 associated to words and pictures not matching the semantic 
expectation derived from previously presented items) and phonological priming 
studies (in which alliteration and rhyme have been found to reduce the N400 
amplitude).
66
 Recent studies have shown that N400 is also sensitive to non-
semantics related interpretative mismatches, such as impossible thematic role 
assignments (Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, and Friederici, 2002) and grammatical 
rules violations (e.g., incorrect choice of subject case in Hindi, Choudhary et al., 
2009). To conclude, N400 has been reported to reflect world knowledge conflicts 
(i.e., larger N400 for false sentences than for true sentences) and pragmatic 
violations (Van Berkum, 2009).
67
 The sentential frame is, however, not necessary 
for the elicitation of N400, which has been equally observed in association to 
single words’ presentation, e.g. in experimental conditions in which a certain 
lexical item of a list mismatched the semantic category of the prior words. 
Interestingly, in addition, comparable N400 effects have been reported across 
different input modalities, including both linguistic (e.g. sign languages), quasi-
language (e.g. pseudo-words) and non-linguistic stimuli, as long as meaningful 
(e.g., drawings, pictures and faces).
68
  
 Despite of the growing literature attesting N400 modulations, the exact nature 
of the effect (e.g., its functional role, its relative automaticity and/or dependency 
                                                 
65 In contrast, function words elicit no N400. 
66 See Swaab et al. (2011) and Kutas and Federmeier (2011) for an extensive review of the studies 
reporting N400. 
67 See Coulson (2011) for a review. 
68 To exemplify, a line drawing inconsistent with the semantic context created by a preceding 
sequence of words or line drawings elicit a N400-like effect (Ganis, Kutas, and Sereno, 1996). As 
reported in Kutas and Federmeier (2011)’s review, in addition, N400-like modulations have been 
shown to be elicited also by the execution of mathematical and memory tasks. See Kutas and 
Federmeier (2011) for a more detailed discussion of these findings. 
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upon attentional resources) is still object of open debate. According to Kutas and 
Federmeier, however, on the basis of current evidence N400 can be assumed to 
reflect both initial conceptual representations and their “need to be refined with 
time, either through continued interactions within semantic memory or via the 
application of later occurring processes that serve to select meaning features, revise 
initial interpretations, or otherwise update meaning representations (for example, 
adding information that might not have become available by the time the N400 was 
triggered)” (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011: 642). 
 Two other negative modulations, occurring with latency similar to N400, but 
characterized by a more anterior scalp distribution have been reported in 
association with other types of semantic and interpretive manipulations. The first 
effect has been observed to be activated by imaginable/concrete words (e.g., 
banana), in comparison with low-imaginable/abstract words (e.g., justice, see for 
example Holcomb and Kounios, 1999). Despite the high semantic sensitivity and 
temporal latency (around 300-400ms after stimulus onset) of the effect may 
suggest an overlap with the prototypical N400 wave, its anterior distribution has 
been interpreted as an indication of being generated by partially different neuronal 
sources in comparison with the ‘canonical’ N400.  
 The second effect, known as ‘anterior sustained negativity’, has been observed 
in response to interpretive difficulties and/or conceptual violations and has 
therefore been associated to discourse model elaboration (that is, the creation of a 
cognitive representation of the linguistic information to be processed). To 
exemplify, Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas (1998) and Dwivedi et al. (2006) reported 
larger sustained negativities during the interpretation of semantic violations 
involving temporal relations, mood and modality. Van Berkum and colleagues, on 
the other hand, observed that sentences containing a NP possibly associated to two 
equally suitable referents (e.g., David had told the two girls to clean up their room 
before lunch time. But one of the girls had stayed in bed all morning, and the other 
had been on the phone all the time. David told the girl that ...) elicits a more 
significant anterior negativity in comparison with NP unambiguously referring to a 
single entity in the preceding discourse (e.g., David had told the boy and the girl to 
clean up their room before lunch time. But the boy had stayed in bed all morning, 
and the girl had been on the phone all the time. David told the girl that ..., van 
Berkum, Brown, and Hagoort, 1999; van Berkum and Zwitserlood, 2003). A very 
comparable effect was reported by Dwivedi et al. (2010) during the interpretation 
of ambiguous anaphoric scopes. Coulson and Kutas (2001) observed the 
emergence of larger anterior negativity during the comprehension of jokes whose 
interpretation resulted inconsistent with the frame evoked by the previous linguistic 
context in comparison with non joking sequence endings, and interpreted it as a 
reflection of the frame-shifting needed to re-establish coherence. Similarly, Baggio 
and Lambalgen (2008) compared event-related potentials associated with sentences 
including when sentences either inducing a discourse model recomputation (such as 
in the case of the sentence The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled 
coffee on the paper, in which the fact that some coffee has been spilled out has the 
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consequence of interrupting the action of writing letters) or initial discourse model 
extension (e.g., The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the 
tablecloth). In line with authors’ predictions, when clauses expressing actions 
which had the effect to disable the accomplishment of the preceding verb (thus 
initiating discourse model recomputation) elicited larger negative shifts compared 
to clauses in which the verb had a neutral effect on the activity describe in the main 
clause.
69
 Importantly, in all these latter studies the negative shift differentiated from 
standardized N400 not only for the more anterior distribution on the scalp, but also 
for its very prolonged duration, emerging around 300-400ms and lasting for some 
hundreds of milliseconds. This latter peculiarity has allowed also distinguishing the 
‘anterior sustained negativity’ from the anterior but not prolonged negative shift 
associated to words concreteness described just before. 
 To conclude, recent findings have revealed that particular cases of semantic re-
analysis and extra-processing at the discourse level lead to the elicitation of P600 
component, a centro-parietal positive shift peaking around 600ms after stimulus 
and typically associated, as we will see to the detection of syntactic and 
morphosyntactic anomalies. 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Syntactic and morphosyntactic ERPs 
 
A second, very productive field of application of the electrophysiological 
techniques into language comprehension is represented by syntactic and 
morphosyntactic processing. To start with, words that are primarily syntactic in 
nature, such as functional words (e.g., to, with), have been shown to a elicit a N280 
effect at the left anterior electrode sites, which have been by contrast not reported 
with words with richer semantics such as content words (eliciting, as we said, the 
centro-parietal N400 component). 
 As already mentioned, morphosyntactic anomalies of different types, such as 
subject-verb agreement violations and phrase structure irregularities (e.g., verb 
tense violations), have been reported to associate with P600, a centro-parietal 
positive shift peaking around 600ms after stimulus. P600 instances have also been 
observed during the processing of syntactic ambiguities, garden-path-sentences, 
sentences characterized by increased syntactic complexity or-less-preferred 
structures, structure-dependent interpretational anomalies (such as thematic role 
violations and semantic violations in relative clauses), and ‘semantic illusion’ 
cases, that is, syntactically well-formed but semantically anomalous sentences.
70
 
Finally, similarly to N400, P600 has been shown to be not restricted to the 
linguistic domain and to be also evoked by the processing of other types of 
sequence irregularities, such as incongruous musical sequences, spelling mistakes 
and action sequences violations.
71
 On the basis of these evidence, P600 has been 
                                                 
69 As we will see in the next section, anterior sustained negativities have also been observed during 
the syntactic processing of filler-gap dependencies and during subvocal rehearsal tasks.  
70 See Brouwer et al. (2012) for a review of the ‘semantic illusion’ sentences eliciting P600. 
71 See Swaab et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of P600 studies and for related references. 
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traditionally interpreted as reflecting syntactic integration difficulties (Friederici, 
2002) and processes of reanalysis and updating of previously misinterpreted 
information (Kaan and Swaab, 2003, Brouwer, Fitz, and Hoeks, 2012). P600 
sensitivity to stimulus frequency (Hahne and Friederici, 1999) and task 
requirements (Gunter and Friederici, 1999), in addition, has allowed to associate 
the P600 to the class of the controlled, high-level processes of sentence 
comprehension.  
 In many cases, P600 emergence due to syntactic violations has been found to be 
preceded by the elicitation of a class of earlier negative shifts generally referred to 
as Left Anterior Negativity (LAN). Though having received its denomination on the 
basis of its recurrent left-oriented distribution, LAN instances have been observed 
to be possibly characterized (at least in some cases) by a bilateral distribution. The 
latency of this family of negative effects is also characterized by a discrete array of 
variation, ranging from cases of early instances occurring between 100-300ms after 
stimulus (early LAN, or ‘ELAN’) to cases of later emergence (around 300-500ms 
after stimulus). Early Left Anterior Negativity modulations have been found in 
response to phrase structure irregularities (e.g., *The pizza was in the eaten, as 
opposed to The pizza was eaten, Friederici, Pfeifer, and Hahne 1993; Hahne and 
Friederici, 1999, and following studies), argument structure inadequacies and word 
category violations (such as sentences in which the word presented does not belong 
to the expected grammatical category, e.g., The young apprentice went to see the 
new *designing in the museum, Friederici, Hahne, and Mecklinger 1996). 
Interestingly, in German the latency of the negative shift has been shown to be 
influenced by the location of the violation within the critical word, resulting in 
earlier latencies when the violation concerned the word prefixes and later latencies 
in the cases in which the violation was encoded in the suffixes (Friederici et al. 
1996, 1993; Hahne and Friederici, 1999). Later LAN (300-500ms after stimulus) 
have also been observed to respond to numerous types of morphosyntactic 
violations (either involving number, case, gender, and tense agreement, see for 
example Deutsch and Bentin, 2001) and to grammatical sentences containing long-
distance dependencies, such as filler-gap constructions (Felser, Clahsen, & Münte, 
2003). To conclude, Steinhauer, Drury, and Portner (2010) investigated the 
interpretation of sentences either containing licensed and unlicensed negative 
polarity items (e.g. John hasn’t ever been to Paris vs. John has *ever been to 
Paris) and reported larger late LAN in the unlicensing relative to the licensing 
condition.
72
 Due to its early onset, the ELAN has been interpreted to reflect highly 
automatic processing of initial structure building (Hahne and Friederici, 1999). 
Differently, the functional role of later LANs has not been determined yet. In 
particular, the frequently reported prolonged duration, together with its anterior 
(not always lateralized) distribution has raised the question of whether later 
prolonged LANs may constitute an instance of the semantic-conceptual sustained 
                                                 
72 See Steinhauer and Drury (2012) for an exhaustive review of the studies reporting ELAN and later 
LAN modulations. 
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anterior negativity discussed in the previous section, rather than a pure 
morphosyntactic component (see Baggio and Lambalgen, 2008, and Steinhauer and 
Drury, 2012, for a discussion of this issue). 
 A third ERP wave reflecting morphosyntactic processing is represented by the 
so-called Mismatch Negativity (MMN), a fronto-central negativity (with reversed 
polarity at mastoids) occurring approximately 100ms after stimulus and generally 
considered to reflect the brain’s detection of a deviant stimulus among standard 
input. Despite having been traditionally reported in association to auditory and 
visual stimuli mismatches, studies comparing the processing of syntactically 
correct minimal sentences (e.g. we come) with that of structurally similar sentences 
violating subject-verb agreement (e.g. *we comes) have shown that MMN also 
reflects very early and automatic syntactic processing, resulting in larger 
amplitudes in the cases of grammatical violations (Hasting, Kotz, and Friederici, 
2007; Pulvermüller et al., 2008),  
 
2.3.2.2.3 ERPs related to the physical features of the stimulus 
 
Besides the set of ERPs components reflecting the strictly linguistic information 
encoded in the input, electrophysiological investigation of language processing has 
allowed the identification of endogenous waves indexing the physical properties of 
the stimulus.  
 To start with, all types of auditory and visual stimuli have been reported to elicit 
the so-called N1-P2 complex, a negative deflection occurring at approximately 
100ms after stimulus and followed by a positive deflection at around 200ms 
(Näätänen and Picton, 1987). Due to its very early latency, high automaticity and 
crucial sensitivity to the stimulus’s physical features (e.g., loudness, fundamental 
frequency, etc.), N1-P2 waves have been associated to the neuronal activity in the 
primary sensory cortex.  
 A second ERP component characterizing the presentation of auditory stimuli is 
represented by the just mentioned Mismatch Negativity (MMN) effect, a fronto-
central negativity occurring around 150-250ms after stimulus onset. In most 
studies, auditory MMN modulations have been reported to respond to the random 
presentation of a stimulus deviating from the repeated and standard trend of the 
previous sound sequences in one or more perceptual features (e.g., pitch, duration, 
intensity, rise time, etc).
73
 As underlined by Näätänen, Kujala, and Winkler (2011), 
however, the MMN has been found to be sensitive also to more subtle and abstract 
properties, such as phonetic changes and musical regularities violations (but only in 
‘musical’ subjects).74 The amplitude and latency of MMN have been shown to be 
modulated by how different the deviant stimulus is from the standard, resulting in 
                                                 
73 Numerous attempts to identify an equivalent to the MMN in the visual modality have also been 
reported. See Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira, and Amenedo (2003) and Näätänen, Kujala, and Winkler 
(2011) for a review.  
74 See Näätänen, Kujala, and Winkler (2011) for an extensive review and discussion of MMN 
findings. 
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larger and earlier MMN responses when the physical difference between standard 
and deviant is larger. In spite of this, the MMN shift usually becomes clearly 
visible only through a subtraction procedure, in which the ERP response to the 
standard stimulus is subtracted from the response elicited by the infrequent, deviant 
stimulus. The observation that the MMN can be elicited even in passive conditions 
without active attention allocation has suggested that it represents a measure of 
preconscious central auditory processing and, in particular, of automatic and 
implicit change detection mechanisms. In addition, the evidence that MMN is 
hardly elicited when standards and deviants stimuli are presented with long 
intervals from each other (e.g., more than 10 seconds, Sams et al. 1993) has 
suggested auditory sensory memory to be also crucially involved in the 
discriminability processes reflected by MMN.
75
  
 To conclude, prosodic mismatches have been showed to be indexed by the so-
called Right Anterior Negativity (RAN) and Closure Positive Shifts (CPS) 
components. The former effect corresponds to a negativity shift recorded in the 
right hemisphere electrodes between 300 and 500ms after stimulus onset and first 
reported in response to the violation of the expected prosody for the particular 
syntactic structures presented (Eckstein and Friederici, 2005). Differently, the CPS 
have been identified to correlate with the perception of major intonational 
boundaries in both linguistic and pseudo-linguistic material, such as jabberwocky 
sentences (in which all content words are replaced by meaningless words); pseudo-
word sentences (in which all function and content words are replaced by 
meaningless words) and delexicalized sentences (Pannekamp and Toepel, 2005). 
 
2.3.2.3  ERPs studies on negation  
 
As occasionally observed during the discussion of the currently available evidence 
on negation processing, the EEG-ERP methodology represents a particularly 
suitable technique for the online investigation of the temporal dynamics underlying 
the interpretation of negative sentences. Nevertheless, the relative few studies 
which have adopted the ERP methodology for the investigation of negative 
sentences so far have been characterized by very different experimental paradigms 
and, in some cases, highly contrasting findings. To facilitate the comparison of the 
study presented in the second part of this dissertation with previous 
electrophysiological findings on negation, therefore, we will devote this last 
paragraph to a more systematical retracing of the EEG studies on negation 
processing briefly reported in the previous sections. 
 The first important finding concerns the N400 component, whose modulation 
has been regarded as the main index of negation integration during sentence 
processing. Fischler, Bloom, and Childers (1983) tested a group of healthy subjects 
                                                 
75 Numerous studies have shown that the auditory sensory memory, in turn, has an influence on 
attentive information processing and on automatic attention shifts. The reader interested in a deepen 
discussion of these issues is referred to Näätänen et al. (2011).  
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in a sentence evaluation task during which participants were asked to read world-
knowledge related expressions and to evaluate the truth-value of each sentence 
within 1000ms after reading. The results showed that the final word of 
semantically ‘congruous’ sentences (e.g. A robin is not a tree; Hawaii is not cold) 
elicited larger N400 amplitudes than the final words of semantically ‘incongruous’ 
sentences (e.g. A robin is not a bird; Hawaii is not tropical). This insensitivity to 
the presence of negation has been taken as a strong demonstration that, as predicted 
by non-incremental models of negation processing, during the very first stages of 
sentence interpretation, negation is not yet integrated in the comprehension 
process. It has been noted, however, that the close proximity of some of the words 
composing the experimental stimuli (e.g. robin-bird, Hawaii-tropical) could have 
determined lexical priming effects possibly confounding the ERP latencies. 
Fischler et al. (1983)’s results have been confirmed and extended by a more recent 
study by Lüdtke et al. (2008), who made use of a sentence-picture verification task 
to investigate ERP effects for true and false sentences wither containing sentential 
negation or not. Participants were presented German sentences of the type Vor/Auf 
dem X ist ein/kein Y (‘In front of X there is a/no Y’) followed by a matching or 
mismatching picture, and they were asked to judge whether the previous sentence 
represented a correct description of the situation illustrated.
76
 In order to control the 
amount of time needed for comprehending the actual meaning of the sentence, two 
time-conditions, differing for the delay with which the target picture was displayed 
after the sentence, were created: in the short delay condition, the picture was 
presented 250ms after the reading of the sentence; in the long delay condition the 
delay between the two stimulus was augmented to 1500ms. Importantly, 
experimental sentences were constructed in such a way that no possibly 
confounding lexical priming effects could arise between the subject of the sentence 
and the word indicating the background location. Equally important, the sentences 
could not be considered true or false in themselves at the moment they were read, 
as their truth-value could be determined just in relation to the following picture. 
Worth noting, this choice allowed to temporally separate the cognitive processes 
initiated by the interpretation of the strictly ‘linguistic’ information from those 
underlying the verification of sentence truth-value. A sort of priming effect 
facilitating the evaluation process was expected in the cases in which the object 
illustrated in the picture had already been mentioned in the sentence (true 
affirmative sentences and false negative sentences cases). In addition to ERP 
recording, response times were also taken into account. In the short delay 
condition, N400 activations replicated the patterns reported in Fischler et al. 
(1983), with larger N400 amplitudes in the cases in which the final word resulted 
incongruent with the picture, although contextually true with regards to negation 
(e.g. In front of the tower there is no ghost against a picture of a lion lying in front 
of a tower). Conversely, in the long delay condition, where the participants had 
more time to process the sentence before evaluating of the picture, N400 
                                                 
76 An example of Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s stimuli is reported in TABLE 1 (page 72). 
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amplitudes were modulated in line with the truth-value of the sentence: N400 
amplitudes were larger in the cases in which the final word was not depicted in the 
picture and it made the sentence contextually true with regards to negation (e.g. In 
front of the tower there is no ghost against a picture of a lion lying in front of a 
tower) in comparison with the cases in which the final word was ‘congruent’ with 
the picture, but truth-conditionally false with regards to actual meaning of the 
sentence (e.g. In front of the tower there is no lion against a picture of a lion lying 
in front of a tower). To conclude, N400 reductions correlated with shorter response 
times in both the short-delay and the long-delay condition.  
 As mentioned, nevertheless, Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s results have been the object 
of important criticism by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), who underlined the 
fact that the N400 modulations associated with negative sentences interpretation 
might be crucially affected by the absence of appropriately supportive discourse. In 
the attempt to control the influence of pragmatic inadequacy on negative sentence 
N400 elicitation, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) investigated the interpretation 
of pragmatically licensed and pragmatically unlicensed affirmative and negative 
sentences. As already mentioned above, pragmatically felicitous sentences were 
introduced by a single statement (e.g., With proper equipments...) relevant to the 
target affirmative or negative sentence, which could be either true or false. 
Pragmatically infelicitous sentences were introduced by the same statements used 
for the pragmatically felicitous sentences, although in these cases the introductive 
statement was almost irrelevant to the meaning of the following sentence (e.g., 
With proper equipments, bullet-proof vest are/aren’t very dangerous/safe). An 
example of Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008)’s stimuli is reported in TABLE 2 
(next page). Event-related potentials were recorded from the critical word onset, 
that is, the word which determined the truth-value of the sentences (underlined in 
the examples).  
 The results showed that, when the sentences had been appropriately introduced, 
N400 responded to the actual truth-value of the sentence both in the case of 
affirmative and negative sentences, with false words enhancing larger N400 than 
true words. By contrast, pragmatically unlicensed sentences elicited increased 
N400 not only after false words in affirmative sentences, but also after true and 
false words in negative sentences (e.g., With proper equipments, bullet-proof vest 
aren’t very safe), that is, irrespectively form the truth-value of the sentences. 
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  TABLE 2. Example of Kuperberg et al. (2008)’s stimuli. 
 
 Pragmatically licensed sentences  
True affirmative With proper equipment, scuba-diving is very 
safe and often good fun. 
False affirmative With proper equipment, scuba-diving is very 
dangerous and often good fun. 
True negative With proper equipment, scuba-diving isn’t 
very dangerous and often good fun. 
False negative 
 
With proper equipment, scuba-diving isn’t 
very safe and often good fun. 
 
Pragmatically unlicensed sentences 
True affermative Bulletproof vests are very safe and used 
worldwide for security. 
False affirmative Bulletproof vests are very dangerous and used 
worldwide for security. 
True negative Bulletproof vests aren’t very dangerous and 
used worldwide for security. 
False negative Bulletproof vests aren’t very safe and used 
worldwide for security. 
 
 
Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008)’s study was not free from methodological 
weakness as well. First of all, the adoption of a sentence verification task including 
real-world related statements whose truth-value could be immediately defined on 
the basis of general world-knowledge made it impossible to temporally distinguish 
the cognitive processes associated with the processing of the linguistic stimuli (i.e. 
affirmative vs. negative sentences) from that underlying sentence-verification. 
Secondly, the specific attempt at avoiding pragmatic infelicity, realized through the 
insertion of a an introductive statement (e.g., With proper equipment,…) restricting 
the context of validity of the following utterance (e.g., ….., scuba-diving is/isn’t 
very dangerous) had the effect of creating a strong bias for true sentences, 
rendering all types of false sentences extremely more unexpected in comparison 
with their true counterparts, as clearly emerging from a rating pretest conducted by 
the authors. During the pretest, a group of subjects not included in the ERP study 
was asked to rate each sentence with a score ranging from 1 (= unnatural) to 5 (= 
natural). The results showed that true affirmative and true negative sentences were 
perceived as rather natural (obtaining an average score of 4.02 and 3.90, 
respectively), whereas false affirmative and false negative sentences sounded very 
highly unnatural (obtaining a score of 1.38 and 1.36, respectively). Though the 
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pretest ratings are likely to have been largely biased by the authors’ instruction of 
giving low score of naturalness to false sentences, it cannot be excluded that the 
naturalness asymmetry between conditions may have had an unforeseen effect on 
ERP components.  
 Similarly to Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), Staab et al. (2008) recorded 
event-related potentials during the verification of affirmative and negative 
sentences (e.g., … so he bought/he didn’t bought the pretzels/the cookies) which 
had been previously introduced by a short story (e.g., During his long flight Joe 
needed a snack. The flight attendant could only offer him pretzels and cookies) and 
by a bias sentence which had the specific purpose of orienting participants’ 
expectations (e.g., Joe wanted something salty…/Joe wanted something sweet….). 
To simplify, a whole story ending by a true negative sentence would be constituted 
as follows (the target sentence is underlined): “During his long flight Joe needed a 
snack. The flight attendant could only offer him pretzels and cookie. Joe wanted 
something salt, so he didn’t bought cookies”. N400 analysis showed that false 
sentence endings elicited larger negativities than true ones. However, the effect 
reached significance only for affirmative sentences.  
 In sharp contrast with Staab et al. (2008) and Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), 
in addition, Ferguson et al. (2008) reported evidence indicating that event-related 
potentials are not immediately affected by prior contextual information’s 
manipulation. As in Staab et al. (2008)’s and Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008)’s 
studies, experimental sentences were accompanied by discourse contexts which 
made the utterance of the target sentence pragmatically appropriate, thus ensuring 
that N400 amplitudes could not be influenced by discourse-context anomalies. 
Very differently from other studies, nevertheless, negation was used to cancel real 
word expectations within a conditional statement (e.g.: If cats were not carnivores, 
they would be cheaper for owners to look after. Families could feed their cat a 
bowl of carrots/fish and listen to it purr happily). ERP results showed that the 
introduction of a negated-world context (e.g. If cats were not carnivores) did not 
immediately cause an inversion of the N400 effect to semantic violations at the 
critical word (carrots/fish in the example above), suggesting that the interpretation 
process was not immediately updated with the contrafactual information introduced 
by the if sentence.  
 More recently, Hald et al. (2013) investigated the effect of modality switching 
(that is, the verification of a property in one modality, e.g. auditory: blender-loud, 
after verifying a property in a different modality, e.g. gustatory: cranberries-tart) on 
the processing of affirmative and negative sentence. In line with Fischler et al. 
(1983) and Lüdtke et al. (2008), true negative sentences were characterized by 
larger N400 than false negative sentences in the modality-mismatching condition. 
In contrast, however, no differences in the N400 modulations were associated to 
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the interpretation of true and false negative sentences in the cases in which no 
modality-switching was required.
77
  
 Besides the N400, other later positive ERPs have been observed during negative 
sentence processing. A ‘late positivity effect’, arguably reflecting the ‘re-
integration’ (after initial insensitivity) of negation into the interpretation process 
has been reported by Lüdtke et al. (2008) and Herbert and Kübler (2011). In the 
former study, adopting the sentence-picture verification paradigm, the effect started 
around 550ms after picture onset in the short-delay condition (SOA 250ms) and 
only 250ms after picture onset in the long-delay condition (SOA 1500ms). This 
difference has been interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the considerable 
delay with which the picture was presented in the long-delay condition gave to the 
comprehenders more time to finalize the integration of the negation into the 
meaning representation before evaluating the picture. Herbert and Kübler (2011) 
employed sentences like Dogs cannot bark/fly, where the truth-value of the 
sentences varied depending on the semantic relatedness of the subject with the 
predicate. Subjects were auditory presented to the sentences; no overt behavioral 
response from the participants was expected. The analysis of the ERPs revealed the 
emergency of a cortical positivity at the parietal electrodes in the time window 
from 600-1000ms after the target words onset, with larger amplitudes in the cases 
of false target words (e.g. bark) in comparison with true target words (e.g. fly). In 
line with non-incremental accounts of negative sentence processing, in both studies 
this ‘late positivity effect’ has been interpreted as an instance of the P600-like 
waves elicited by the re-integration of semantic anomalies and the updating of the 
mental representation of what is being communicated. In addition, Lüdtke et al. 
(2008) report the emergency of differences in the ERPs associated to the reading of 
the experimental sentences. In particular, a more pronounced N1-P2 complex was 
observed 80-120ms after the reading of the negative participle kein in comparison 
with ein. The N1-P2 complex, in addition, was followed by a larger posterior 
positive shift in negative relative to affirmative sentences. To conclude, enhanced 
negative shifts were observed after subjects nouns following kein in comparison 
with subject noun following ein, an effect interpreted as possibly belonging to the 
family of slow waves associated with memory process. More precisely, according 
to the authors, this latter effect may reflect the specific retrieval processes which 
take place after encountering negation and indicate that the listeners have to keep 
in mind that the sentence contained a negation, although not interpreting it 
immediately. 
                                                 
77 Given the low relevance of the modality feature to the present dissertation, we will dwell on further 
discussing this very intricate issue. The reader interest in more detailed information is therefore 
referred to the original work. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3 DEVELOPMENTAL DYSLEXIA AS A CASE OF STUDY 
 
3.1 Dyslexia: What it is 
 
‘Developmental Dyslexia’ is commonly used to refer to a specific type of learning 
disorder, primarily manifested in the inability of effectively learning to read, write, 
spell, and decode single-words.
78
 As for the other learning disabilities, the term 
does not include those children whose reading and writing problems can be 
considered the result of other primary deficits (such as sensory and/or physical 
handicaps, mental retardation, and emotional disturbance) or environmental factors 
(such as educational, cultural, or economic disadvantages). As underlined by the 
definition adopted by the International Dyslexia Association, on the contrary, 
dyslexia is generally defined in terms of discrepancy between a subject’s reading 
skills and his/her intelligence and educational experiences: 
 
“Developmental Dyslexia is a specific disability that is 
neurological in origin and its characterized by difficulties with 
accurate and/or fluent word recognition and by poor spelling and 
decoding abilities, often unexpected in relation to other cognitive 
abilities and the provision of effective classroom instruction” 
(www.eida.org/definition-of-dyslexia). 
 
Despite the widely open debate on the precise origin and nature of the dyslexic 
deficit, a general consensus has been reached with regard to the neurobiological 
bases of developmental dyslexia.
79
 Cross-cultural epidemiological studies, in 
addition, has provided important evidence of the high hereditability of the disorder 
(Scerri & Schulte-Körne, 2010), while considerable efforts within genetics studies 
have been devoted to the investigation of the so called ‘genes of dyslexia’ (e.g., 
Galaburda, LoTurco, Ramus, Fitch, & Rosen, 2006; Kaminen & Hannula-Jouppi, 
2003).   
                                                 
78‘Learning disabilities’ refers to a number of disorders affecting the acquisition of one (or 
more) of the basic processes involved in the understanding of spoken or written language 
(reading, writing, mathematical abilities) or in movement and coordination skills (i.e., 
dyspraxia). The definition of Developmental Dyslexia as a learning disorder distinguishes it 
from ‘acquired dyslexia’, that is, the cases in which the reading disability derives from 
brain damage of various types.   
79
 In particular, anomalous activation of the left hemisphere language network (e.g. Paulesu 
et al., 2001), abnormal white matter development (Rimrodt, Peterson, Denckla, Kaufmann, 
& Cutting, 2010), anomalous cerebellum (Stoodley & Stein, 2011) and planum temporal 
morphology (Bloom, Garcia-Barrera, Miller, Miller, & Hynd, 2013; Brambati et al., 2004), 
together with magnocellular deficits (e.g., Gori, Cecchini, Bigoni, Molteni, & Facoetti, 
2014) have been reported. See Peterson & Pennington (2012) for a quite recent review of 
the neurobiological data about DD. 
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 As largely attested, in most cases the dyslexic deficit does not occur in isolation, 
but it overlaps with one (or even more) other developmental impairments, such as 
dysgraphia (resulting in poor and slow handwriting, messy and unorganized papers, 
difficulty in copying); dysorthographia, a partially different type of transcription 
disorder crucially affecting the ability of properly acquiring the orthographic 
coding;
 
dyscalculia (determining a general difficulty with math, mainly manifested 
in inaccurate counting, numbers reversal, calculation errors, difficulty in retaining 
math facts, vocabulary and concepts), and dyspraxia (characterized by poor motor 
skills, difficulty in planning and coordinating body movements, messy 
organization, poor sense of time, and general slowness in the execution of motor 
tasks). The comorbidity between dyslexia and writing difficulties seems to 
represent the most common case, as shown by the extremely high percentages of 
co-occurence with dysorthographia (98,7%) and dysgraphia (82,7) observed in a 
sample of 301 Italian dyslexic children (Gagliano et al., 2007). Recurrent 
overlapping with attention deficit (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, ADHD 
for short, reflected in variable attention, high distractibility, impulsivity and 
hyperactivity) and with a more specific set of language deficits known as SLI 
(Specific Language Disorder, resulting in a general delay in the mastering of 
language skills, such as late talk and anomalous persistence of morphosyntactic 
errors in oral production) have also been attested (Germanò, Gagliano, & Curatolo, 
2010; Newbury et al., 2011). 
 Dyslexia has been observed in all cultures and languages with a written 
language, including non-alphabetic writing systems, such as Korean and Hebrew. 
The diffusion of the deficit, however, is crucially influenced by the language’s 
degree of transparency in the mapping between orthography and phonology, with 
less transparent languages (e.g., English) reporting a wider manifestation of the 
deficit in comparison with languages characterized by more consistent orthography, 
such as Italian and Japanese. Though the difficulties in the acquisition of writing 
and reading skills undoubtedly represent the main hints of the disorder, a large 
number of studies have shown that they are just the tip of the iceberg. In particular, 
deficits in the auditory processing (Gaab, Gabrieli, Deutsch, Tallal, & Temple, 
2007; Georgiou, Protopapas, Papadopoulos, Skaloumbakas, & Parrila, 2010), visual 
and auditory attention (e.g., Facoetti et al., 2003), motor control (e.g., Stoodley & 
Stein, 2011), working memory capacity, and central executive functionality (e.g., 
Varvara, Varuzza, Sorrentino, Vicari, & Menghini, 2014) have been reported.
80
 A 
very rich tradition of studies on dyslexic linguistic abilities, in addition, has shown 
that the linguistic-related deficits of developmental dyslexia are not restricted to 
writing and reading skills, but include a wide range of phonological problems, 
specific morphosyntactic impairments
81
 and interpretive difficulties, which will be 
                                                 
80
 See Nicolson & Fawcett (2008) for a more extensive, though not extremely updated 
review of these evidence. 
81
 The observation of morphosyntactic deficits in dyslexic subjects, together with the 
common feature of phonological deficits and the high comorbidity of the two disorders, has 
lead to the suggestion that developmental dyslexia and SLI may represent different degrees 
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briefly overviewed in § 3.2. For this reason, different models and theories in the last 
decades have suggested that writing and reading skills do not represent the core 
deficit of the disorder, but only the most visible dysfunction of a multifactorial 
disability (Menghini et al., 2010; Menghini, Finzi, Carlesimo, & Vicari, 2011). In 
particular, two main classes of proposals can be distinguished: the ‘linguistic’ 
models and the ‘cognitive’ models. According to the former, the writing and 
reading difficulties of dyslexic subjects are the consequence of a speech-specific 
phonological deficit. In particular, the phonological deficit model has proposed that 
developmental dyslexia is caused by a primary deficit in the representation and 
processing of speech sounds (Ramus, Rosen, Dakin, & Day, 2003; Snowling, 
2000). The auditory temporal processing hypothesis, on the contrary, has suggested 
that the phonological deficit is secondary to a more basic auditory deficit impairing 
dyslexic children ability to perceive auditory stimuli that have short duration and 
occur in rapid succession (Georgiou et al., 2010; Tallal, 1980). According to the 
‘cognitive’ models, on the other hand, the linguistic difficulties characterizing 
developmental dyslexia represent the consequence of a more general cognitive 
impairment. Just to mention the most relevant proposals, the automaticity-
cerebellum hypothesis (Fawcett & Nicolson, 2008; Nicolson, Fawcett, & Dean, 
2001) assumes that dyslexics’ writing and reading difficulties derive from an 
automatization deficit due to deficient cerebellar functioning. Given the crucial 
involvement of the cerebellum in motor skills, the model can also account for the 
coordination and balance difficulties frequently observed in dyslexic children, 
though it does not offer any explanation for non-strictly phonological linguistic 
impairments in developmental dyslexia. A different view has been proposed by 
Vicari and co-workers (Vicari et al., 2005; Vicari, Marotta, Menghini, Molinari, & 
Petrosini, 2003), according to which developmental dyslexia derives from an 
impairment of the procedural implicit learning (that is, the unconscious learning 
based on the unintentional perception of regularities in the input), preventing 
dyslexic subjects to take benefit from the repeated association of stimuli or 
sequences of stimuli which typically accompanied new skills acquisition (see also 
Goldberg, 2014). A very different hypothesis, grounded on neurobiological 
evidence showing that dyslexic brains are characterized by significant 
abnormalities in the visual and auditory magnocells, is represented by the 
magnocellular theory (Stein & Walsh, 1997; Stein, 2001). According to this latter 
hypothesis, both reading and writing deficits of dyslexic subjects are the 
consequence of the auditory and visual disorders derived from a more general 
magnocellular dysfunction. Within this theoretical framework, the same disruption 
is also thought to underlie visuo-spatial attention and motor control/automatisation 
deficits typically found in dyslexic subjects. More recently, a similar proposal have 
been advanced by the visuo-spatial attentional hypothesis (Facoetti, Paganoni, & 
Turatto, 2000; Facoetti et al., 2003), according to which dyslexics’ reading 
                                                                                                                            
of severity of a unique language specific disorder. See Bishop & Snowling (2004) and 
Ramus, Marshall, Rosen, & Van Der Lely (2013) for a discussion of this very intricate 
issue. 
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disability is attributable to a specific deficit in the magnocellular-dorsal pathway, 
containing the main fronto-parietal attentional network (Gori, Cecchini, Bigoni, 
Molteni, & Facoetti, 2014). The consequent visuo-spatial attention inefficiency 
would hamper the accurate selection of the letters to be read from the other 
irrelevant signs or letters cluttering the written page, resulting in very slow and 
incorrect reading. Although deficits in the magno-dorsal pathway in dyslexic 
subjects have been reported, together with the successfully administration of 
rehabilitation treatments based on visuo-spatial, the visuo-spatial attentional model 
– as all the hypotheses mentioned so far – results crucially unsuitable to account for 
non-reading related linguistic weaknesses observed in developmental dyslexia. An 
explanation compatible with the whole range of phonological, morphosyntactic and 
interpretive deficits exhibited by dyslexic subjects have been proposed by working 
memory-based models, according to which all the variegated manifestations of the 
disorder are due to dyslexics’ limited working memory capacity and efficiency. 
Given our major interest in working memory, developmental dyslexia and negation 
processing connection, we will cover this topic in more details in § 3.3. Prior to 
that, a short overview of the linguistic difficulties determined by developmental 
dyslexia is provided, including preliminary evidence on the interpretation of 
negative sentences in developmental dyslexia (§ 3.2) and main EEG findings 
reported in the investigation of linguistic abilities in developmental dyslexia (§ 
3.2.4). 
 
 
3.2  Linguistic deficits in developmental dyslexia  
3.2.1  Phonological and phonology-related deficits 
 
Given its direct impact on writing and reading abilities, phonology has initially 
represented the most widely investigated component in the study of dyslexic 
subjects’ linguistic skills. A long tradition of studies has consistently reported that 
dyslexic subjects display a lower-than-normal phonological awareness (that is, the 
ability of consciously analyzing and manipulating speech sounds), as shown by the 
very poor performance in tasks requiring the deliberate activation and manipulation 
of speech units, such as analyzing words into consonants and vowels, finding 
rhyming words, detecting prosodic patterns, and inverting or deleting one or more 
phonemes from a given word (Bradley & Bryant, 1983; Stanovich & Siegel, 1994). 
Studies investigating children at risk of dyslexia (that is, preschool children with at 
least one parent diagnosed as dyslexic), in addition, highlighted early impairments 
in their phonological development, mainly manifested in delayed speech 
production, weak stress competence, and higher degree of voicing alternation, in 
comparison with age-matched non at risk children (De Bree, 2007; Gallagher, 
Frith, & Snowling, 2000; Scarborough, 1990). Studies involving adults dyslexics 
of different languages, moreover, have shown that, despite of significantly 
improved reading, writing and spelling skills, phonological impairment 
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consistently persists into adulthood, as reflected by the poor performance in 
phonological awareness tests (Bruck, 1992; Ghidoni & Angelini, 2007; Ramus et 
al., 2003; Wilson & Lesaux, 2001) and in writing and reading tests crucially taxing 
phonological abilities (such as non-word reading and word dictation under 
articulatory suppression, e.g., Ghidoni & Angelini, 2007; Re, Tressoldi, Cornoldi, 
& Lucangeli, 2011). Beyond behavioral evidence, a large number of studies 
employing on-line (Desroches, Joanisse, & Robertson, 2006) and neuroimaging 
techniques have provided further evidence of dyslexics’ phonological deficits, the 
most relevant of which is represented by the hypoactivation of the posterior 
temporal areas, classically considered to be highly involved in phonological 
processing (e.g., Rumsey et al., 1992).  
 As we will discuss in § 3.3.2, in addition, important deficits have also been 
observed in tasks depending on the phonological short-term memory, the cognitive 
component responsible for the storage of phonological forms. In particular, the 
non-word repetition test, involving the repetition of meaningless but 
phonologically plausible pseudo-words, has been reported to represent a critical 
task for both dyslexic children (e.g., Kamhi & Catts, 1986; Rispens, 2004), 
children at genetic risk of dyslexia (Carroll & Snowling, 2004; De Bree, 2007; 
Bree, Wijnen, & Gerrits, 2010; Gallagher et al., 2000), and adult dyslexics (Ramus 
et al., 2003).  
 To conclude, the observation that vocabulary impairments – mainly manifested 
in poorer and slower vocabulary acquisition – do not seem to represent a primary 
deficiency in children at risk of dyslexia, given its relatively late emergence 
(around 3 years of age; Scarborough, 1990), has led to the conclusion that they may 
represent a secondary output of phonological deficits. In parallel, dyslexic children 
and adults poor performance in rapid automatic naming tasks (that is, tasks 
requiring the immediate naming of objects, colors and letters; e.g., Felton, Naylor, 
& Wood, 1990; Ghidoni & Angelini, 2007; Willburger, Fussenegger, Moll, Wood, 
& Landerl, 2008) has been interpreted as a consequence of their difficulty in 
accessing phonological representations (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008).
82
 Further 
confirmation to the association between phonological impairment and disrupted 
vocabulary access has been offered by studies showing that the lexical and 
vocabulary abilities of dyslexic adults result crucially impaired only when tested 
under a condition of phonological processing overload (e.g., lexical decision under 
articulatory suppression, Re et al., 2011; phonological recoding in lexical access, 
Wilson & Lesaux, 2001). 
  
                                                 
82
 Worth noting, however, according to other researchers phonological awareness and rapid 
automatic naming have to be considered as different and independent abilities (Wolf, 
Bowers, & Biddle, 2000). 
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3.2.2  Syntactic and morphosyntactic skills 
 
As mentioned, the last decades’ studies have highlighted that the linguistic deficits 
associated to developmental dyslexia are far from being restricted to phonological 
and phonology-dependent abilities, such as writing, spelling and reading skills. The 
investigation of morphosyntactic and syntactic abilities, in particular, has shown 
that the grammatical competence is also impaired in dyslexic subjects, even if 
limitedly to specific and, to say it roughly, particularly ‘complex’ linguistic 
operations. First evidence in this direction has been reported by Byrne (1981), who 
explored dyslexic children’s acquisition of English though-sentences, that is, 
sentences, such as (b) below, in which the subject of the main clause is the logical 
object argument in the embedded clause. These sentences are structurally identical 
to sentences in which the subject of the main clause is involved in an entirely 
different syntactic dependency, such as (a) below. Here is thus the classical 
minimal pair: (a) The bird is happy to bite vs. (b) The bird is tasty to bite: while in 
the former case the bird is the logical subject of the biting, in the latter it is – on the 
contrary – the logical object of the action. According to acquisition studies on 
typically developing children, the proper interpretation of sentences like (b) is 
acquired later than that of (a), not before than children enter school. Interestingly, 
Byrne (1981)’s study reported that the acquisition of the marked interpretation in 
which the bird represents the logical object of the biting is acquired even later by 
dyslexic children, who tend to erroneously interpret the bird as the subject of the 
biting even during school years.  
 A second very prolific domain of investigation of syntactic abilities in 
dyslexia is represented by the interpretation of relative clauses. Studies involving 
dyslexic and non-dyslexic children reported that both the comprehension and 
production of subject and object relative sentences result extremely more difficult 
for dyslexic subjects’ than for control peers, especially in the case of object relative 
clauses (Bar-Shalom, Crain, & Schankweiler, 1993; Stein, Cairns, & Zurif, 1984, 
Guasti & Branchini, 2012).  
 A third case of syntactically complex sentences which have been reported to 
be problematic for dyslexic children is represented by passive sentences, whose 
interpretation and production are mastered significantly later in dyslexic children in 
comparison with non-dyslexic children (Reggiani, 2009).  
 A recent study by Guasti and colleagues, moreover, highlighted that dyslexic 
children experience more troubles than typically developing children in the 
production of object wh-questions (Guasti, Branchini, & Arosio, 2012).  
 The investigation of the acquisition of the binding principles governing the 
interpretation of pronominal expressions has led to contrastive evidence. In 
particular, Waltzman & Cairns (2000) reported that poor readers make significantly 
more errors with the interpretation of referential pronouns (e.g., Pigi is drying herj,) 
than their control peers. Fiorin (2010)’s study on the interpretation of structurally 
ambiguous pronouns (involving sentences like Every friend of Francesco painted 
hisi/j bike), on the contrary, showed similar mastering of bound and referential 
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interpretations in dyslexic and non-dyslexic children. Differently from control 
children, however, dyslexic children tended to maintain a strong preference for one 
of the two interpretations during the whole task. A recent study by Guasti (2013) 
has extended the investigation of pronominal expressions acquisition to clitics 
production in Italian 9-years-old dyslexics. The results have revealed a reduced use 
of clitic pronouns in dyslexics in comparison with control subjects.  
 ‘Strict’ morphosyntactic competence has also been shown to be deficient in 
dyslexics, resulting in poor sensitivity to subject-verb agreement violations 
(Jiménez, 2004), impaired inflectional morphology production (Altmann, 
Lombardino, & Puranik, 2008; Joanisse, Manis, Keating, & Seidenberg, 2000) and 
weak morphological awareness (Leikin & Hagit, 2006).  
 To conclude, a rich tradition of longitudinal studies involving children at risk of 
dyslexia, in addition, shows that significant differences in morphosyntactic and 
syntactic skills between at risk and non at risk children emerge at very early ages. 
Scarborough (1990) reported that, from the age of 30 until 48 months, at risk 
children produced shorter and less complex sentences compared to control 
children. More recent confirmation of early deficits in morphosyntactic skills have 
been provided by Rispens (2004)’s study with 5 and 6-year-old children at risk for 
DD. Van Alphen et al. (2004) and Wilsenach (2006)’s longitudinal studies showed 
that, differently from age-matched controls, children at risk of dyslexia aged 19 and 
25 months could not discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences involving violations of the auxiliary selection or its absence within 
participle constructions (e.g., De boer__ gewerkt, ‘The farmer __ worked’). Van 
Alphen and colleagues (2004) additionally tested the production of plural nouns 
and inflected verbs in 3-year-old at risk for dyslexia and control children, showing 
that the former elicited very fewer correct forms in comparison to the latter. In 
Scarborough (1990) and Gallagher et al. (2000), moreover, syntactic abilities have 
been found to represent a very strong predictor of reading disabilities, even more 
than phonological skills.  
 
3.2.3 Semantic, interpretive and pragmatic competences 
 
Since recently, semantic and pragmatic abilities in subjects with dyslexia had been 
only sporadically explored. The observation that, during reading tasks, dyslexic 
children efficiently rely on the semantic context as a source of help for word 
identification, in fact, had been traditionally taken as a proof of the integrity of the 
semantic representations in developmental dyslexia (Nation & Snowling, 1998). 
More recent studies investigating spoken language comprehension in dyslexic 
children, however, have highlighted specific semantic and pragmatic deficits in 
dyslexia. Fiorin (2010) investigated the interpretation of Italian grammatical aspect 
by comparing the comprehension of spoken sentences either including imperfective 
(e.g., Marco mangiava il gelato, ‘Marco ate-IMP the ice-cream’) or present perfect 
tense (e.g., Marco ha mangiato il gelato, ‘Marco ate-PP the ice-cream’) through a 
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picture-selection task, in which participants were asked to choose which of the two 
pictures presented (one illustrating a complete situation, the other depicting an 
ongoing situation) appropriately illustrated the sentence just listened. Differently 
from age-matched controls, dyslexic children frequently evaluated pictures 
depicting a completed action (e.g., a picture displaying Marco with smeared mouth 
and no ice-cream in his hands) as correctly illustrating imperfective sentences. 
Fiorin (2010) explained dyslexics’ poor performance by assuming that the 
interpretation of imperfective grammatical aspect involves the performing of more 
complex reasoning in comparison with past perfect tense, exceeding dyslexic 
children processing resources. More precisely, the interpretation of imperfective 
past tense requires the computation of a conversational implicature according to 
which, if the speaker had wanted to refer to a complete situation, she would have 
used the past present tense but, since she did not, the action described has to be 
considered not completely performed yet. 
 Vender (2011) extended the investigation of semantic and pragmatic abilities in 
dyslexia to the interpretation of extra-phrasal pronominal relations and scalar 
implicatures. The first study included sentences in which the resolution of the 
anaphoric dependency cannot be determined on the basis of structural constraints 
but, on the contrary, requires the consideration of saliency principles. Two types of 
sentences were tested. The first type was represented by utterances involving the 
resolution of a zero pronoun, such as Paperina ha ballato con Minnie e poi Ø ha 
preparato la cena (‘Daisy Duck danced with Minnie and then Ø prepared the 
dinner’). As explained by Vender (2011), the use of a zero pronoun is expected to 
encode the meaning according to which the topic of the sentences has not changed 
from that expressed in the previous utterance. As a consequence, the predication of 
the sentence containing the zero pronoun has to be referred to the same topic (that 
is, Daisy Duck in the example above). The second type of sentences corresponded 
to structurally similar sentences requiring the resolution of an overt pronoun, e.g., 
Paperina ha ballato con Minnie e poi lei ha preparato la cena (‘Daisy Duck 
danced with Minnie and then she prepared the dinner’). In this latter case, the 
resolution of the anaphoric dependency is thought to be more complex, as it 
involves the computation of a conversational implicature, according to which, if 
the referent of the pronoun had been the topic of the previous sentence, the speaker 
would have used a zero pronoun. On this basis, the explicit expression of the 
pronoun is expected to encode the meaning according to which the previous topic 
does not represent the appropriate reference for the pronoun. As expected, 9-year-
old dyslexic children made significantly more errors than their control peers in the 
interpretation of the pronominal expressions, actually paralleling the performance 
of 5-year-old children. The investigation of conversional implicatures also included 
the interpretation of sentences including quantifiers, frequency adverbs, and 
propositional connectives. In all cases, the informatively appropriate interpretation 
of the sentences was based on the assumption that if the speaker uses a weaker 
term in the scale (e.g., sometimes in place of often or always within the scale of 
frequency adverbs, some instead of most or all within the scale of quantifiers, or in 
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place of and within the scale of propositional connectives), this entails that none of 
the more informative, stronger characterizations of the scale holds for the situation 
under interpretation. As for the resolution of pronominal assignments, the results 
showed that 9-year-old control children displayed an adult-like performance, while 
dyslexic performance equalized that of 5-year-old non-dyslexic children, reflecting 
a significant delay in the acquisition of the ability to compute scalar implicatures. 
 To conclude, the pragmatic competence of adult dyslexics has been the object 
of a pilot study by Griffiths (2007), who investigated the dyslexics’ understanding 
of metaphors and irony together with their ability to extract inferential information 
from stories. The study consisted in the fulfillment of a self-reported questionnaire 
for the estimation of the pragmatic competence and by the administration of the 
Right Hemisphere Language Battery to a sample of control and dyslexic subjects 
aged 17 to 41 years. In line with the information that emerged from the 
questionnaire, the linguistic tests revealed more mistakes in dyslexic participants 
than in controls, supporting the existence of pragmatic deficits in developmental 
dyslexia. According to the authors, the pragmatic difficulties observed may be due 
to deficits in working memory, processing and automatization. 
 
3.2.3.1 The interpretation of negation in developmental dyslexia 
 
 Vender & Delfitto (2010) and Rizzato, Scappini, & Cardinaletti (2013, 
unpublished) reported preliminary evidence of dyslexics’ difficulty in the 
interpretation of negative sentences. In Vender & Delfitto (2010)’s study, a 
sentence picture-verification task was used to test dyslexic children comprehension 
of several types of negative sentences: internal sentential negation (e.g., La gallina 
non sta facendo la spesa, ‘The hen is not doing shopping’), external negation, 
metalinguistic negation (e.g., Non è vero che Biancaneve sta litigando con un 
nano, ‘It is not true that Snowhite is quarelling with a darf’), negative passive 
sentences (e.g., Gatto Silvestro non è colpito da Titti, ‘Sylvester is not hit by 
Tweety’), negative quantifiers (e.g., Nessuna formica sta bevendo il caffè, ‘No hant 
is drinking a coffee’), and negative concord constructions (e.g., Grande Puffo non 
sta salutando nessuno, ‘Papa Smurf is not greating anyone’). The participants were 
asked to listen carefully to a series of exclusively negative sentences and to 
evaluate the truth-value of each sentence on the basis of the picture immediately 
following it. The picture, then, could illustrate a situation congruent with the 
meaning of the previous sentence or not, resulting in true and false conditions. 
Similarly to Lüdtke, Friedrich, Filippis, & Kaup (2008)’s paradigm discussed in § 
2.3, however, the study was characterized by the use of pragmatically inappropriate 
contexts of utterance. In particular, in the case of true negative sentences the 
complete lack of relevance of the picture to the activity mentioned in the sentence 
produced an effect of strong pragmatic infelicity, violating the plausible denial 
constrains elaborated by Wason (1965). Rizzato, Scappini, & Cardinaletti (2013, 
unpublished), on the other hand, employed a pragmatically balanced sentence-
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verification task
83
 to test the interpretation of negative sentences in dyslexic adults. 
Unfortunately, the test included a very low number of participants (5 undergraduate 
dyslexic subjects and 5 age-matched controls). In both studies, dyslexic subjects 
reported higher error rates, suggesting that the comprehension of negative 
sentences results significantly more effortful for dyslexic subjects in comparison 
with non-dyslexic controls. Due to the methodological bias mentioned above, 
however, the results of these two studies have to be taken with some caution, 
inviting to further research.  
 
3.2.4  The use of EGG in the investigation of the linguistic deficits in 
developmental dyslexia 
 
In parallel to behavioral studies, in the last few decades a series of 
electrophysiological studies have also been performed with the aim of better 
understanding which cognitive processes can be considered responsible of the 
dyslexics’ difficulties in both written and oral tasks. The fine-grained temporal 
resolution of EEG, together with the well-established functional role of some of the 
linguistic ERPs reported in the literature, in fact, has represented the opportunity to 
distinguish between the cases in which the atypical linguistic performance of 
dyslexic subjects has to be attributed to a slowdown of the same cognitive 
processes characterizing typical language processing from the cases in which 
dyslexic subjects seem to resort to qualitatively different cognitive processes. 
Nevertheless, as we will briefly overview below, in many cases the investigation 
has lead to contrastive or – at least – inconclusive results. A large number of EEG 
studies made use of phonological priming tasks (consisting in the presentation of a 
target stimuli replicating or not, e.g. through rhyming/alliteration, the phonological 
characteristics of one or more previously presented items) to investigate the 
phonological processing in developmental dyslexia. The results largely confirmed 
dyslexics’ phonological impairment (Ackerman, Dykman, & Oglesby, 1994; 
Bonte, Poelmans, & Blomert, 2007; Jednoróg, Marchewka, Tacikowski, & 
Grabowska, 2010; McPherson, Ackerman, Holcomb, & Dykman, 1998; Brian 
McPherson & Ackerman, 1999; Rüsseler, Becker, Johannes, & Münte, 2007), 
though partially diverging with respect to the component which differentiated 
dyslexic and non dyslexic subjects. In Bonte & Blomert (2004)’s study, the 
phonological processing associated to the execution of an auditory lexical decision 
and an alliteration priming tasks elicited comparable N400, but differently early 
auditory components (N1 and N2) in children with and without dyslexia. In 
Jednoróg et al. (2010), on the contrary, the presentation of a phonologically 
congruent or incongruent word after a series of six alliterating words determined a 
difference in N400 amplitudes between the two groups of subjects. In particular, 
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 The study employed a reduced version of the experimental protocol design for the STUDY 
1 and the STUDY 2. The reader interested in more detailed information on procedure and 
materials, therefore, is referred to § 2.1.2, PART 2. 
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clearly reduced N400 in incongruent conditions and enhanced N400 in congruent 
conditions were reported for dyslexic children in comparison with controls. 
 The event-related potentials technique has also been employed in the 
investigation of dyslexics’ syntactic and morphosyntactic competence. A series of 
studies on Hebrew-speaking subjects reported evidence of slower and more 
effortful recognition of words’ grammatical functions in adults dyslexics in 
comparison with non-dyslexic peers (Breznitz & Leikin, 2000, 2001; Leikin & 
Hagit, 2006; Leikin, 2002). In Breznitz & Leikin (2000), in particular, the 
elicitation of the N100 and P300
84
 components associated to words’ grammatical 
functions categorization was reported to be significantly affected by the fast-paced 
reading rate in the dyslexic adults, resulting in shorter latency and increased 
amplitude of the components in accelerated reading conditions in comparison with 
slower reading conditions. Conversely, no difference in the amplitudes of the two 
components was observed in the control group. Sabisch, Hahne, Glass, von 
Suchodoletz, & Friederici (2006)’s study focused on the detection of phrase 
structure violations in a group of dyslexic children and a group of non dyslexic 
controls. The results showed comparable P600 but different early morphosyntactic 
processing in the two groups, reflected in the emergence of a typical ELAN in the 
controls, but not in the dyslexic subjects, who conversely reported a left anterior 
negativity occurring around 300-600ms later. In addition, the involvement of the 
right hemisphere in the formation of the prosodic structure (reflected by a wave of 
right anterior negativity, RAN, in control children) was not detected in the dyslexic 
group, suggesting that children suffering from dyslexia do not rely on prosodic 
information during syntactic processing, as normal children seem to do. Rüsseler, 
Becker, Johannes, & Münte (2007) investigated the ERPs associated to gender 
agreement violations in isolated word pairs consisting of a definite article and an 
agreeing or disagreeing noun in adult dyslexic and control subjects. In both groups, 
the detection of morphosyntactic violations was reflected in the N400 component. 
In the dyslexic group, however, the effect presented a delayed onset and a longer 
persistence in comparison with the control group. To conclude, Cantiani et al. 
(2011) investigated the ERPs activated by morphosyntactic violations in a group of 
dyslexic children, a group of dyslexic children also suffering from SLI, a group of 
age-matched children, a group of dyslexic adults, and a group of control adults. 
The stimuli contained different types of number agreement violations and were 
presented orally. Both control groups showed P600 activation, with slightly 
differences concerning latency, depending on the different developmental stage. In 
addition, control children revealed a significant LAN (Left Anterior Negativity) 
reflecting the detection of the morphosyntactic error. On the contrary, in all 
dyslexic groups a more broadly distributed negativity wave emerged, which was 
interpreted to not represent a LAN instance, but rather a N400 component. 
Dyslexic children failed to activate the P600, but this latter response was present in 
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 The P300 component is generally involved in the process of decision making, reflecting 
stimulus evaluation and categorization. 
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the group of dyslexic adults. Unexpectedly, children suffering from both dyslexia 
and SLI presented EEG patterns more similar to those of age-matched controls’ 
one than dyslexics did. According to the authors, the N400-like effect reported in 
both dyslexic adults and children has to be considered as reflecting a lexical-
semantical strategy adopted to compensate dyslexics’ specific difficulty in 
handling inflectional morphology.  
 A quite large number of EEG studies concerning lexical and semantic 
processing in developmental dyslexia has also been performed. A first class of data 
is represented by studies comparing N400 elicitation in dyslexic and non dyslexic 
subjects during the execution of semantic priming tests. Despite very similar 
experimental paradigms, the different semantic priming studies reported very 
divergent results, including both evidence of delayed, reduced, anomalously 
prolonged or absent N400 effects in both dyslexic children and adults (Jednoróg et 
al., 2010; Johannes, Mangun, Kussmaul, & Munte, 1995; Stelmack, Saxe, Noldy-
Cullum, Campbell, & Armitage, 1988) and children at risk of dyslexia (Torkildsen, 
Syversen, Simonsen, Moen, & Lindgren, 2007) and evidence of comparable N400 
modulation in the two populations (Silva-Pereyra et al., 2003), though in same case 
atypically prolonged (Rüsseler et al., 2007) in dyslexics. A second class of data is 
constituted by studies investigating semantic violations in the written modality. In 
all the studies, semantically incongruous words associated with a N400 effect 
mostly localized in the left superior temporal cortex in both dyslexic and normal 
reading participants. In some of the studies, however, the effect was characterized 
by a delayed latency and/or a reduced amplitude in dyslexic relative to non-
dyslexic subjects (Brandeis, Vitacco, & Steinhausen, 1994; Helenius, Salmelin, 
Service, & Connolly, 1999; Schulz et al., 2008), while in some others the inverse 
pattern was observed, with increased N400 amplitudes in dyslexic subjects in 
comparison with age-matched controls subjects (Robichon, Besson, & Habib, 
2002). According to Brandeis et al. (1994), these differences do not have to be 
interpreted as an indication of impaired semantics in dyslexia but, rather, as a 
reflection of qualitatively different modalities to process word meaning. As 
observed by Helenius et al., (1999), in addition, the written presentation of the 
sentences does not allow concluding that the semantic processing per se is 
impaired, but only that semantic processing during reading is weaker. Less 
controversial findings were in fact reported in the EEG studies adopting the 
auditory modality, which generally failed to find main difference in N400 
modulation between dyslexic and non dyslexic subjects (Helenius et al., 2002; 
Mody, Wehner, & Ahlfors, 2008; Sabisch et al., 2006), suggesting no specific 
semantic impairment in dyslexic subjects. Worth noting, however, the EEG 
investigation on the semantic abilities of dyslexic subjects have been so far limited 
to the consideration of the semantic congruency, while no studies have been 
performed on the interpretation of semantically more complex sentences, such as 
sentence requiring the computation of conversional implicatures or other 
particularly demanding interpretative processes. 
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3.3 Dyslexia and working memory 
3.3.1 A short introduction to working memory 
 
As previously mentioned, among the theoretical models which do not consider 
developmental dyslexia as a strictly language-specific impairment but, rather, as 
the consequence of a more general cognitive deficit, the hypothesis that the reading 
disability may depend on working memory limitations has also been proposed. 
Traditionally, working memory (WM) has been defined as the capacity to store and 
manipulate information (of any nature, be it verbal, phonological, or visuo-spatial) 
over brief periods of time. Many studies have proved its crucial role in both 
language acquisition (Adams & Gathercole, 2000; Tagarelli, Catarina, & 
Rebuschat, 2011) and processing. The temporary maintenance and retrieval of 
syntactic information required by long-syntactic dependencies interpretation and 
syntactic ambiguities resolution have been proved to correlate with working 
memory resources in both behavioral and electrophysiological studies (Kim & 
Christianson, 2013; Roberts et al., 2007; Hestvik, Bradley, & Bradley, 2012; Kim 
& Christianson, 2013; Sprouse, Wagers, & Phlips, 2012). The relationship between 
working memory capacity and lexical retrieval has been extensively studied as 
well, highlighting that people with low working-memory capacity have difficulties 
inhibiting inappropriate meanings in lexical disambiguation tasks (e.g., Gadsby, 
Arnott, & Copland, 2008). Furthermore, the influence of working memory on 
lexical learning has been reported (Majerus, Poncelet, Van der Linden, & Weekes, 
2008; Leclercq & Majerus, 2010). Many studies have observed that WM plays an 
important role in learning a second language as well (Juffs & Harrington, 2011; 
Tagarelli et al., 2011). Particularly, its involvement in the acquisition of foreign 
language vocabulary, grammar and general proficiency (Andersson, 2010; 
Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998; Kormos & Sáfár, 2008; Masoura & 
Gathercole, 1999; Papagno, Valentine, & Baddeley, 1991; Ramus & Szenkovits, 
2008) has been attested. To conclude, working memory has been demonstrated to 
be highly involved in writing and spelling skills (Colombo, Fudio, & Mosna, 
2009), and to represent an excellent predictor of reading skills (Jarrett, 2009).
85
 
Despite being generally assumed to be constituted by some sort of short-term 
storing systems accompanied by monitoring/attention cognitive mechanisms,
86
 the 
exact nature of working memory has not received unanimous definition in 
cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, given the minor relevance of specific 
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 See Gathercole & Baddeley (2014) for an up-to-date, though theoretically driven, review 
of the main  studies on the connection between working memory and language abilities.  
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 See Baddeley (2012) for a review of this kind of models. Alternative accounts have 
referred to the temporary storage systems as ‘short-term memory’, and have attributed the 
monitoring and coordination mechanisms supervising the manipulation of the retained 
information to the more general, non-memory specific executive function and attentive 
system. See Cowan (2008) for a discussion of the difference between working memory and 
short-term memory. 
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assumptions on working memory components and structure to the purposes of the 
present work, we will not deal with the considerations of the different models of 
working memory proposed within the scientific community and we will simply 
refer to the unspecified definition outlined above.  
   
3.3.2 Working memory capacity in children and adults with dyslexia 
 
Working memory deficits have been largely attested as a common feature of 
dyslexic individuals. Given its crucial role in writing and reading assessment, a 
very rich tradition of studies has been devoted to the investigation of 
phonological/verbal short-term memory. Several studies involving phonological 
span tests and verbal repetition tasks reported impaired phonological and verbal 
working memory in both dyslexic children (see, for example, Brosnan et al., 2002; 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Jeffries & Everatt, 2004; Menghini, Finzi, Carlesimo, & 
Vicari, 2011; Poblano, Valadéz-Tepec, de Lourdes Arias, & García-Pedroza, 2000; 
Smith-Spark & Fisk, 2007; Swanson, 1999) and adults (e.g., Ghidoni & Angelini, 
2007, Smith-Spark et al., 2003; Alloway and Alloway, 2013).
87
 In addition, Jeffries 
& Everatt (2004) and Schuchardt, Maehler, & Hasselhorn (2008) reported that low 
phonological working memory measures represent a major difference between 
dyslexic children and children with other special educational needs, who 
conversely were observed to manifest intact phonological abilities but lower-than-
normal visuo-spatial and visual-motor coordination abilities. Correspondingly, 
Kibby, Marks, Morgan, & Long (2004) showed that phonological short-term 
measure represents a strong predictor of the non-word reading ability of dyslexic 
subjects.  
 Similar connections between dyslexics’ phonological memory and their 
morphosyntactic and syntactic competence have also been demonstrated. Rispens 
& Been (2007)’s study on dyslexic children found a significant correlation between 
the degree of subjects’ sensitivity to subject-verb agreement and their phonological 
short-term memory as assessed through the non-word repetition task. 
Correspondingly, Wiseheart, Altmann, Park, & Lombardino (2009) showed that 
short-term memory significantly predicted the difficulties experienced by a sample 
of compensated adult dyslexics in the interpretation of complex syntactic structures 
(e.g., passive and relative clause sentences) to the point that entering WM and word 
reading measures as covariates eliminated the difference in performance between 
dyslexic and age-matched control subjects. The role of phonological working 
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 Interestingly, in two recent studies item and order retention processes were separately 
assessed with the purpose of achieving a better understanding of short-term deficits in 
adults with dyslexia. Trecy, Steve, & Martine (2013) observed not only impaired order 
short-memory, but also inefficient short-term item memory. Hachmann et al. (2014), in 
contrast, reported controls-like accuracy in the recalling of individual items, but very much 
poorer performance when the task required the recognition of the serial order in which 
those items were presented. Similar evidence of selective impaired serial order processing 
in dyslexia have been reported by Szmalec, Loncke, Page, & Duyck (2011). 
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memory load in sentence comprehension has been further investigated by 
Robertson & Joanisse (2009), who made use of a sentence-picture matching task to 
evaluate the interpretation of sentences differing with respect to syntactic 
complexity (canonical vs. non-canonical word order), length (varied by adding 
adjectival information), and experimental task-related WM load (manipulated 
through a variation of the delay between the presentation of the sentences and the 
pictures) in a group of dyslexic and non-dyslexic subjects. The results showed that, 
though sentence comprehension was reported to get worse for all the participants 
when working memory load increased, the effect was more pronounced in the 
dyslexic group compared to the age-matched group. In addition, significant 
statistical correlation between phonological short-term memory (assessed through 
non-word repetition) and sentence comprehension under highly demanding 
conditions was reported. To conclude, Martin (2013) provided preliminary 
evidence of phonological working memory influence on second language 
acquisition in dyslexic subjects.  
More controversial results have been reported with respect to dyslexics' short-
term visuo-spatial memory, responsible for the retention of sequences of abstract 
figures and spatial positions, which has been observed to be normally functioning 
in some studies (e.g., Alloway, Wootan, & Deane 2014; Fiorin, 2010; Vender, 
2011, Kibby, Marks, Morgan, & Long, 2004), but disrupted in some others (e.g., 
Brosnan et al., 2002; Menghini, Finzi, Carlesimo, & Vicari, 2011; Poblano, 
Valadéz-Tepec, de Lourdes Arias, & García-Pedroza, 2000; Smith-Spark & Fisk, 
2007; Pickering, 2006, Helland and Asbjørnsen, 2004; Martinussen and Tannock, 
2006).
88
 As observed by Menghini and colleagues (2011), the reason of such 
contrastive evidence has likely to be attributed to methodological discrepancies 
among the studies, concerning both the kind of memory tasks used and the criteria 
adopted for the inclusion of the dyslexic subjects. As a consequence, no conclusive 
considerations on ‘pure’ visuo-spatial short term memory in developmental 
dyslexia can be drawn. 
To conclude, deficits in the central executive and/or attentive domain have also 
been widely reported in both studies involving orientation, focusing, shifting 
attention and visual search, discrimination speech tasks, engaging and disengaging 
attention, and inhibition tasks (see, for example, Brosnan et al., 2002; Facoetti, 
Paganoni, & Turatto, 2000; Facoetti et al., 2003; Menghini et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, other studies have documented deficits in planning, monitoring and 
revising during problem solving and response shifting (Chaix et al., 2007; Mati-
Zissi & Zafiropoulou, 2001; see also Nicolson & Fawcett, 2008 for a review), 
suggesting deficient executive functions in developmental dyslexia. 
The extensive evidence speaking in favor of phonological memory impairment 
in dyslexia, together with the data suggesting an important correlation between this 
latter component and language processing in dyslexia, has led to the hypothesis 
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 Deficits have also been found in studies using tasks which evaluated orientation, 
focusing, shifting attention and search of visually presented materials (Menghini et al., 
2010; Varvara, Varuzza, Sorrentino, Vicari, & Menghini, 2014). 
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that an isolated short term verbal/phonological deficit may underlying 
developmental dyslexia (Kibby et al., 2004; Poblano et al., 2000; Ramus & 
Szenkovits, 2008). The identification of executive and attentive impairments, on 
the other hand, has suggested that both dyslexics’ phonological and visual memory 
deficits may represent a secondary outcome of the inefficiency of central 
executive/attention system in dyslexia (e.g., Facoetti et al., 2003). As a 
confirmation, Brosnan et al. (2002) showed that the poor performance reported by 
dyslexic subjects in a series of visuo-spatial, phonological and verbal memory tasks 
can be (at least partially) explained as deriving from dyslexics’ difficulties in 
inhibiting the processing of the surrounding context, an ability crucially dependent 
on central executive/attentive functions. Similarly, Smith-Spark & Fisk (2007) 
noted that the reduced phonological and visual-spatial spans observed in a sample 
of dyslexic adults was related to task’s complexity and became evident only in 
those cases in which the experimental procedure required a high memory-updating 
load, speaking in favor of a central executive dysfunction. Central executive 
inefficiency has also been proved to account for dyslexics’ lower-than-normal 
reading and linguistic abilities (Berninger & Abbott, 2006; Robertson & Joanisse, 
2009). In line with these latter findings, Varvara et al. (2014) observed that 
children with dyslexia show deficits in several abilities crucially involving the 
concurrent use of short-term storing and executive functions (such as verbal 
categorical and phonological fluency, visual-spatial and auditory attention, verbal 
and visual short-term memory, and verbal working memory), and that the 
‘spoonerism’ measure (assessing the abilities to switch letters and sounds between 
two given words to create two other meaningful words) significantly predicted 
word and non-word reading performance. Although to a lesser extent, auditory and 
visual-spatial attention also explained the increased percentage of variance related 
to reading deficit in dyslexic and non-dyslexic children. On the basis of 
McLoughlin, Leather, & Stringer (2002)’s hypothesis, according to which the 
inefficiency of WM and, in particular, of the phonological and central executive 
components represents the common cause of all the primary deficits observed in 
dyslexic subjects, Fiorin (2010) and Vender (2011) suggested slightly different 
working memory models to account for dyslexics’ poor comprehension of 
sentences which are complex from an interpretative point of view, such as those 
involving the computation of conversional implicatures (e.g., imperfective tense, 
scalar implicatures, and extra-sentential pronominal expressions) and negative 
sentences. Given the currently complete lack of experimental evidence in this 
direction, however, this latter proposal has to be considered as a speculative, 
though potentially plausible, hypothesis. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
The present study 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 
The present study aims at addressing two main issues. On one side, it was designed 
to contribute to the broad debate about the processing of negation (see relevant 
considerations in § 2.2) by providing novel electrophysiological data on the 
interpretation of negative sentences by a group of Italian healthy subjects, still 
lacking in the literature on the topic (STUDY 1). More specifically, it was intended 
to replicate Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s study with an experimental paradigm arguably 
free from the pragmatic infelicity characterizing this latter study. On the other side, 
the present research was intended to deepen the relationship between working 
memory resources, negative sentences interpretation and developmental dyslexia, 
in the line of research initiated by Vender and Delfitto (2010). From this 
perspective, the current study is framed within the investigation on both dyslexics’ 
deficits in spoken language comprehension (see § 3.2 for a review), working 
memory resources in children and adults with Developmental Dyslexia (see the 
relative discussion in § 3.3.2), and negation processing dependency on non-
automatic, working memory linked processes (STUDY 2). 
 
 
1.1  Relevance of the present study to the broad debate on the 
 processing of negation  
 
As highlighted in the discussion of the different models and theories proposed to 
account for the interpretation of negative sentences, the current debate on the 
processing of negation mainly concerns four main issues, highly connected with 
each other: (a) the degree of difficulty of negative sentences interpretation in 
comparison with affirmative sentences, an aspect crucially related to the timing of 
integration of the negative elements into the interpretive process (i.e. incremental 
vs. non-incremental processing); (b) the influence of the pragmatic context to the 
easiness of interpretation of negative sentences; (c) the way in which the negative 
meaning is captured (i.e., through the rejection of the negated state of affairs 
representation vs. through a mitigation of the meaning/suppression of the concept 
under the scope of negation); (d) the model of language comprehension assumed. 
As already emphasized, all these aspects are interwoven with each other. While 
non-incremental models of negation have mainly attributed the well-reported 
increased difficulty associated to negative sentences relative to affirmative 
sentences interpretation to their being characterized by some kind of two-step 
based interpretation, incremental models have attributed it to the crucial lack of 
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appropriate licensing context observed in many experimental studies. On a strict 
parallelism, while non-incremental models have proposed that the understanding of 
the actual meaning of negative sentences necessarily pass through the consideration 
and subsequent rejection/correction of its affirmative counterpart, some 
incremental models have suggested that negation has an immediate ‘suppressive’ 
effect to the concepts to which it refers to. To conclude, while most non-
incremental models of negation are inevitably based on representational models of 
language comprehension, incremental theories have not necessarily argued in favor 
of one or the other language interpretation theory.
89
  
 As we have seen, the fine-grained temporal resolution of EGG-ERP method 
makes it a very suitable technique for disentangling the temporal stages 
characterizing the processing of negative sentences. Among the few EEG studies 
on negation currently available, however, the two studies specifically designed 
with this purpose have reported very contrasting results. Both studies, in addition, 
were not free from methodological limitations.  
 Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s sentence-picture verification task provided preliminary 
electrophysiological confirmation to the Two-Step Simulation Hypothesis by 
showing that N400 elicited by sentence-verification against a picture presented 
with a delay of 250ms is not modulated by the actual truth-value of the sentence 
but by the match/mismatch of its affirmative counterpart with the situation 
depicted. In addition, the following time window (500-1000ms) was characterized 
by the emergence of a late positivity in negative conditions, but not in the 
affirmatives one, an effect the authors interpreted to reflect reanalysis processes 
underlying the second stage of interpretation of negative sentences. The adoption 
of two different temporal conditions, the second of which characterized by a 
significantly extended delay between sentence and picture presentation (SOA 
1500ms), allowed researchers to observe that, when the subjects are given more 
time to elaborate the meaning of a negative sentence before being forced (through 
the visualization of the picture) to determine its truth-value, negation effects occurs 
earlier (around 250ms after picture onset) and overall task’s demands decrease, in 
particular in the negative conditions. As mentioned, however, the characteristics of 
the pictures employed (in which the entity depicted in front of the background 
described did not corresponded to the one mentioned in the sentence in all 
conditions) determined significant differences in the pragmatic felicity of the 
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 An exception to this latter consideration is represented, as we have seen, by the 
‘disembodiment’ account of negation, specifically referring to (and providing further 
evidence in favor of) the Embodiment Theory Cognition framework. According to this 
latter proposal, language comprehension depends on the activation of the same neural 
structures that enable the effective execution of the action described, and linguistic negation 
crucially determines the inhibition of this activation (with regard to the linguistic 
information under its scope). Though extremely promising, the investigation on negation 
processing within the Embodiment Cognition Theory has been so far focused only on a 
limited set of predicates (namely, first –person sentences mostly including hand action 
related verbs) and does not seem to be immediatly extendible to other type of utterances. 
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sentence-picture associations, with true affirmative and false negative sentences 
resulting extremely more ‘congruent’ to the corresponding picture in comparison 
with false affirmative and true negative conditions (see TABLE 1, page 72). A 
larger N400 in false affirmative and true negative conditions, therefore, could 
represent a consequence of the different gradient of relevance of the picture to the 
meaning of the sentence. For the same reason, the matching/mismatching between 
the entity mentioned in the sentence and that represented in the picture induced 
unequal priming effects across conditions, possibly influencing N400 modulations. 
Lastly, the very simple mechanism of verification allowed by the comparison of 
the sentences against pictures representing only one single entity (in some 
conditions not corresponding to that mentioned in the sentence) may have induced 
the participants to implement task-related shortcuts not requiring the full 
interpretation of the sentence, e.g. based on the only considerations of whether the 
sentence contained negation and whether the depicted situation corresponded to 
that mentioned in the previous sentence.  
 Nieuwland & Kuperberg (2008)’s sentence-verification study investigates ERP 
elicitation during the silent reading of pragmatically licensed (e.g., With proper 
equipment, scuba-diving isn’t very dangerous and often good fun) and 
pragmatically unlicensed negative sentences (e.g., With proper equipment, scuba-
diving isn’t very dangerous and often good fun, see TABLE 2, page 83, for an 
example of all experimental conditions) containing mid-sentence critical words 
making the sentence true or false (e.g. dangerous in the examples above). To 
ensure attention to the stimuli, after having read each sentence participants had to 
perform a lexical decision task. No explicit verification of sentence truth-value was 
required. In striking contrast with the need of a first stage of simulation of the 
negated state of affairs, N400 amplitudes showed that participants were able to 
access the actual meaning of both affirmative and negative sentences just 400ms 
after the critical word presentation. As mentioned, however, the unbalanced 
context between true and false conditions created a stronger expectation for true 
sentences in comparison with false sentences. Lexical predictability and 
expectation, in addition, were not controlled.  
 Beside methodological limitations, however, the very different experimental 
paradigms adopted have rendered it very difficult to reliably compare the results of 
the two studies. For this reason, the present study was designed as a picture-
sentence verification task replicating Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s study, though 
tentatively overcoming the main limitations of the original paradigm. In particular, 
more complex visual scenes have been adopted to avoid pragmatic infelicity effects 
and unbalanced priming between the picture and the sentences. Beyond attenuating 
pragmatic felicity differences across conditions, the use of more complex pictures 
(always representing two different characters, one of which corresponding to the 
subject of the previous sentence, and two different activities, one of which 
mentioned in the sentence) have made much more difficult for the participants to 
implement task-related strategy shortcuts, such as those possibly induced by 
Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s sentence-picture verification task. The use of sentences not 
  
 
 
 
106 
 
related to real-world situations, in addition, has permitted to easily control the 
sentences’ predictability and lexical anticipation. An example of the stimuli used is 
reported in TABLE 3. 
 
TABLE 3. Example of the stimuli of the present study. 
 
Sentence Picture 
 
True affermative (TA) 
Minnie sta tagliando delle carote. 
‘Minnie is cutting carrots’. 
 
 
False affermative (FA) 
Topolino sta saltando un recinto. 
‘Mickey Mouse is jumping a fence’. 
  
 
True negative (TN) 
Homer non sta guidando la macchina. 
‘Homer is not driving the car’. 
 
 
 
False negative (FA) 
Aladdin non sta chiudendo la porta. 
‘Aladdin is not closing the door’. 
 
 
 
The main objective of STUDY 1 was the investigation of the dynamics underlying 
the processing of sentential negation within a pragmatically plausible experimental 
paradigm, in which the utterance of negative sentences could be interpreted in 
terms of exchange of the characters/activities described.
90
 As for experimental 
hypothesis, a two-step based interpretational process was assumed to underlie the 
processing of negative sentence. As a consequence, ERP components similar to 
those reported by Lüdtke et al. (2008) were expected to be found in spite of the 
crucial difference in the pragmatic plausibility of the two studies. 
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 For more detailed information about the experimental method see the Materials and 
Procedure sections in the following paragraphs. 
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1.2 Dyslexia, negation and working memory 
 
As we have seen, a growing number of studies on general linguistic abilities in 
children and adults with developmental dyslexia have highlighted that dyslexic 
deficits are not restricted to the well-known reading, writing and spelling 
impairments, and not even limited to the linguistic domain. Worth noting, as we 
have seen, many of the linguistic difficulties that have been recently uncovered 
cannot be regarded as a secondary outcome neither of the phonological deficit, nor 
of the related vocabulary development delay. In particular, besides strictly syntactic 
and morphosyntactic weaknesses, spoken language comprehension difficulties 
have been observed to emerge in all cases in which the interpretation of the 
linguistic input is not strictly referential, but involves inferential processes (e.g., 
extra-sentence anaphoric dependencies, imperfective verbal tense, scalar 
implicatures, jokes and metaphors) and other non-default interpretive processes 
(e.g., though sentences, ambiguous pronominal reference, negation). Vender & 
Delfitto (2010) and Rizzato, Scappini, & Cardinaletti (2014, unpublished) provided 
preliminary evidence that negative sentences are one of the problematic cases. The 
results of both these previous studies, however, have to be considered with some 
caution. Vender & Delfitto (2010)’s sentence-picture verification task, in fact, was 
characterized by the same level of pragmatic inadequacy characterizing Lüdtke et 
al. (2008)’s paradigm. Also in this case, therefore, the significant difference in 
accuracy between true negative and false negative sentences may have been 
strongly influenced by sentence-picture priming effects. The unbalanced 
distribution of the stimuli, together with the low number of items for experimental 
condition (three items for condition, for a total of 12 experimental items), in 
addition, further undermines the reliability of the results. Rizzato, Scappini, & 
Cardinaletti (2014, unpublished)’s study, on the other hand, was characterized by a 
very limited number of subjects (5 dyslexic adults and 5 control subjects) and, 
therefore, can only be considered a very preliminary pilot study. Due to their 
behavioral nature, moreover, the two studies have given no indication of what is 
disrupted in the on-line processing of negative sentence in subjects with 
developmental dyslexia. According to Vender (2011)’s, the poorer performance of 
dyslexic children has to be attributed to the their limitations in working memory 
capacity. Vender (2011)’s interpretation is grounded on the Two-step Simulation 
hypothesis elaborated by Kaup and colleagues, according to which – as we have 
seen – the interpretation of negative sentences is implicitly encoded in the 
sequencing of two distinct mental simulations, corresponding to the negated state-
of-affairs and to the actual state of affairs described in the sentence. According to 
Vender (2011), the construction and evaluation of these two different simulations 
would constitute a costly operation in terms of working memory, especially in those 
cases in which the negated state of affairs is not present in the discourse context. In 
Vender & Delfitto (2010)’s sentence-picture verification task, this latter case is 
represented by the true negative condition, in which the picture following the target 
sentence always depicted a situation different from that negated (e.g., a hen reading a 
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newspaper after a sentence like The hen is not doing shopping) and, therefore, did not 
provide any benefit to the construction of mental simulation of the negated state of 
affairs (i.e., a hen doing shopping). On the contrary, negative sentences interpretation 
was facilitated by the visualization of a picture always corresponding to the negated 
state of affairs described in the corresponding sentence (e.g., a picture of a boy riding 
a bike after the sentence The boy is not riding the bicycle). As explained by Vender 
(2011), although not being problematic for non-dyslexic children, the asymmetry in 
the working memory resources involved in the interpretation of the two types of 
negative sentence would account for the significantly poorer accuracy in true 
negative sentences verification in comparison with false negative sentences reported 
by Vender & Delfitto (2010). It is worth noting, however, that Vender (2011)’s 
explanation has to be considered speculative with this respect, since Vender & 
Delfitto (2010) reported no data supporting a direct relationship between working 
memory resources and negative sentences interpretation performance. 
 Preliminary evidence of linguistic negation processing dependency on working 
memory resources has been reported, as we have seen, by Deutsch et al. (2009). 
Nevertheless, this latter study did not concern the interpretation of negative 
sentences, but it only investigated the influence of working memory resources on the 
evaluative priming of negated and non-negated words.
91
 As a consequence, therefore, 
this latter study offers only partial support to Vender (2011)’s suggestion. 
 Based on these premises, the second part of the present study aimed at deepening 
the understanding of the relationship between developmental dyslexia, negative 
sentence interpretation and working memory capacity. More precisely, the use of a 
pragmatically plausible sentence-picture verification task for the investigation of 
negative sentence processing by a group of Italian dyslexic subjects was intended to 
verify whether dyslexics’ difficulties persist even in absence of major pragmatic 
differences across experimental conditions. The use of the EGG technique, on the 
other hand, had the purpose of gathering fine-grained temporal information on 
ongoing cognitive processes underlying negative sentence processing in dyslexic and 
non-dyslexic subjects. To conclude, participants’ working memory assessment and 
analysis in relation with both behavioral measures (reaction times; accuracy) and 
event-related potentials’ amplitudes associated to the processing of negative 
sentences was expected to provide information on the connection – if any – between 
negative sentences processing and working memory resources hypothesized by 
Vender (2011). 
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 See § 1.3.1.3 for a description of the study. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2. PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
 
Prior to the execution of the main experiments (STUDY 1 and STUDY 2, presented 
in Chapter 3 and 4 of this second section, respectively), two preliminary studies 
have been carried out to control the adequacy of the experimental protocol for the 
populations for which it was designed. The first study was administered to a group 
of 10 Italian young adults (mean age 27;9). The second study involved a group of 
33 Italian primary school-children (mean age 9;5). Since the two experiments were 
based on two slightly different versions of the original protocol, they will be 
presented separately in the following sections.   
 
 
2.1  The preliminary study with Italian typically developed adults: 
 Behavioral and EEG measures 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The first preliminary study involved a group of 10 Italian adults, and included both 
behavioral and electrophysiological measures. The purposes of this preliminary 
study were various. First of all, we aimed at verifying the feasibility of the task and 
the adequacy of the time settings adopted. On the basis of Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s 
short delay condition settings, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the 
sentence and the picture presentation was set to 250ms. The picture visualization 
was extended to 350ms, that is, 100ms more than in Lüdtke et al. (2008)’ 
paradigm. The different characteristics of the stimuli used in the present 
experimental protocol, however, could make it necessary to give a longer SOA 
interval and/or to further lengthen the image visualization. In Lüdtke et al. (2008), 
in fact, all experimental sentences predicated the position of a certain entity (e.g., a 
ghost, a lion, etc.) with respect to a background object (e.g., In front of the tower 
there is a ghost). The pictures, in addition, included the representation of a single 
entity, which could correspond to that mentioned in the sentences or not, depending 
on the truth-value of the sentence. As we already pointed out, therefore, it could be 
particularly easy for the participants to implement task-related shortcuts strategies 
for the verification of the truth-value of the sentences. On the contrary, the 
different type of sentences adopted in the present study (always describing whether 
a certain character was performing or not a specific activity through the use of a 
transitive verb followed by a object noun), together with the choice of inserting two 
different entities in each image, make the whole interpretive and verification 
process more difficult and, possibly, significantly longer. 
 The second objective of the preliminary study with adult subjects was that of 
evaluating the adequacy of the protocol for the realization of an EEG study. In 
particular, given that the displaying of two different characters within the same 
picture was expected to induce wider horizontal eye-movement than in Lüdtke et 
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al. (2008)’ study, a main concern of this preliminary study was controlling the 
quantity and the amplitude of the eye-movements elicited by the visualization of 
the sentence in the EEG recording. 
 Secondary purposes were verifying the sustainability of the task and, more 
generally, the adequacy of the experimental protocol for the identification of 
differences in event-related potentials emergence during the processing of 
affirmative and negative sentences. 
 
 
2.1.2 Methods 
 
2.1.2.1. Participants 
 
A total of 10 Italian adults (mean age 27;9; SD 2;6) took part in the study. All 
participants were volunteers. Including criteria were being Italian native speaker. 
Exclusion criteria were diagnosis of learning disabilities, non corrected visual or 
auditory deficits or significant cognitive impairments. 
 
2.1.2.2 Materials  
 
For all participants, the same set of sentences and pictures (corresponding to one of 
the four lists of stimuli of the complete experimental paradigm) was used, for a 
total of 240 experimental items. Each item was composed by a sentence and a 
picture. All sentences were Italian sentences, composed by an animate agent as 
subject (i.e., a person/a cartoon character/an animal), a transitive verb in the gerund 
form (e.g., sta mangiando, ‘is eating’), and an inanimate entity as object 
complement. Sentences could be either affirmative (60 stimuli, e.g., Cenerentola 
sta pulendo il pavimento, ‘Cinderella is cleaning the floor’) or negatives (60 
stimuli, e.g., Cenerentola non sta pulendo il pavimento, ‘Cinderella is not cleaning 
the floor’). All sentences were intended to describe equally plausible situations and 
could not be considered true or false by themselves, but their truth-value could only 
be determined trough the comparison with the picture. The pictures were black-
and-white images representing two different characters performing two different 
actions. In all pictures, one of the two characters and one of the actions performed 
by the characters corresponded to those mentioned in the previous sentence. 
Depending on the truth-value of the sentence, the association between the character 
and the activity could correspond or not to that expressed in the sentence. The 
combination between sentence polarity and truth-sentence generated thus four 
experimental conditions: true affirmative sentences (TA, 60 stimuli), false 
affirmative sentences (FA, 30 stimuli), true negative sentences (TN, 60 stimuli), 
and false negative sentences (FN, 60 stimuli). An example of the four experimental 
conditions is reported in TABLE 3 (page 106).  
 Receptive vocabulary was controlled comparing the lexical items used in the 
sentences with Marconi, Ott, Pesenti, Ratti, and Tavella (1994)’s lexicon of 
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primary school Italian children. The comparison confirmed that, except for very 
few exceptions (cow boy ‘cow boy’, aquilone ‘kite’, sbucciare, ‘to peel’), all 
lexical items were expected to be known since primary school.
92
 Given the medium 
frequency of the few words which were not included in Marconi et al. (1994), we 
expected that they would not be problematic for the participants. A reduced set of 
30 Italian transitive verbs was used. Each verb had eight occurrences through the 
experiment, once every 30 sentences. All sentences had been recorded by a female 
voice and had a variable duration between 2000 and 3000ms. 
 All characters depicted in the pictures were easily recognizable cartoon 
characters, animals or highly stereotyped figures (e.g., a policeman, a thief, etc.), 
each one appearing an equal number of times through the experiment. To facilitate 
their identification, the characters were always presented in fixed couples (e.g., 
Grumpy with Snow White, Daisy Duck with Minnie, the indian with the cow boy, 
etc., see examples in the Appendix A).  
 The reader interested in more detailed information concerning stimuli 
construction, counterbalancing and plausibility is referred to the Materials section 
of the main study (§ 3.2.2). 
 
 
2.1.2.3 Procedure 
 
2.1.2.3.1 Sentence picture-verification task  
 
Each participant was tested individually in a silent, quiet room at the Dipartimento 
di Scienze Neurologiche e del Movimento (University of Verona). Prior to the 
beginning of the test, participants were familiarized with the couples of characters 
depicted in the pictures and were asked to memorize the name of those that they 
did not remember well. They were informed that they would listen to a series of 
sentences, each followed by a picture, and that their task would be to express 
whether they considered the sentence to be true or false on the basis of its 
congruence/incongruence to the following picture. The choice between true and 
false had to be expressed by pressing a corresponding button on the keyboard.
93
 
Participants were warned that the picture would not stay on the screen for long 
(350ms) and, that, therefore, they would have needed to pay very much attention to 
the appearance of the picture. In order to inhibit horizontal eye-movements, in 
addition, they were asked to limit eye movements as much as possible, together 
with any other movement not strictly necessary for the execution of the task. They 
had no time limitation for making their decision, but they were informed that it was 
important to express their judgments as quickly and accurately as possible. Once 
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 This aspect was taken into consideration with a view to the adoption of the experimental 
protocol with primary school children (see the paragraph dedicated to the preliminary study 
with children below). 
93
 The numerical button 1 was assigned to the answer “true”, the numerical button 2 to the 
answer “false”.  
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the subject had pressed the true/false button, the subsequent stimulus was 
presented. No feedback on the subjects’ responses was provided during the 
performance of the task.  
 Experimental stimuli were presented through E-Prime software. The 240 
sentence-picture pairs were subdivided in 8 blocks of 30 sentences each; at the end 
of each block the participant had the possibility to take a break for as long as she 
preferred. During each trial, the participant first listened to the sentence. After a 
pause of 250ms, then, she was presented with a picture, which remained displayed 
on the screen for 350ms. Experimental items were preceded by a warming-up 
session to familiarize the subjects with the task and to make sure that she had 
correctly understood the instructions. This session was composed by 8 sentence-
picture pairs similar to the experimental items.  
 The testing session had duration of about one hour and half, including about one 
hour necessary for the placing of the electrodes cap. 
 
2.1.2.3.2 EGG recording 
 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted 
on an elastic cap according to the International 10–20 system over frontal (Fp1, 
Fp2, Fz, FC1 and FC2), central (C3, Cz, C4, CP1 and CP2), parietal (P3, Pz and 
P4), occipital (O1 and O2) and posterior (Iz, I1, I2) areas of the scalp, and on the 
left mastoid. All of the electrodes were referenced to the right mastoid. Horizontal 
eye movements were detected by means of the electro-oculogram (EOG) that was 
recorded as the differential voltage between two electrodes placed near the external 
canthi of the left and right eyes. Vertical eye movements and blinks were detected 
by an electrode placed just above and below the right eye. The impedance of all the 
electrodes was kept below 5 kΩ. EEG and EOG signals was sampled at 500 Hz, 
filtered with a band-pass of DC 100 Hz, digitized and amplified. 
 
 
2.1.3 Results 
 
2.1.3.1  Behavioral measures 
 
All participants were able to perform the task and reached a percentage of correct 
answers above 75%; therefore, all subjects were included in the analysis. 
Descriptive statistics of accuracy and response times are reported in TABLE 4 
below. As for accuracy, no differences were found between affirmative and 
negative sentences. Response times, on the contrary, were influenced by both 
sentence polarity and sentence polarity by truth-value interaction. Negative 
sentences reported overall longer reaction times in comparison with affirmative 
sentences, but the two types of sentence were differently influenced by the truth-
value variable: while false affirmative sentences had longer verification times than 
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true sentences, false negative sentences received faster responses than true negative 
sentences.  
 
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics – Preliminary study with adults. 
 
Average results 
(10 subject) 
True 
AFF 
False 
AFF 
True 
NEG 
False 
NEG 
Correct responses 
out of 60 (SD) 
56,20 
(3) 
55,40 
(4,2) 
53,50 
(5,3) 
56,80 
(1,7) 
Reaction times (SD) 
1315 
(335,6) 
1447 
(391,8) 
1644 
(352,4) 
1609 
(403,3) 
 
 
Both accuracy and reaction times measures were submitted to a 2 (polarity) x 2 
(truth-value) ANOVA. The analysis revealed an effect of polarity [F (1, 9) = 
59.906, p ≤ .001] and truth-value by polarity interaction [F (1, 9) = 5.529, p ≤ .05] 
for reaction times, but not for accuracy [polarity F (1, 9) = 4.225, p = .452; truth-
value by polarity interaction F (1, 9) = 3.297, p = .103]. The truth-value variable, 
on the other hand, was not significant either for reaction times [F (1, 9) = 1.793, p 
= .213] and accuracy [F (1, 9) = 3.187, p = .108]. The data resulting from the 
statistical analysis are summarized in TABLE 5. 
 
TABLE 5. ANOVA results – Preliminary study with adults. 
 
Dep. variables Effect F (1,9) p-value 
Accuracy polarity 4.225 .452 
 
truth-value 3.187 .108 
polarity*truth 3.297 .103 
Reaction times polarity 59.90 ≤ .001 * 
 
truth-value 1.793 .213 
polarity*truth 5.529 ≤ .05 * 
 
 
2.1.3.2 EEG analysis  
 
EGG recordings of four participants were excluded from the analysis because of 
unexpected technical problems. For this reason, only a qualitative analysis was 
performed on the data of the remaining six participants.
94
 In order to verify the 
amount of horizontal eye-movements recorded on the EEG during the visualization 
of the picture, eogh virtual channel analysis was computed as the difference 
between the potential of a site placed on the right external chantus (RHEOG) 
                                                 
94
 The analysis of the EEG was made possible thanks to the collaboration of Francesco 
Vespignani (University of Trento). 
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minus a site placed on the left external chantus (LHEOG). Given that the eye has a 
positive dipole directed outward the head, a positive deflection in the eogh channel 
was read as a movement toward the right side, while negative deflections were read 
as a movement towards the left side of the screen. Data were just low pass filtered 
at 100Hz and no rejection of other artifacts was done; therefore, all the trials were 
considered. Visual inspection of single trails EEG recording within the early time 
between 200ms prior to image presentation and 400ms after its onset showed the 
presence of many horizontal saccades. All subjects except one tended to initially 
move the eyes toward left in all conditions. Eye artifacts were very large (around 
14 µV). 
 In order to perform the analysis of the ERPs on the picture, epochs from 600ms 
prestimulus to 1500ms post-stimulus were excluded. EEG recordings were applied 
a low pass filter (80Hz) and the data were re-referenced to the average of the 
mastoids. Given that the high number of horizontal eye-movements made it 
impossible to remove all the trials contaminated, it was necessary to adopt eye-
movements correction in order to perform ERPs analysis on the picture. For this 
reason, independent component analysis (ICA) was applied. It is worth noting, 
however, that ICA could not represent the most adequate solution for our case, as it 
generally requires much many EEG sites (around 64) and a good spatial sampling 
of the frontal region around the eye to correctly capture the artefactual component. 
Prior to ICA decomposition, data were resample at 200Hz. ICA components 
relative to vertical and horizontal eye movement were visually identified and 
removed (from 2 to 4 components were rejected). Data were then back projected 
and trials affected by residual eye movements or other artifacts were manually 
eliminated. Qualitatively, the ICA correction worked well only for some of the six 
subjects. Before single subjects averaging in the four experimental conditions, a 
baseline correction in the [-300ms, 0ms] interval was performed and a further low 
pass filter (30Hz) was applied. The resultant grand averages are plotted in FIGURE 
1 – Appendix B.  
 The data show that a probable interaction between polarity and congruency 
emerged after around 600ms from picture onset. A closer look to Cz electrode 
(whose plot is magnified in FIGURE 6, next page), however, showed no clearly 
identifiable N400 patterns.   
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FIGURE 6. ERPs to the picture at Cz. 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Discussion and conclusions 
 
In line with previous findings, the behavioral results reflected increased difficulty 
in negative sentences relative to affirmative sentences interpretation, as indicated 
by significant differences in reaction times. The results of this preliminary study, 
therefore, confirmed that the experimental paradigm was adequate to capture 
behavioral differences in the interpretation of affirmative and negative sentences. 
Though extremely repetitive and relatively long, in addition, the task turned out to 
be highly sustainable for young adult subjects. 
 EEG data revealed that, despite the short time of visualization of the image 
(350ms), many early eye-movements were still present in the recordings. As a 
consequence, the necessity of adopting eye artifacts correction for ERP analysis 
was taken into consideration. No other technical problems emerged from the pilot 
application of the EEG technique. No significant results about the processing of 
negation could be inferred from the pilot study, neither in the direction of Lüdtke et 
al. (2008), nor in that of Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008). The lack of 
interpretable N400 modulations, however, was likely to be due to the very low 
number of subjects and to the eye-correction technique adopted. All in all, 
therefore, we did not consider the limitations observed in the pilot study to 
represent discouraging factors for the execution of an EEG study on the processing 
of negation with a larger number of adult participants. This research is the object of 
STUDY 1. 
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2.2 A behavioral study on negative sentences interpretation in primary 
school children 
 
2.2.1  Introduction 
 
This second preliminary study, performed with a group of 33 Italian primary 
school children, had the double purpose of verifying whether the experimental task 
could be adequate to the cognitive capacities of children of an age similar to that of 
Vender and Delfitto (2010)’s participants and, eventually, to re-calibrate the 
experimental settings in order to make the task more sustainable for them. These 
concerns were motivated by the consideration of three main differences between 
our experimental design and Vender and Delfitto (2010)’s sentence-picture-
verification task, concerning (a) the characteristics of the images, (b) the time 
available for their visualization, and (c) the duration of the task. As already 
discussed above, in Vender and Delfitto (2010)’s study the experimental pictures 
were characterized by the presence of a single subject, not always corresponding to 
the one mentioned in the previous sentence (see § 3.2.3.1 for a description of the 
study). Though simplifying the process of evaluation of the truth-value of the 
sentence, this choice determined an important unbalance in the pragmatic 
plausibility of the two conditions. To avoid this effect, as we said, we arranged our 
sentence-picture verification task such that the action mentioned in the sentence 
was always depicted in the correspondent picture. As a consequence, our images 
were characterized by the presence of two characters and two different actions, 
resulting in more complex visual scenes and, most likely, more difficult 
verification processes.  
 Other possible sources of extra difficulty derived from the fact that the protocol 
was intended to be employed in an EEG study. This latter aspect determined two 
main constrains for the experimental design. First of all, the necessity of having a 
high amount of EEG recordings for each experimental condition resulted in a very 
elevated number of stimuli (60 stimuli per condition in the original version of the 
protocol, 30 stimuli in the reduced version created for the preliminary study with 
primary school children). Differently from Vender and Delfitto (2010), in addition, 
true and false affirmative sentences were also included in stimuli with the purpose 
of investigating the processing cost specifically associated with the presence of 
negation. As a consequence, the task had a duration which could possibly exceed 
children’s maintenance of attention. Secondly, as we said, the planned application 
of the same protocol in an EEG study made it necessary to control for participants’ 
horizontal eye movements by limiting the time of visualization of the images to a 
fixed amount of milliseconds. Nevertheless, this limitation could in principle 
represent an extra difficulty in comparison with Vender and Delfitto’s study, in 
which the pictures stayed on the screen until the child had provided her truth-value 
judgment. 
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2.2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.2.1 Participants  
 
A total of 33 Italian children (mean age 9;5) took part in the study. All children 
were attending the third year of primary school and had been recruited trough their 
school institutions (Scuola Primaria “C. Collodi”, Isola della Scala, Verona, and 
Scuola Primaria “A. Cesari”, San Giovanni Lupatoto, Verona). Children’s parents 
were informed about the purposes and the procedure of the study and were asked 
written consensus concerning their children participation. Including criteria were 
being Italian native speaker (though not necessarily monolingual Italian speaker) 
and having an average school performance. Exclusion criteria were diagnosis of 
learning disabilities, non corrected visual or auditory deficits or significant 
cognitive impairments, poor knowledge of Italian.  
 
2.2.2.2 Materials 
 
For all participants, the same set of sentences and pictures were employed, for a 
total of 120 experimental items. The pictures and the sentences had the same 
characteristics of the stimuli used for the preliminary study with adults, but the 
number of the stimuli was reduced by half with respect to the original version of 
the paradigm, resulting in a total of 120 experimental items. As a consequence, the 
test was composed by 30 sentences for each condition (30 true affirmatives, 30 
false affirmatives, 30 true negatives, 30 false negatives). 
 
2.2.2.3 Procedure 
 
Each participant was tested individually during school hours, in a quite silent room 
within the school. Prior to the beginning of the test, participants were familiarized 
with the couples of characters depicted in the pictures and were asked to memorize 
the name of those that they did not know well. They were reassured that they 
would simply play a game with the computer and they were instructed to listen 
carefully to the sentence and then to decide whether the picture matched the 
sentence or not by pressing the corresponding button on the keyboard.
95
 They were 
warned that the picture would not stay on the screen for long and, therefore, they 
would need to pay very much attention to the appearance, although the task could 
appear quite long and demanding. They had no time limitation for making their 
decision, but they were informed that it was important that they express their 
judgments as quickly and accurately as possible. Once the subjects had expressed 
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 The numerical button 1 was assigned to the answer “true”, the numerical button 2 to the 
answer “false”. To facilitate the association of each button with the correspondent answer, 
the two buttons were covered by a green and a red sticker, respectively. 
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their judgments, the following sentence was presented. No feedback to subjects’ 
responses was provided during the performance of the task. 
 For stimuli presentation, E-Prime software was used. The 120 sentence-picture 
pairs were presented in 4 blocks of 30 sentences each; at the end of each block the 
participant had the possibility to take a break for as long as she preferred and, if 
necessary, was motivated to continue the task although it could be felt as boring or 
difficult. Experimental items were preceded by a warming-up session to familiarize 
the subjects with the task and to make sure that all of them correctly understood the 
instructions. This session was composed by 8 sentence-picture pairs similar to 
those used as experimental items. During each trial, the participant first listened to 
the sentence, orally presented; then, she was presented with a picture on a 
computer screen in front of her. Both reaction times and accuracy were measured.  
 The amount of time occurring between the sentence and the picture (SOA 
interval) and the time of presentation of the picture were manipulated across 
subjects. The first 5 children were tested with a SOA interval of 250ms, after which 
the picture was displayed on the screen for 250ms. Since all five children had 
below chance performance with these settings, the time of presentation of the 
picture has been progressively lengthened with the following 7 children. The 
persisting poor performance suggested that the difficulties were probably due to the 
too short SOAs adopted, which did not give them time enough to process the first 
before being presented with the second stimulus, resulting in random answers to 
the picture. For this reason, a SAO of 1000ms was set for the remaining 21 
children. Of these, 11 children saw the picture for 500ms (Group 1); the remaining 
10 children saw the picture for 350ms (Group 2). This difference was intended to 
identify the shortest period of visualization of the picture necessary to 9 year-old 
children for correctly performing the task. The main features of Group 1 and Group 
2 are summarized in TABLE 6. 
 
TABLE 6. Main features of Group 1 and Group 2. 
 
Group Number Mean age 
SOA 
interval 
Picture 
visualization 
Group 1 11 9;6 1000ms 500ms 
Group 2 10 9;4 1000ms 350ms 
 
 
2.2.3 Results 
 
As we said, the first 5 participants (tested with a SOA of 250ms and a picture 
presentation of 250ms) had a significantly below chance performance, indicating 
that the experimental designed proposed was likely not to be adequate to their 
cognitive capacities. These results were not unexpected, as the main objective of 
the preliminary study was precisely that of calibrating the time settings of the 
experimental design on children cognitive abilities. Subsequent attempts of 
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manipulation of the duration of the SOA interval led to the observation that an 
inter-stimuli interval of 1000ms resulted tolerable for 9 years-old children. The 
remaining two groups of subjects, tested with this setting, reported more interesting 
results. Most of the participants of the two groups had an overall above chance 
performance, indicating that the task was compatible with their cognitive 
capacities. Nevertheless, many children appeared very fatigued and showed to lose 
concentration during the execution of the task and had to be convinced to continue. 
This observation indicates that, although both versions of the task (picture 
presentation set on 500ms/picture presentation set on 350ms) were feasible for 9-
years-old children, the number of experimental trials represented a source of great 
difficulty for many of them.  
 For both groups, only participants with a percentage of correct answers above 
75% were included in the analysis. This led to the exclusion of 3 children of Group 
1 (500ms) and 2 children of the Group 2 (350ms). As a consequence, the results of 
8 children for each group were considered. Descriptive statistics of accuracy and 
response times of Group 1 are reported in TABLE 7. 
 
TABLE 7. Average correct responses and reaction times of Group 1. 
 
Group 1 (500ms) 
True 
AFF 
False 
AFF 
True 
NEG 
False 
NEG 
Correct responses 
out of 30 (SD) 
27,4 
(1,30) 
26,3 
(2,43) 
22,1 
(2,75) 
25,3 
(2,71) 
Reaction times (SD) 
2208 
(619) 
2525 
(717) 
3094 
(882) 
2930 
(529) 
 
 
The verification of negative sentences was characterized by poorer accuracy and 
longer reaction times with respect to affirmative sentences. The number of correct 
responses, in addition, was significantly lower for true negative sentences with 
respect to false negative sentences. Both accuracy and reaction times were 
submitted to a 2 (polarity) x 2 (truth-value) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 
polarity variable resulted significant both with respect to accuracy [F (1, 7) = 
17.157, p ≤ .005] and reaction times [F (1, 7) = 43.739, p ≤ .001]. Truth-value, on 
the other hand, was not significant neither for accuracy [F (1, 7) = 2.800, p = .138] 
nor for reaction times [F (1, 7) = 1.213, p = .307]. Polarity by truth-value 
interaction had a main effect on accuracy [F (1, 7) = 8.464, p ≤ .05], while it only 
approximated significance for reaction times [F (1, 7) = 4.797, p = .065]. The 
relevant data are summarized in TABLE 8 below. The descriptive statistics of the 
performance of Group 2 are reported in TABLE 9. 
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TABLE 8. ANOVA results – Group 1. 
 
Dep. Variables Effect F (1,7) p-value 
Accuracy polarity 17.15 ≤ .005 * 
 
truth-value 2.80 .138 
polarity*truth 8.46 ≤ .05 * 
Reaction times polarity 43.73 ≤ .001 * 
 
truth-value 1.21 .307 
polarity*truth 4.79 .065 
•
 
 
TABLE 9. Average correct responses and reaction times of Group 2. 
 
Group 2 (350ms) 
True 
AFF 
False 
AFF 
True 
NEG 
False 
NEG 
Correct responses 
out of 30 (SD) 
27,5 
(2,14) 
24,9 
(1,36) 
26,1 
(2,17) 
25,1 
(3,72) 
Reaction times (SD) 
2642 
(729) 
3188 
(463) 
3340 
(683) 
3571 
(942) 
 
 
Similarly to Group 1, Group 2 exhibited longer reaction times for negative 
sentences relative to affirmative sentences. Despite this, no main differences in the 
average of correct responses were found between sentences of opposite polarity. 
On the contrary, the level of accuracy varied with respect to sentence truth-value, 
with false sentences reporting lower correct responses in comparison with true 
sentences, be it affirmative or negative. Again, a 2 (polarity) x 2 (truth-value) 
ANOVA was conducted on the two measures (accuracy, reaction times). 
Differently from Group 1, a main effect of polarity was found for reaction times [F 
(1, 7) = 6.669, p ≤ .05], but not for accuracy [F (1, 7) = .256, p = .628]. The truth-
value variable was significant for both reaction times [F (1, 7) = 6.389, p ≤ .05] and 
accuracy [F (1, 7) = 8.988, p = ≤ .05]. Polarity by truth-value interaction was 
neither significant with respect to accuracy [F (1, 7) = 1.452, p = .267], nor to 
reaction times [F (1, 7) = .977, p = .356]. The results of ANOVA analysis are 
summarized in TABLE 10.  
 
TABLE 10. ANOVA results – Group 2. 
 
Dep. variables Effect F (1,7) p-value 
Accuracy polarity .25 .628 
 
truth-value 8.98 ≤ .05 * 
polarity*truth 1.45 .267 
Reaction times polarity 6.66 ≤ .05 * 
 
truth-value 6.38 ≤ .05 * 
polarity*truth .97 .356 
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The differences in the performance of the two groups were separately tested by 
means of 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA analysis on accuracy and reaction times, with group 
(Group 1, Group 2) as between-subject variable and polarity (affirmative, negative) 
and truth-value (true, false) as within-subject variables. The analysis evidenced a 
lack of group effect on both reaction times [F (1, 7) = .184, p = .675] and accuracy 
[F (1, 7) = 1.743, p = .208]. The truth-value by group interaction reached 
significance with respect to accuracy [F (1, 7) =10.946, p ≤. 01]. 
 
 
2.2.4 Discussion and conclusions 
 
In line with previous findings, the results of both groups showed that the 
processing of negative sentences need significantly more time in comparison with 
affirmative sentences, as reflected by overall higher response times in negative 
conditions in comparison with affirmative conditions. The lack of very strong 
differences in the overall performance of the two groups, in addition, indicates that 
both versions of the experiments can be considered adequate to 9-year-old 
children’s cognitive capacities. This result suggests that, when given enough time 
to process the sentences before being presented to the picture (SOA = 1000ms), 
children perform above chance even reducing the time of visualization of the 
picture from 500ms to 350ms. The average accuracy of the two groups, however, 
was characterized by slightly different patterns. The major difficulty associated 
with negation, in fact, was reflected in higher error rates in negative conditions 
than in affirmative conditions in Group 1 (500ms), but not in Group 2 (350ms), 
which reported a very similar percentage of correct responses in affirmatives (87%) 
and negatives conditions (85%). Group 1’s accuracy rates, in addition, were 
significantly influenced by the interaction between truth-value and sentence 
polarity, with true affirmatives reporting higher percentages of correct responses 
(91%) than false affirmatives (88%) and false negatives sentences receiving most 
accurate responses (84%) than true negative sentences (74%). Conversely, the 
accuracy of Group 2 was affected only by sentence truth-value (true conditions: 
89%; false conditions: 83%). These differences suggest that the shorter SOA 
adopted with Group 2 may had the effect of making the verification process very 
difficult in general, thus rendering less visible the difficulty depending on the 
linguistic difference between the stimuli (i.e. affirmative vs. negative sentences).  
 Even if the limited period of visualization of the picture did not constitute an 
obstacle to the execution of the task by primary school children, other 
considerations discouraged the application of the paradigm for a EEG study with 
children. First of all, despite the fact that only half of the experimental items 
prepared for the EEG investigation (120 sentence-pictures pairs in place of 240) 
were included in this version of the experiment, the task was perceived as very 
long and demanding by the children. This perception was probably also due to the 
lengthening of the SOA interval up to 1000ms, which was however necessary for 
enabling their execution of the task. The very long response latencies, in addition, 
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also contributed to the overall lengthening of the task. Taken all together, these 
observations made it hardly imaginable to test primary school children with the 
whole set of 240 experimental stimuli. Secondly, but not less importantly, most of 
the children who participated in the preliminary study could not stand still during 
the execution of the task, and waved their legs or clapped their fingers or move 
they heads around for most of the time. This latter factor resulted crucially 
problematic for a possible EEG study with children, as it would probably 
determine artifacts contamination of a quite high number of experimental trials. As 
a consequence, we considered the possibility of performing the EEG study with 
dyslexic adults, in place of primary school dyslexic children. This study is the 
object of STUDY 2. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3 STUDY 1: AN ERP STUDY ON THE PROCESSING OF NEGATION IN 
 ITALIAN YOUNG ADULTS 
 
 
3.1  Methods 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
 
A group of 27 Italian adults (mean age 27:6; SD 3;25) took part in the study. All 
participants were Italian native-speakers, had normal or corrected to normal vision, 
normal hearing, absence of neurological problems, and normal non-verbal QI.
96
 
They had all received a high school diploma and were undergraduate students or 
graduate subjects at the moment of testing. All participants were volunteers and did 
not receive payment for their participation.   
 
3.1.2 Materials 
 
The task included 240 experimental trials, each one composed by a sentence 
followed by a black and white picture. A total of 240 pictures were prepared. All 
the pictures represented a couple of easily recognizable characters, such as cartoon 
characters (e.g., Aladdin and Jasmine) or highly stereotyped characters (e.g., a 
policeman and a thief). To facilitate character recognition and to avoid strangeness 
in the coupling, a total of 30 fixed couples was chosen, each of which appeared in 8 
pictures (e.g., Minnie and Daisy Duck, Little Red Riding Hood and the 
grandmother, Cinderella and the stepmother, Bart and Lisa Simpson, etc.). In all 
pictures, the two characters were performing two different actions, taken from a set 
of 60 very recognizable activities (e.g., closing the door, driving the car, washing 
dishes), corresponding to the predicates appearing in the experimental sentences. 
Each activity was depicted in eight out of the 240 pictures, each time performed by 
a different character. In half of the eight occurrences, in addition, the action was 
performed on a certain object, in the other half on another object. To exemplify, the 
action corresponding to the verb chiudere (‘to close’) was referred to a door in four 
experimental items, to a suitcase in the other four occurrences. The number of 
times in which the character mentioned in the sentence appeared in the right or in 
the left side of the pictures was not initially considered as a main factor of 
balancing; as a consequence, it resulted only roughly balanced. All the pictures 
illustrate common objects and actions plausible with the characters that were 
performing them. Pictures quality and properties had been equalized (bpi 95, 
102x768 pixel) through the GIMP software. The full set of images used in the 
experiment is reported in the Appendix A. 
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 Non-verbal QI was controlled through the administration of Caffarra et al. (2003)’s 
version of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices.  
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 Each picture was paired with four sentences, for a total of 960 experimental 
sentences. The 960 sentences were used to create four lists of stimuli which 
counterbalanced items and conditions through the ‘latin square distribution’, on the 
basis of which each list included only one of the four sentences (true affirmative 
sentence, false affirmative sentences, true negative sentence, false negative 
sentence) associated to a certain picture. All sentences were Italian active sentences 
with a singular agent subject, a transitive verb on the present gerundive form, and 
an inanimate object as complement. For each list, half of the sentences were 
affirmative and half negative. Of the affirmatives, half of the sentences were true 
and half were false; equally, of the negatives, half of the sentences were true and 
half were false. As a consequence, the stimuli included four possible situations: (a) 
affirmative sentences expressing a correct description of the situation depicted; (b) 
affirmative sentences attributing the performance of the mentioned action to the 
wrong character; (c) negative sentences denying the attribution of the action 
performed by one characters to the alternative character represented; (d) negative 
sentences denying the execution of a certain action by the character actually 
performing it. The combination between the sentence polarity and sentence 
congruence/incongruence with the picture, therefore, yielded four experimental 
conditions: (a) true affirmative sentences; (b) false affirmative sentences; (c) true 
negative sentences; (d) false negative sentences. An example of the stimuli 
associated with each experimental condition can be found in TABLE 3. The full set 
of sentences created for one of the four lists is reported as an example in the 
Appendix A. 
 All sentences had a variable duration between 2000ms and 3000ms. They had 
been recorded by a female voice and digitally edited through the Audacity 
software. All sentences had a neutral prosody with no special focus on any of the 
words of the sentence, resulting in very ‘descriptive’ utterances. As said, receptive 
vocabulary was controlled comparing the lexical items used in the sentences with 
Marconi et al. (1994)’s lexicon of primary school Italian children. The comparison 
confirmed that, except for very few exceptions (cow boy ‘cow boy’, aquilone 
‘kite’, sbucciare, ‘to peel’), the lexical items used in the sentences corresponded to 
very familiar words. Object complements nouns were mostly introduced by Italian 
indefinite articles or prepositions (e.g., un/una, del/della/delle, etc.), except from 
few cases of collocations, in which definite articles were used (e.g., ascoltare la 
radio, ‘listening to the radio’; spegnere il fuoco, ‘extinguishing the fire’; preparare 
la tavola, ‘setting the table’; guidare la macchina, ‘driving the car’ guardare la 
televisione, ‘watching the television’; contare le carte, ‘counting cards’; pulire gli 
occhiali,, ‘cleaning the glasses’, etc.).  
 
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
 
Each participant was tested individually in the Brain Vision Lab of the 
Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche e del Movimento of the University of 
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Verona. Positioning the electrodes cap took around 45 minutes. During the 
preparation, the participants were approximately informed about the type of data 
which would be recorded and were asked to limit all the movements not strictly 
related to the execution of the task during the testing session, with particular 
insistence on the importance of avoiding horizontal eye-movements as much as 
possible. They were informed that they would have been firstly auditory presented 
to a sentence and then to a picture, which would be displayed on the screen for a 
limited amount of time. They were told that their task was evaluating the truth-
value of each sentence on the basis of the following picture, and that they had to 
express their judgment by pressing 1 (= true) or 2 (= false) button on the keyboard. 
They had no time limitation for making their decision, but they were informed that 
it was important for them to express their congruency judgments as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Once the subject had expressed her judgment, the following 
sentence was presented.  
 Around one week before the date of the test, each participant received an email 
containing the presentation of the 30 fixed couples of characters appearing in the 
experimental pictures, with the request of memorizing those she knew less well. 
For this reason, no specific time for the familiarization with the characters was 
planned before the beginning of the test. The participants who expressed the 
necessity of reviewing the couples of characters, however, were given some 
minutes to visualize them.  
 In order to counterbalance items and conditions, the 26 participants were tested 
with the four sets of sentences created by assigning one of the four sentences 
associated with each picture to a different list (‘latin square distribution’). 7 
subjects were tested with List 1; 7 subjects with List 2; 7 subjects with List 3; 6 
subjects with List 4. For each list, the 240 sentence-picture pairs were divided in 8 
blocks, which were presented in random order. At the end of each block, the 
participant had the possibly to take a break for as long as she preferred. No picture 
and/or sentence were repeated twice across the blocks. To avoid confusion between 
the different pictures of each block, each couple of characters occurred only once 
per block. During each trial, the participant first listened to the sentence and then 
saw the picture. On the basis of Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s short-delay condition, the 
SOA interval was set on 250ms. Given the higher complexity of the pictures used 
in the present study in comparison with Lüdtke and collegues' ones (in which the 
picture displaying had been limited to 250ms), picture presentation was set up to 
350ms, that is, the amount of time the pilot study demonstrated to be sufficient for 
adult participants to reach an above chance performance in the task. The 
participants did not receive any feedback on their responses. During the entire task, 
the EEG signal was continuously recorded. At the beginning of the task, a 
warming-up session common for all participants was administered to familiarize 
the subject with the task and to make sure she correctly understood the instructions. 
This session was composed by 8 sentence-picture pairs. Accuracy and the reaction 
times of these latter trials were not included in the analysis of the performance. All 
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the sentences were auditorily presented through headphones, while the pictures 
were displayed on a computer screen placed on a table in front of the participants. 
 
 
3.1.3.1 EEG recording 
 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted 
on an elastic cap according to the International 10–20 system over frontal (Fp1, Fp2, 
Fz, FC1 and FC2), central (C3, Cz, C4, CP1 and CP2), parietal (P3, Pz and P4), 
occipital (O1 and O2) and posterior (Iz, I1, I2) areas of the scalp, and on the left 
mastoid. All of the electrodes were referenced to the left mastoid. Horizontal eye 
movements were detected by means of the electro-oculogram (EOG), which was 
recorded as the differential voltage between two electrodes placed near the external 
canthi of the left and right eyes. Vertical eye movements and blinks were detected by 
two electrode placed just above and below the right eye. The impedance of all the 
electrodes was kept below 5 kΩ. EEG and EOG signals was sampled at 500 Hz, 
filtered with a band-pass of DC 100 Hz, digitized and amplified. 
 
 
3.2 Results 
 
3.2.1 Behavioral measures 
 
Only the participants who reached an accuracy of at least 75% of correct responses 
were included in the analysis. This led to the exclusion of one participant who did not 
realized that the action mentioned in the sentence was always depicted in the 
following one, although not being always performed by the expected character. 
Differently, all other participants referred that after some trials they had become 
aware of this pattern and had managed to take advantage from it for the evaluation of 
sentence truth-value in those cases in which they did not have the opportunity of 
looking at both situations depicted in the scene. Another subject was excluded from 
the analysis because of technical problems with the E-Prime software during the 
execution of the task. As a consequence, the analysis included was performed on 25 
subjects (7 for List 1; 5 for List 2; 7 for List 3; 6 for List 4). For each subject, the 
average reaction times for each experimental condition were calculated. Reaction 
times deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from mean were discarded from 
the analysis, together with the corresponding truth-value responses. This eliminated 
about 2% of the data. Descriptive statistics of the data included in the analysis are 
reported in TABLE 11. 
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TABLE 11. Average accuracy and response times – Study 1. 
 
Average results 
(25 subject) 
True 
AFF 
False 
AFF 
True 
NEG 
False 
NEG 
Correct responses 
out of 60 (SD) 
56,4 
(2,36) 
54,8 
(1,92) 
52,4 
(4,97) 
55,1 
(2,65) 
Reaction times (SD) 
1100 
(265,2) 
1263 
(291,2) 
1536 
(352,6) 
1531 
(400,1) 
 
 
A 2 (polarity) x 2 (truth-value) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
both accuracy and reaction times. The polarity variable had a main effect on both 
accuracy [F (1, 24) = 12.589, p ≤ .005] and reaction times [F (1, 24) = 142.450, p ≤ 
.001]. The truth-value factor had a significant effect on reaction times [F (1, 24) = 
9.518, p ≤ .005], though not on accuracy [F (1, 24) = 1.678, p = .208]. To conclude, 
the truth-value by polarity interaction was significant for both accuracy [F (1, 24) = 
11.616, p ≤ .005] and reaction times [F (1, 24) = 13.686, p ≤ .001]. For clarity 
convenience, the results of the statistical analysis are summarized in TABLE 12 
below.  
TABLE 12. ANOVA results – Study 1. 
 
Dep. variables Effect F (1,24) p-value 
Accuracy polarity 12.58 ≤ .005 * 
 
truth-value 1.67 .208 
polarity*truth 11.61 ≤ .005 * 
Reaction times polarity 142.45 ≤ .001 * 
 
truth-value 9.51 ≤ .005 * 
polarity*truth 13.68 ≤ .001 * 
 
 
As it can be observed in the means of the two groups reported above, the 
significant polarity effect reflects the longer response times and higher error rates 
characterizing negative sentences interpretation in comparison with affirmative 
sentences. The truth-value effect on response times, on the other hand, seems to be 
mostly determined by the different response times associated to the verification of 
true and false sentences limitedly to the affirmative conditions. The polarity by 
truth-value effect shows that, in line with previous findings, accuracy rates were 
differently affected by sentence truth-value in affirmative and negative conditions, 
with false affirmative and true negative sentences reporting higher error rates than 
false affirmative and false negative sentences, respectively. A comparable effect 
characterized the average reaction times, though the difference between true and 
false conditions was extremely stronger for affirmative than for negative condition. 
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3.2.2 EEG analysis  
 
ERPs extraction was performed through the Fieldtrip software (Oostenveld and 
Fries, 2011). Data of all other channels were re-referenced to the average activity 
of the two mastoids, filtered with an 80Hz low-pass filter and resample at 200Hz. 
On epochs extracted around the onset of the images [-600, 1500] ms, an ICA was 
calculated to remove ocular artifacts. After ICA calculation, topography and time 
course of the components were visually inspected to detect which components may 
be linked to blink, horizontal eye-movement and vertical eye-movement. No other 
components, even if likely to be linked to some type of artifact, were removed. For 
each subject, the number of removed components ranged from 1 to 3. After this 
stage, very noisy (broken or detached electrodes) channels were interpolated. In 
particular, it was necessary to interpolate one channel for 3 subjects and two non-
adjacent channels for 2 subjects. Interpolation was performed through the ‘spline 
interpolation method’ implemented in Fieldtrip.  
 Automatic epoch rejection was performed prior to single subject average by 
excluding epochs for which at least one channel overcome the threshold of 140 µV 
in the difference between maximum and minimum voltage amplitude. Only 
subjects for which less of at least 60% of the total epochs were not rejected were 
included in the analysis. This led to the exclusion of 4 of the 25 subjects who 
participated to the study. 
 The remaining epochs were separately averaged for each subject and condition 
after removing baseline activity calculated as the average potential for each 
electrode in the  
[-400,0]ms pre-stimulus interval. Data analysis was performed in shorter epochs [-
400,1450] in order to eliminate interval border effects (residual artifacts that are 
only partially included in the epoch and filtering artifacts). Single subject averages 
have been used to calculate across-subjects grand-averages relative to each 
experimental condition. The obtained grand-averages have been plotted for the 
visual inspection of the results and used to calculate single channels’ amplitudes in 
specific time intervals, selected on the basis of the visual inspection and of the 
relevant literature.  
 Grand average ERPs to the picture for the four experimental conditions are 
plotted in FIGURE 2 – Appendix B. The qualitative analysis of the grand averages 
led to the observation that true affirmative and false negative conditions, on the one 
hand, and false affirmative and true negative conditions, on the other, elicited 
similar negative deflections at posterior sites starting from the time interval 
between 400 and 600ms after sentence. More precisely, the negative shift was not 
modulated by the presence of negation, but rather by the match/mismatch between 
the character-action association mentioned in the sentences (even when negated) 
and the situation depicted in the picture, resulting in less negative deflections with 
true affirmative and false negative sentences in comparison with false affirmative 
and true negative sentences. The visual inspection of the grand averages of the four 
conditions also showed that the negative waves associated with affirmative and 
  
 
 
 
129 
 
 
negative sentences, on the one hand, and true and false sentences, on the other, 
differentiated around 600ms after sentence onset. On the basis of these 
observations, a match-mismatch effect was calculated as (NT+AF) - (NF+AT), that 
is, the difference between (a) the sum of the wave averages of the true negative and 
false affirmatives sentences, and (b) the sum of the averages of the negative false 
and affirmative true sentences. Polarity effect and truth-value effects were also 
computed. The polarity effect was calculated as the differential waves between 
negative and affirmative conditions: (NT+NF) – (AT+AF). Similarly, the truth-
value effect was calculated as the differential waves given by the sum of false 
conditions minus the sum of true conditions difference true and false conditions: 
(AT+NT) – (AF+AT). Differential waves were calculated for each single subject 
and averaged to produce grand average difference waves to further visually inspect 
how the two main experimental variables influenced event-related potentials from 
600ms after sentence onset on. The waves derived from the consideration of the 
three effects are plotted in FIGURE 4 – Appendix B, where differential waves were 
smoothed for visualization purposes only. On the basis of the qualitative analysis 
of grand averages and effects, the following three time-windows were selected:  
 
(1) TW1: 400-600ms, characterized by the polarity by  
 truth-value interaction (match-mismatch effect);  
 
(2) TW 2: 600-1000ms, showing a negative deflection for  
 negative sentences (polarity effect), together with the  
 emergence of a truth-value related left anterior-
 negativity;  
 
(3) TW3: 1000-1400ms, apparently characterized by a more  
 sustained left-anterior negativity for true sentences in  
 comparison with false sentences (truth-value effect). 
  
T-test and ANOVA analysis on the different time intervals were performed with 
regard to four different groups of channels. The subdivision of the electrodes was 
determined by the crossing of two topographical factors, longitude (anterior, 
posterior) and latitude (left, right), yielding four pools of channels, each containing 
3 electrodes: (a) Anterior Left (AL), including F3, C3, and CP1 electrodes; (b) 
Anterior Right (AR), including F4, C4, and CP2 electrodes; (c) Posterior Left (PL), 
including PO3, P3, and P1 electrodes; (d) Posterior Right (PR), including PO4, P4, 
and P2 electrodes. This choice was motivated by the purpose of verifying the 
statistical significance of the left-anterior negativity characterizing the two later 
time-windows (TW 2: 600-1000ms; TW3: 1000-1400ms). 
Additionally, an in-depth analysis on a single cluster of parietal and central 
channels (including Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2, P3, and P4 electrodes) was performed with 
the aim of better understanding the time course of the centrally distributed polarity 
by truth-value negativity characterizing the first two time windows (TW 1: 400-
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600ms; 600-1000 ms) and allowing for a comparison with the N400 effect reported 
by Lüdtke et al. (2008). 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Four-groups of channels based analysis 
 
The overall grand averages for the 3 differential effects of mis-match, polarity and 
truth-value in the four groups of channels (AL, ER, PL, PR) selected is reported in 
FIGURE (next page). Vertical lines are drawn accordingly to the time windows used 
in the statistical analyses below (400, 600, 1000, and 1400ms).  
 With respect to the four groups of channels selected, separate factorial analysis 
has been performed on the three time windows chosen: 400-600ms (TW1), 600-
1000ms (TW2), 1000-1400ms (TW3). The analysis included four factors of two 
levels each: 2 topographical factors (longitude: anterior, posterior; latitude: right, 
left) and 2 factors concerning the experimental main variables (polarity: negative, 
affirmative; truth-value: true, false). 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Grand-averages of the main effects at the four channels of electrodes. 
 
 
 
 
TW 1: 400-600ms. The results of the ANOVA analysis concerning the first time 
window are reported in Table 13 below. Two main effects emerge: 
 
 (1) a statistically significant polarity*truth-value effect characterizing 
 the negative going deflection starting around 400ms after picture 
 onset and reflecting, as we said, the match-mismatch between the 
 sentence and the picture; 
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 (2) a polarity*longitude effect, likely to reflect the fact that negative 
sentences are more positive (0.37 µV, see Table 14) than affirmative 
sentences at the anterior sites. 
 
TABLE 13. ANOVA analysis of ERP data in TW1. 
 
Effect F (1,20) p-value ges 
Polarity 5.24 .477 .00053 
truth-value 2.74 .870 .0000081 
Longitude 4.44 ≤ .05 * .041 
Latitude 1.22 .281 .0024 
polarity*truth 1.20 ≤ .001 * .010 
polarity*long 5.93 ≤ .05 * .00036 
truth*long 1.74 .201 .00023 
polarity*lat 4.78 .497 .000025 
truth*lat 1.76 .198 .00012 
long*lat 3.02 .097 
•
 .0021 
polarity*truth*long 3.59 .072 
•
 .00054 
polarity*truth*lat 1.52 .231 .00012 
polarity*long*lat 1.22 .729 .0000027 
truth*long*lat 1.66 .211 .000046 
polarity*truth*long*lat 2.99 .995 .00000000088 
 
 
As for the polarity*truth-value effect distribution, no strong interaction with 
topographical factors was reported, in line with the visual inspection that shows a 
very broadly distributed nature of the effect. The polarity*truth-value*long 
approaching significance interaction, however, suggests a posterior focus of the 
effect. 
 
TABLE 14. Longitude-related differences (negative minus affirmative). 
 
Longitude AFF NEG Difference 
Anterior 3.739 4.104 .365 
Posterior 5.704 5.738 .033 
 
 
 
TW 2: 600-1000ms. Main results of the ANOVA on the second time window 
selected are reported in TABLE 15. As it can be observed, the time interval between 
600 and 1000ms after picture onset was characterized by three main effects: 
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 (1) a polarity effect, reflecting a broadly distributed increased negativity 
for negative sentences in comparison with affirmative sentences; 
 
 (2) the persistence of the polarity*truth-value effect that emerged in TW1 
(400-600ms), accompanied by an approaching significance 
polarity*truth-value*latitude interaction; 
 
 (3) a truth-value*longitude significant effect, suggesting participants’ 
sensitivity to sentence truth-value at this stage.  
 
As observable in the plotting of the three effects under investigation (FIGURE 4 – 
Appendix B) and confirmed by the different means of the effect in the anterior and 
posterior sites (TABLE 15), the truth-value by longitude interaction is most 
probably due to the increased negativity associated to false sentences relative to 
true sentences at the anterior sites. 
 
TABLE 15. ANOVA analysis of ERP data in TW2. 
 
Effect F (1,20) p-value ges 
polarity 3.00 .0986 
•
 .0029 
truth-value 2.11 .161 .0013 
longitude 6.49 ≤ .05* .056 
latitude 5.18 ≤ .05* .0092 
polarity*truth 11.35 ≤ .005* .019 
polarity*long .17 .684 .000024 
truth*long 14.47 ≤ .001 * .0015 
polarity*lat 1.04 .319 .000095 
truth*lat 2.34 .141 .00038 
long*lat 3.28 .084 
•
 .0023 
polarity*truth*long .36 .551 .000057 
polarity*truth*lat 3.59 .072 
•
 .00035 
polarity*long*lat 1.13 .300 .000044 
truth*long*lat 3.05 .096 
•
 .00016 
polarity*truth*long*lat .10 .743 .0000067 
 
 
TABLE 16. Mean amplitude and differences of true and false conditions 
(truth-value effect) in the anterior and posterior electrodes. 
 
Longitude False True Difference 
Anterior 6.350 7.035 - .684 
Posterior 4.529 4.499 .029 
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TW 3: 1000-1400ms. The results of the factorial analysis on TW 3 are reported in 
TABLE 17 below. As main effect, a truth-value by longitude interaction, 
comparable to the one reported in TW2 but further characterized by the three-factor 
interaction truth-value*long*lat, was observed.  
 
TABLE 17. ANOVA analysis of the ERP data in TW 3. 
 
Effect F (1,20) p-value ges 
Polarity 2.96 .100 .0052 
truth-value 1.81 .192 .0022 
Longitude 22.83 ≤ .001 * .14 
Latitude 14.03 ≤ .001 * .024 
polarity*truth-value 1.14 .296 .0033 
polarity*longitude 1.41 .248 .00033 
truth*longitude 7.60 ≤ .05 * .0015 
polarity*latitude .38 .544 .000058 
truth*latitude 2.67 .117 .00086 
long*latitude 1.84 .189 .0020 
polarity*truth*long .45 .509 .000076 
polarity*truth*lat 1.70 .206 .00019 
polarity*long*lat 2.07 .164 .00018 
truth*long*lat 5.65 ≤ .05 * .00056 
polarity*truth*long*lat 0.05 .821 .0000073 
 
 
As revealed by the mean differences between conditions of opposite polarity 
(TABLE 18), the effect has to be attributed to the major difference in the anterior 
left quadrant. No persistence of the truth-value by polarity effect characterizing the 
previous time windows was found in TW 3. 
 
TABLE 18. Differences between affirmative and negative (polarity 
 effect) sentences in the four quadrants of channels. 
 
Longitude Latitude AFF NEG Difference 
Anterior Left 4.384 5.586 -1.201 
Anterior Right 6.587 6.875 -0.288 
Posterior Left 1.773 1.897 -0.123 
Posterior Right 2.795 2.823 -0.027 
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3.2.2.2 Centro-parietal cluster analysis 
 
The four-based channels analysis allowed the identification of a negative, centrally 
distributed polarity by truth-value effect, presenting the typical topography of N400, 
but with a very much longer duration. In order to provide better understanding of the 
effect, an in-depth analysis on a centro-parietal cluster of electrodes was conducted. 
The CP cluster, where the effect appeared to be maximal, was composed by six 
electrodes: Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2, P3, and P4. ANOVA analyses on the average ERP 
amplitude in the CP cluster with truth-value and polarity as 2-level factors were run 
every 50 ms from 0 to 1450ms after picture. Only significances which were 
maintained lasting for at least three consequent time intervals were considered to be 
relevant. The interaction between polarity and truth-value resulted significant from 
450 to 1050ms time window, confirming the very long latency of the effect already 
emerged in the four-groups based analysis above. The most relevant time intervals 
and the corresponding analysis main statistical data are reported in TABLE 19. 
 
TABLE 19. The polarity by truth effect at the CP cluster. 
 
Time interval F (1,20) p-value ges 
300, 350ms 1.27 .271 .0014 
350, 400ms .70 .410 .0012 
400, 450ms 3.59 .072 .0052 
450, 500ms 14.11 ≤ .001 * .016 
500, 550ms 14.57 ≤ .001 * .017 
550, 600ms 10.91 ≤ .005 * .018 
600, 650ms 10.64 ≤ .005 * .018 
650, 700ms 8.47 ≤ .01 * .018 
700, 750ms 9.08 ≤ .01 * .021 
750, 800ms 9.16 ≤ .01 * .027 
800, 850ms 9.95 ≤ .005 * .032 
850, 900m 8.10 ≤ .005 * .027 
900, 950ms 14.49 ≤ .005 * .031 
950, 1000ms 12.92 ≤ .001 * .028 
1000, 1050ms 7.67 ≤ .05 * .018 
1050, 1100ms 4.31 ≤ .05 * .014 
1100, 1150ms 3.26 .085 • .012 
1150, 1200ms 3.09 .093 .011 
1200, 1250ms 0.48 .495 .027 
 
 
On the contrary, only weak and late effects were associated to truth-value and 
polarity variables. No sequences including at least three sequentially significant 
50ms intervals were found, though both variables reached significance in few of 
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the intervals occurring more than 1000ms after the onset of the picture. The most 
relevant time windows and data are reported in TABLE 20 and TABLE 21 below. 
 
TABLE 20. The truth-value effect at the CP cluster. 
 
Time interval F (1,20) p-value ges 
1250,1300ms 3.59 .072 .0048 
1300, 1350ms 3.23 .087 .0063 
1350, 1400ms 8.35 ≤ .01 * .011 
1400, 1450ms 6.32 ≤ .05 * .0089 
1450, 1500ms 3.83 .064 .0074 
 
 
TABLE 21. The polarity effect at the CP cluster. 
 
Time interval F (1,20) p-value ges 
1200, 1250ms 4.52 ≤ .05 * .012 
1250,1300ms 3.36 .081 .010 
1300, 1350ms 4.30 .051 .011 
1350, 1400ms 1.89 .18 .0053 
1400, 1450ms 4.95 ≤ .05 * .013 
1450, 1500ms 5.37 ≤ .05 * .016 
 
 
3.2.2.2.1 Correlations between the polarity by truth-value effect and reaction times  
 
A possible explanation of the extremely long latency of the N400-like polarity by 
truth effect is represented by the hypothesis that it persists until the subject 
expresses her truth-value judgment about the sentence and/or executes the 
behavioral response. This would make the long duration of the effect to be not a 
truly long effect for every subject, but a kind of artifact due to the averaging of 
many subjects with different speed of processing. To test this hypothesis, the 
relationship between the duration of the polarity by truth-value effect and 
behavioral response times was investigated: if the rational above makes sense, we 
would expect that the N400 has an earlier latency (onset and offset) for fast 
responders and a later latency for slow responder. This would make the effect more 
compatible with the N400 reported in the literature, according to which this 
component is usually limited in the 200-600ms interval from the onset of the 
critical stimulus (see, for example, Kutas & Petten, 2006). We pursued this testing 
by implementing a median split of our subjects’ group on the basis of RTs 
averaged across the four experimental conditions. The median RT for the whole 
group corresponded to 1344ms and allowed to separate ‘slow’ subjects (N=10) and 
‘fast’ subjects (N=11 subjects). The grand averages of the polarity by truth-value 
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effect at the CP cluster (Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2, P3, and P4) for the two groups are 
reported in FIGURE 7. 
 
FIGURE 7. ‘Fast’ (red line) and ‘slow’ (green line) grand averages on the CP 
cluster. 
 
 
Contrary to expectations, t-tests on the mean amplitudes of the two groups (run 
every 100ms time intervals)
97
 revealed no significant difference in the N400-like 
overall duration of the two groups. In both fast and slow subjects, in fact, the effect 
had a similar average duration of 1100ms after picture onset. On the contrary, the 
two groups of subjects reported different N400 amplitudes in the first stage of 
sentence verification, with fast subjects showing a significantly larger effect with 
respect to slow subjects in the 450-550 time window [t (19) = - 2.270, p = ≤ .05]. 
 
 
3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Both behavioral and electrophysiological data provide evidence in favor of non-
incremental accounts of negation. The significantly differences in reaction times 
and error rates shows that, even in pragmatically balanced conditions, the 
interpretation of negative sentences results significantly more effortful than that of 
affirmative sentences. Differently from previous studies (e.g., Lüdtke et al., 2008), 
typically reporting the well-known AT > AF > NF > NT scale of difficulty, no 
difference in reaction times between true and false negative sentences was 
reported. As more extensively observed during the discussion of the use of the 
picture-sentence verification task in the study of negation processing (§ 2.3), this 
diverge was probably due to the different experimental paradigm adopted in the 
current study. In particular, the insertion of two different characters and activities 
within each picture prevented the facilitation effects deriving from simple priming 
between the two stimuli which characterized Lüdtke and colleagues’ paradigm. For 
this reason, the general slowdown observed in the interpretation of negative 
                                                 
97
 No correction for multiple comparisons was adopted. 
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sentences can only be attributed, in the current study, to the linguistic specificity of the 
sentences, that is, to their being negative, and not to extrinsic factors deriving from the 
experimental design and/or stimuli characteristics, such as the pragmatic asymmetry 
across condition observed in Lüdtke et al. (2008). Despite of the absence of facilitating 
priming-conditions between the sentence and the picture, significant differences in both 
accuracy and reaction times were reported between true and false affirmative 
sentences. Two explanations are possible. On the one hand, the longer reaction times 
associated to false affirmative in comparison with true affirmative sentences may 
represent a consequence of the higher markedness of former. According to this view, 
the slower verification and higher error rates characterizing false affirmative sentences 
would be due to the unexpected use of an affirmative sentence for the expression of a 
false information. On the other hand, the effect may be determined from the perceptual 
complexity derived from the split of the character and the activity mentioned in the 
sentence into two visually distinct elements within the following picture, crucially 
characterizing the false, but not the true affirmative condition. The same explanations 
can be raised to account for the partially unexpected difference in accuracy observed 
between true and false negative sentences. Conversely to affirmative conditions, in this 
latter case the most marked condition would be represented by true sentences as a 
consequence of the fact that negative sentences are rarely used to predicate the truth 
outside of specific communicative contexts (e.g., the correction of a previously 
provided wrong information/presupposition). The very frequent association of 
sentential negation with the expression of wrong information (deriving, for example, 
from the prototypical use of negation for voluntary lying and denying), on the contrary, 
would render the interpretation of false negative sentences slightly more appropriate 
than that of their true counterparts within the experimental design proposed, in which 
the participants had been warned that the sentences could represent either a correct 
(true) or an incorrect (false) description of the following picture. The lack of a rating 
pre-test evaluating the naturalness of the experimental sentences adopted, however, 
makes it impossible to choose between the pragmatic and the perceptual complexity 
based explanations just suggested. Whatever reason motivates the different accuracy of 
true and false negative, moreover, one might wonder why a similar difference does not 
characterize the reaction times of the two negative conditions as well. A possible, yet 
very speculative answer to this latter question is provided by the hypothesis that the 
general slowdown associated with the interpretation of negative sentences has the 
effect of minimizing the difference in truth-value related processing costs.   
 Tough only partially replicating Lüdtke et al. (2008)’s findings, the results of the 
analysis of EGG are also in line with non-incremental, two-step models of negation 
processing. In particular, the very similar negative amplitudes evoked by true and false 
sentences of opposite polarity during the first stage of sentence verification (400-
600ms) can be interpreted as a signature of the first interpretive step hypothesized by 
Kaup and colleagues, during which the comprehender elaborates the simulation of the 
non-negated state of affairs. Worth nothing, the use of more complex visual scenes in 
comparison with those employed by Lüdtke et al. (2008) prevented that the N400 
component could be influenced by simple priming/non-priming effects between the 
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content of the two stimuli presented. Importantly, in addition, the emergence within the 
same time interval of a polarity effect (characterized by a very different topographical 
distribution than N400) shows that, despite very similar N400 amplitudes, the two 
types of sentences are not perceived as identical. Differently from Lüdtke et al. (2008), 
the polarity by truth-value effect persisted also in the following time window (600-
1000ms), during which it was accompanied by the emergence of a anterior left truth-
value effect. The presence of this latter effect represents an indication of the fact that, 
as predicted by the two-step simulation hypothesis proposed by Kaup and colleagues, 
the comprehender has switched to the mental simulation of the actual meaning of the 
sentences as defined by the presence of negation. The sustained duration of the N400, 
on the other hand, suggests that the activation of the negated state of affairs is not 
suppressed right away after the first step of interpretation, but is maintained also during 
the application of the negative operator into the interpretative process (step 2). The 
analysis of the later time window (1000-1040ms) selected, in which a fully developed 
effect truth-value was reported, confirmed that N400 latency characterizes the whole 
interpretative process. On the basis of these consideration, it can be hypothesized that 
the interpretation of negative sentences does not rely on a strictly sequential two-stages 
process but, rather, on the progressive elaboration of the two mental simulations (one 
corresponding to the negated state of affairs, and one to the actual meaning of the 
sentence), which become simultaneously available and thus comparable starting from 
600ms after picture onset. 
 Differently to Lüdtke et al. (2008), no parietal late-positivity deflection (interpreted 
by the authors as a ‘direct’ signature of second-step re-analysis determined by the 
integration of negation into the interpretative process) characterized the negative 
sentences interpretation in the present study. As mentioned, indirect evidence of the 
computation of negation was provided in the current study by the emergence of a truth-
value related negativity at the left anterior electrodes starting from around 600ms after 
the picture. Though not fully understandable, this difference might be due to the 
already discussed differences between the two experimental designs adopted.  
 To sum up, despite differences in some of the components reported, the present 
study can be considered as a replication and extension of Lüdtke et al. (2008) findings. 
In particular, the reduction of the priming effects between the sentence and the picture 
prevented the implementation of non-linguistic task-specific shortcut strategies. Very 
importantly, in addition, the adoption of a pragmatically controlled design leads to the 
observation that, even in pragmatically felicitous contexts, negative sentences 
interpretation seems to require a cognitively costly two-step, non-incremental 
processing. As the reader may remember, this latter consideration is however in sharp 
contrast with the evidence reported by Nieuwland & Kuperberg (2008), in which N400 
deflection reflected the immediate interpretation of the negative operator. Further 
investigation is needed to better clarify which key factors – beyond sentences 
pragmatic licensing – enabled a similar speed of interpretation of negation.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
4 STUDY 2: AN ERP STUDY ON NEGATION, WORKING MEMORY  
 AND DYSLEXIA  
 
 
4.1 Methods 
 
4.1.1 Participants 
 
A group of 15 adults took part in the study (mean age 22;4; SD 2;19). All 
participants were Italian native-speakers, had normal or correct to normal vision, 
normal hearing, absence of neurological problems, and normal non-verbal QI.
98
 
They had all received a high school diploma at the moment of testing, and had 
received an official diagnosis of developmental dyslexia supplied by a certified 
psychologist or speech therapist of the Italian National Health System. 
Nevertheless, only those subjects who still showed significant writing and reading 
difficulties were included in the study.
99
 This led to the exclusion of one subject 
whose performance suggested he had largely compensated reading and writing 
problems. They were recruited trough the Dyslexia Services Offices of University 
of Verona and University of Brescia, trough local associations dealing with 
dyslexia and through announcements on the web pages of nearby universities. 
Subjects who incurred in extraordinary travel expenses for their participation in the 
study were reimbursed.  
 The participants of Study 1 (25 Italian adults, mean age 27;3; SD 3;25) were 
included in the study as control group.
100
 To avoid the accidental inclusion of 
subjects unaware of being dyslexics, writing and reading skills of the participants 
of the control group were also controlled. None of them, however, showed below 
average performance; as a consequence, they were all included in the control 
group.  
 
 
4.1.2 General procedure 
 
The study consisted of two sessions. The first session included a series of 
behavioral tests concerning subjects’ writing and reading skills and working 
memory capacity. The second session was constituted by the sentence-picture 
verification task designed to test subjects’ comprehension of negative sentences. 
During the execution of this second part, ERPs was recorded via TMS-compatible 
                                                 
98
 Non-verbal QI was controlled through the administration of Caffarra et al. (2003)’s 
version of Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices.  
99
 Writing and reading skills were assessed trough a selection of the tasks elaborated for the 
diagnosis of dyslexia in undergraduate Italian students by Re et al. (2011). The results of 
these tests are reported in the Behavioral assessment’s results section (§ 4.3.2). 
100
 The two subjects which had been not included in the analysis of the data in STUDY 1 
were not considered for the inclusion in this second study.   
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EEG equipment (BrainAmp 32 DC, BrainProducts GmbH, Munich, Germany). 
Both behavioral (error rates; response times) and electrophysiological data were 
considered.  
 Each participant was tested individually. The first session was held in a quiet 
room, free from distractions, located either at the Dipartimento di Filologia, 
Letteratura e Linguistica or at the Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche e del 
Movimento of the University of Verona, according to the convenience of the 
participant. The second session took place in the Brain Vision laboratory at the 
Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche e del Movimento of the University of 
Verona. The first session lasted around one hour for each participant; the second 
session lasted approximately one hour and half for each participant, including 
about 45 minutes necessary for the placing of the electrodes cap. 
 
 
4.1.3 Materials 
 
4.1.3.1 Behavioral assessment 
 
4.1.3.1.1 Writing and reading abilities 
 
Subjects’ writing and reading abilities were assessed through a subset of the tests 
proposed for the diagnosis of dyslexia in young Italian adults into the Battery for 
the Assessment of Reading and Writing in Adulthood (Re et al. 2011). Two reading 
tasks and two writing tasks were chosen from the Battery with consideration to 
their very high discriminatory power: the Word reading test, the Non-word reading 
test, the Word dictation, and the Word dictation under articulatory suppression. 
 In the Word reading test, the subjects were asked to read aloud four series of 
isolated words as quickly and accurately as they could. Both reading speed 
(calculated as number of syllables read in one second) and mistakes were 
considered. In the second reading test, the Non-word reading, the subjects were 
asked to perform the same task (reading aloud as quickly and accurately as 
possible) with four series of non existing words. This difference in the materials 
determines an extra effort in this second task, as the reader cannot benefit from 
lexical knowledge. For this reason, Non-word reading represents a very good task 
for determining subjects’ real ability of decoding, especially in the case of 
dyslexics, who very often resort to lexical knowledge as a source of help in the 
decoding. Worth noting, the task obtained a score of 96% (considering both speed 
and accuracy together, and a score of 92% and 96% respectively, considering the 
two variables separately) of probability of correctly discriminating an 
undergraduate student with dyslexia from an age-matched undergraduate student 
without dyslexia (Re et al. 2011).  
 The Word dictation consisted in a normal dictation, in which the subject had to 
handwrite a series of 24 isolated Italian words which were pronounced at a 
constant rhythm of one word every 3 seconds. During the second writing task, the 
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Word dictation under articulatory suppression, the subject had to perform the same 
task with a different series of 24 Italian words, but she was also asked to repeat the 
syllable ‘la’ continuously and aloud during the dictation. As explained by the 
authors of the test, the request of concurrently repeating the syllable ‘la’ has its 
ratio in preventing the resort to the so-called ‘articulatory loop’, a component 
crucially involved during writing and reading, especially during the early stages of 
their acquisition, when the two processes have not yet become automatic. While 
progressively reducing its role in typical writers and readers once they have 
mastered the two skills, the resort to the articulatory loop remains fairly constant in 
dyslexic subjects. As a consequence, dyslexics writing ability is expected to 
significantly deteriorate under those conditions in which they cannot take profit 
from the articulatory loop. The Word dictation under articulatory suppression 
represents exactly this situation: the phonological loop, in fact, is not only 
prevented from being a source of help, but it also represents a source of 
phonological interference. As a consequence, this latter task constitutes a very 
reliable test for discriminating dyslexic adults from non dyslexics adults on the 
basis of their writing ability, as shown by the very high probability-based effect 
size reported by Re and colleagues (around 98%). 
 
4.1.3.1.2 Working memory capacity evaluation 
 
Subjects’ working memory was assessed through five tests evaluating the 
functionality of the three components traditionally assumed to form subjects’ 
general working memory capacity: the phonological short-term memory, the visuo-
spatial short-term memory, and the central executive.
101
 Short-term phonological 
memory was tested through the Digit span forward and the Digits span backward 
tests (standardization by Monaco, Costa, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2013). In the 
first test, the subject was presented with some sequences of digits, pronounced at a 
rate of approximately one digit per second, and she was asked to repeat each 
sequence just after having listened it, reporting the digits in the same order in 
                                                 
101
 This tripartite model of working memory has been originally elaborated by Baddeley & 
Hitch (1974), according to which working memory is composed by a limited capacity 
attention controller, called central executive, responding to different cognitive functions 
(e.g., attention, active-inhibition, planning, updating, maintenance and integration of 
information) and two peripheral slave systems devoted to the temporary storing and 
rehearsing of information pertaining to a single modality: acoustic and verbal information 
in one case (phonological loop), and visual and spatial information in the other (visuo-
spatial sketchpad). The original model has been largely revised and refined during the last 
years by Baddeley himself and co-workers (see Baddeley, 2012, for a review and 
discussion). Alternative models, providing very different perspectives on the working 
memory system, have also been suggested (see, for example, Cowan, 1997; Cowan, 2008, 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson & Delaney, 1999). A systematic consideration of the 
different models of working memory proposed goes beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation and the author’s competence. The choice of adopting Baddeley and colleagues’ 
model in the current study was motivated by the fact that it represents, so far, the most 
frequently used for the investigation of working memory and dyslexia.  
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which they had been pronounced. The series had increasing length; two sequences 
for each length were included. The test was stopped when the sequences of digits 
reached a length such that the subject could not correctly remember them, 
indicating that the quantity of the material to be stored exceeded his/her short-term 
memory capacity. The Digit span backward, as the name itself explains, represents 
the backward version of the digit recall: again, the subject was asked to listen a 
series of digits of increasing length, but this time she was asked to repeat them in 
the reverse order with respect to the order in which they had been pronounced. As 
observed by Baddeley (1996), the execution of this task has a double involvement 
in working memory: on the one side, it involves the phonological component of 
working memory, which has the role – as in the forward version of the same task – 
of temporary maintaining the digits in storage; on the other, the mental 
manipulation of the units stored, necessary for the repeating of the sequence in the 
reverse order, is carried out by the central executive. Also in this case, the test was 
administered in Monaco et al. (2013)’s version and the span was determined as the 
maximum length of the sequence repeated in the correct reverse order. 
 The short term visuo-spatial memory was determined through the Corsi forward 
and Corsi backward tests (Monaco et al. 2013’s standardization). In both tests, the 
subject was presented with a board on which nine cubic blocks were fixed. Each 
block appeared identical to all the others on the side visible to the subject, but it 
was marked with a serial number (from 1 to 9) on the side visible to the 
experimenter. The experimenter touched a sequence of blocks at a rate of 
approximately one block per second and the subject was asked to reproduce the 
sequence just after having seen it. While in the forward version of the test, the 
subject had to reproduce the sequences by touching the blocks in the same order in 
which the experimenter had touched them, in the backward version she was asked 
to reproduce the sequences in the reverse order with respect to the order followed 
by the experimenter. Similarly to the backward version of the Digit span test, the 
execution of the backward version of the Corsi test is assumed to involve both the 
temporary storage of the information and its manipulation, carried out under the 
supervision of the central executive. While the results of two forward versions 
Digit span and the Corsi block tests purely depend upon the capacity of the two 
storages components at issue (short-term phonological memory and visuo-spatial 
short term memory), therefore, the results of the backward versions of the two tests 
are generally considered as a measure of the coordinate use of two concerning 
storage system with the central executive.  
 Beside the indirect measure of central executive offered by the two tests just 
mentioned, the same component was also evaluated through the administration of 
the Paper-and-pencil dual task elaborated by Della Sala et al. (2010). In this latter 
test, the efficiency of central executive was calculated as the difference in the 
performance obtained during the execution of two distinct tasks in the single task 
modality and in the dual task modality, in which the two tasks had to be carried out 
simultaneously. The first task was a digit span task, resembling the Digit span 
forward task described above. The second task consisted in using a pencil to draw a 
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line through a series of circles arranged in a path of 319 circles on a paper over a 
90-s period. The performance measure was the number of circles crossed within 
the allotted time. 
 
4.1.3.2 Sentence-picture verification task materials 
 
The same materials of STUDY 1 were used. 
 
 
4.1.4 Sentence-picture verification task procedure  
 
The same procedure of STUDY 1 was adopted. Of the dyslexics, three subjects were 
tested with List 1, four subjects were tested with List 2, three subjects were tested 
with List 3, and four subjects were tested with List 4.   
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
4.2.1  Behavioral assessment  
 
The performance of only 13 out of the 15 subjects recruited in the dyslexic group 
was included in the analysis. As mentioned, in fact, one subject was excluded from 
the group as he performed above chance in the writing and reading tests, indicating 
very well-compensated or erroneously diagnosed dyslexia. A second subject was 
excluded because she failed to reach a minimum of 75% correct responses in the 
sentence-picture verification task, which was considered as cut-off measure for the 
inclusion in the analysis. On the same basis, the performance of all the 25 control 
subjects was taken into consideration. 
 
4.2.1.1 Reading and writing abilities 
 
As mentioned, the evaluation of subjects’ reading ability included speed and 
accuracy measures. In both reading tests, reading speed was defined as the number 
of syllables read in one second, while accuracy corresponded to the error rates, 
calculated by assigning 1 point to each word read incorrectly and 0.5 score to each 
auto-corrected error. The writing performance was measured as the sum of the 
words incorrectly written or omitted in each of the two dictation tasks. The results 
of the two groups were compared by means of an independent sample t-test. The 
analysis of the results of the word reading test, the non-word reading test and the 
dictation under articulatory suppression showed dyslexic participants experienced 
significantly greater difficulties in writing and reading in comparison with non-
dyslexic subjects. The simple dictation task, on the contrary, did not reveal 
significant differences between the groups, showing that adult dyslexics manage to 
write with an almost comparable speed and accuracy than non-dyslexic adults 
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under normal dictation circumstances. Relevant data and statistical significance of 
the T-test between the two groups’ performance are reported in TABLE 22. 
 
TABLE 22. Dyslexics vs. controls: Writing and reading tasks. 
 
Task 
Controls 
(= 25) 
Dyslexics 
(= 13) 
t (36) p-value 
Word reading speed: 
 mean and (SD) 
6.00 
(1.14) 
3.35 
(1.15) 
6.72 ≤ .001* 
Non-word reading speed: 
mean and (SD) 
3.98 
(.93) 
1.82 
(.62) 
7.47 ≤ .001* 
Word reading errors:  
mean and (SD) 
.36 
(.670) 
2.19 
(1.52) 
5.08 ≤ .001* 
Non-word reading  
errors: mean and (SD) 
1.20 
(1.18) 
5.88 
(3.05) 
– 6.88 ≤ .001* 
Word dictation: 
mean and (SD) 
.12 
(.332) 
.69 
(1.032) 
– 1.94 = .073 • 
Articulatory condition: 
mean and (SD) 
1.16 
(1.49) 
14.62 
(6.07) 
10.59 ≤ .001* 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Working memory tests 
 
As expected, the analysis of the results of the Digit span forward and Digit span 
backward revealed significant differences between the two groups in the short-term 
phonological memory. In line with previous studies, no main differences were 
found in short-term visuo-spatial memory. The performance of the two groups in 
the dual task test was also comparable, indicating no significant central executive 
impairment in adult dyslexics. Relevant data and statistical significance of the 
comparison between the two groups’ performance are reported in TABLE 23 (next 
page). 
 
 
4.2.1.2.1  Effects of the age factor on behavioral measures  
 
Since the two groups had a significantly different mean age, which could – in 
principle – have had an influence on writing, reading and working memory skills, a 
regression analysis with age as predictor factor and single task performances as 
dependent variables was performed. The analysis revealed that age did not play a 
significant effect on most of the cognitive capacities under investigation. The only 
exception was constituted by non words-reading speed, which was found to be to 
some extent affected by age in dyslexic subjects [F (1, 11) = 5.132, p = ≤ .05, R2 = 
.318]. Since reading speed does not represent a main parameter of the current study 
as it mainly represented an inclusion criterion for subjects’ ascription into the two 
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groups, age influence on this parameter was not considered to constitute a 
problematic aspect. 
 
TABLE 23. Dyslexics vs. controls: Working memory tasks. 
 
Task 
Controls 
(= 25) 
Dyslexics 
(= 13) 
t (36) p-value 
Digit span forward: 
mean and (SD) 
6.68 
(1.445) 
5.54 
(.877) 
3.14 ≤ .005 * 
Digit span backward:   
mean and (SD) 
5.48 
(1.194) 
4.31 
(1.182) 
2.88 ≤ .05 * 
Corsi forward: 
mean and (SD) 
6.37 
(1.40) 
5.61 
(.75) 
1.79 .081 
•
 
Corsi backward: mean 
and (SD) 
5.72 
(1.20) 
5.92 
(.862) 
–.53 .594 
Dual task: 
mean and (SD) 
90.89 
(6.41) 
91.25 
(7.70) 
–.15 .878 
 
 
4.2.1.2.2 Working memory and writing and reading skills connection 
 
In order to deepen in the relationship between working memory and 
developmental dyslexia, a simple linear regression analysis with working 
memory capacity as a predictor and writing and reading measures as dependent 
variables was performed. Contrary to expectations, no strong connections 
between the abilities under investigation were found. The phonological working 
memory
102
 significantly predicted both word reading accuracy (t = 3.375, p ≤ 
.005) and writing skills under articulatory suppression (t = 3.723, p ≤ .005), but 
the model described only a very limited range of variance, as shown by very low 
R
2 
measures (word reading R
2 
= .165; word dictation under articulatory 
suppression R
2
 = .202). The central executive efficiency, measured through the 
paper-and-pencil dual task described above, had a significant influence on the 
error rates observed in the non-word reading task (t = 2.190, ≤ .05) though, again, 
the correlation explained a low percentage of variance (R
2 
= .118).  
  
                                                 
102
 Independent variables: Digit span forward, Digit span backward. 
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4.2.1.3 Sentence-picture verification task 
 
4.2.1.3.1 Dyslexic group 
 
As mentioned, all dyslexic participants except one had a percentage of correct 
answers above 75%. For this reason, 13 of the 14 dyslexic subjects who 
participated in the study were included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics of 
accuracy and response times are reported in TABLE 24.  
  
TABLE 24. Average accuracy and reaction times – Dyslexic group. 
 
Average results 
(13 subject) 
True 
AFF 
False 
AFF 
True 
NEG 
False 
NEG 
Correct responses 
out of 60 (SD) 
53,7 
(3,04) 
51,2 
(3,52) 
49,9 
(3,20) 
50,6 
(3,91) 
Reaction times (SD) 
1505 
(429) 
1710 
(444) 
2069 
(867) 
1839 
(694) 
 
 
Both accuracy and reaction times were submitted to a 2 (polarity) x 2 (truth-value) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results of the analysis are summarized in 
TABLE 25. As reported, the polarity effect characterized both accuracy [F (1, 12) = 
5.215, p ≤ .05] and reaction times [F (1, 12) = 6.796, p ≤.05]. As indicated by the 
means of affirmative and negative conditions, the effect reflects the higher 
processing difficulty associated to negative sentences interpretation in comparison 
with affirmative sentences, resulting in increased response times and higher error 
rates. No difference was reported with respect to sentence truth-value, neither for 
the accuracy F (1, 12) = 2.770, p = .112] nor for reaction times [F (1, 12) = .017, p 
= .899]. To conclude, the polarity by truth-value interaction had a significant 
influence on both accuracy [F (1, 12) = 11.108, p ≤ .01] and reaction times [F (1, 
12) = 7.679, p ≤ .05], reflecting the well-known gradient of difficulty TA > FA > 
FN > TN. 
 
TABLE 25. ANOVA results – Dyslexic group. 
 
Dep. Variables Effect F (1,12) p-value 
Accuracy polarity 5.21 ≤ .05 * 
 
truth-value 2.77 .112 
polarity*truth 11.10 ≤ .01 * 
Reaction times polarity 6.79 ≤ .05 * 
 
truth-value .017 .899 
polarity*truth 7.67 ≤ .05 * 
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4.2.1.3.2 Dyslexics vs. controls performance in the sentence-verification task  
 
The average accuracy and reaction times of dyslexic and non-dyslexic subjects are 
displayed in GRAPH 1 and GRAPH 2, respectively. The statistical comparison 
between the two groups was performed through a 2 (group) x 2 (polarity) x 2 
(truth-value) ANOVA. The main data of the analysis are reported in TABLE 26. 
 
TABLE 26. ANOVA on the sentence-picture verification task. 
 
Dep. Variable Effect F (1,36) p-value 
Accuracy polarity 45.80 ≤ .001 * 
 
polarity*group .003 .953 
truth-value .729 .399 
truth-value*group 1.387 .247 
truth-value*polarity 22.03 ≤ .001 * 
truth*polarity*group 4.290 ≤ .05 * 
Reaction times polarity 16.40 ≤ .001 * 
 
polarity*group .125 .725 
truth-value .208 .651 
truth-value*group 4.113 ≤ .05 * 
Truth-value*polarity 15.415 ≤ .001 * 
polarity*truth*group .420 .521 
 
 
As shown by the mean of the two groups (reported at the bottom of GRAPH 1, next 
page), the significant polarity*truth-value*group effect on reaction times is mainly 
determined by the larger difference between true and false sentences in the 
negative condition in comparison with affirmative sentences observed in the 
dyslexic group relative to the control group. The polarity by group effect on 
reaction times, on the other hand, reflects the more pronounced difference between 
the reaction times associated to affirmative and negative sentence in the control 
group in comparison with the dyslexic group.  
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GRAPH 1. Dyslexic vs. control groups: Average reaction times. 
 
 
 
 
The significant truth-value by group interaction on accuracy was probably 
determined by the larger difference between true and false negative sentences 
observable in the control group (corresponding to an average of 87% and 92% of 
correct responses, respectively) in comparison with the dyslexic group, whose error 
rates did not differ very much between in the negative conditions (corresponding to 
an average of 83% and 84% of correct responses, respectively). 
 
GRAPH 2. Dyslexic vs. control group: Average accuracy. 
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4.2.1.3.2  Working memory and negative sentence processing relationship 
 
In order to verify the working memory influence on negative sentence processing 
hypothesized by Vender (2011), a linear regression analysis with working memory 
measures as independent variables and the behavioral performance (accuracy, 
reaction times) in the picture-sentence verification task was executed. Both 
accuracy and reaction times of the four experimental conditions significantly relate, 
to some extent, to phonological working memory (predictors: digit span forward, 
digit span backward). The relevant results are reported in TABLE 27. As shown by 
the very low R
2 
values, however, the model accounts only for a limited amount of 
the variance. The fact that phonological working memory played a similar 
influence on both affirmative and negative sentence verification, in addition, 
suggests that the effect has to be attributed to experimental task characteristics, 
rather than reflecting a causal connection between negation processing and 
working memory capacity. In particular, the significant correlation between the two 
measures could be due to the necessity of remembering the sentence presented until 
the visualization of the picture and during the consequent evaluation of sentence 
truth-value. 
 
 TABLE 27. Linear regression analysis with phonological 
working memory (digit span forward and backward) as 
predictor. 
 
Dependent Variable R
2
 t p-value 
Accuracy True Aff .180 20.504 ≤ .001 * 
 
False Aff .223 18.683 ≤ .001 * 
True Neg .207 11.159 ≤ .001 * 
False Neg .305 15.718 ≤ .001 * 
RT True Aff .172 6.496 ≤ .001 * 
 
False Aff .149 6.460 ≤ .001 * 
True Neg .163 5.719 ≤ .001 * 
False Neg .292 6.760 ≤ .001 * 
 
 
No significant interaction between the sentence-picture verification measures and 
the visuo-spatial working memory, on the one hand, and central executive, on the 
other, was observed. 
 
 
4.2.2 EEG analysis 
 
The same method used for EEG extraction, epoch rejection and grand averages 
calculation in STUDY 1 was adopted. As in Study 1, only subjects for which at least 
60% of the epochs could be analyzed were included. This led to the exclusion of 3 
of the 15 dyslexic participants. Dyslexics’ grand average ERPs to the picture are 
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displayed in FIGURE 3 – Appendix B. The visual inspection of the grand averages 
was driven by the comparison with the three main effects observed with non-
dyslexic subjects in STUDY 1: the match-mismatch effect, the polarity effect, and 
the truth-value effect. The waves derived from the consideration of the three 
effects are plotted in FIGURE 5 – Appendix B, where differential waves were 
smoothed for visualization purposes only.
103
  
 The visual inspection of the grand averages and of the main effects of the two 
groups revealed a main difference concerning the earlier emergence of a polarity 
effect in the dyslexic group, starting from about 400ms after the onset of the 
picture and reflecting the large and sustained negativity elicited by the negative 
true condition with respect to all the other three conditions. This effect appears to 
have a rather frontal focus, maximal on anterior left sites (F7, T3, C3), but it is also 
evident over posterior sites where, for the control group, the N400-like effect 
developed in the same time window, but with a more posterior and bilateral 
distribution and with a reversal of the effect for affirmative sentences. Another 
difference between the plots of the grand averages of the two groups is represented 
by the delayed onset in the dyslexic group of the difference between true and false 
affirmative sentences, emerging around 400ms after stimulus in the control group 
and around 600ms in the dyslexic group. To determine the statistically relevant 
differences between the two groups, the same analyses performed in Study 1 were 
carried out including the data from both studies and using group (control N= 21, 
dyslexic N = 10) as between-subjects factor. In particular, two different statistical 
analyses have been carried out:   
 
 (1) A four-groups of channels based analysis (AL, including F3, C3, and 
CP1; AR, including F4, C4, and CP2; PL, including PO3, P3, and P1 
electrodes; PR, including PO4, P4, and P2 electrodes). Again, the 
analysis was separately conducted on the three time intervals of 
interest: TW1 400-600ms, TW2 600-1000ms, TW3 1000-1400ms.  
 
(2) An in-depth analysis on a single cluster of parietal and central 
electrodes (including Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2, P3, and P4 electrodes), with 
the attempt of better understanding the time course of the negativity by 
polarity effect in the two groups. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Four-groups of channels based analysis 
 
The overall grand averages of the dyslexic group for the 3 differential effects of 
match/mismatch, polarity and truth-value in the four groups of channels (AL, ER, 
PL, PR) selected are reported in FIGURE 8. Vertical lines are drawn accordingly to 
                                                 
103
 As for non-dyslexic subjects, the three effects was calculated as follows: match-
mismatch effect = (NT+AF) – (NF+AT); polarity effect = (NT+NF) – (AT+AF); truth-
value effect = (AT+NT) – (AF+AT). 
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the time windows used in the statistical analyses below (400, 600, 1000, and 
1400ms).  
 
 FIGURE 8. Main effects’ grand-averages in the four channels of 
        electrodes – Dyslexic group. 
 
 
 
The analysis design was composed by five factors of two levels each: 2 
topographical factors (longitude: anterior, posterior; latitude: right, left), 2 factors 
concerning the experimental main variables (polarity: negative, affirmative; truth-
value: true, false), and one between-subjects variable (group: dyslexic, control). As 
mentioned, factorial analyses on three different time-windows have been separately 
performed.  
 
 
 
TW 1: 400-600ms. The results of the ANOVA in the time interval between 400 
and 600ms are reported in TABLE 28 (next page). The main effect concerns the 
significant group*polarity*truth-value*long interaction, reflecting the earlier 
emergence of different ERPs for negative relative to affirmative sentences in the 
dyslexic group in comparison with control subjects. 
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TABLE 28. ANOVA on TW1 (400-600ms). 
Effect F (1,30) p-value ges 
group .55 .462 .012 
polarity .14 .713 .000089 
truth 4.77 ≤ .05 * .0010 
longitude 5.08 ≤ .05 * .030 
latitude .67 .419 .0010 
group*polarity .58 .453 .00037 
group*truth 7.55 .010 .0016 
group*longitude .39 .534 .0024 
group*latitude .42 .522 .00064 
polarity*truth 24.85 ≤ .001 * .011 
polarity*longitude 3.86 .058 
•
 .00029 
truth*longitude .27 .607 .000026 
polarity*latitude .80 .379 .000031 
truth*latitude 2.37 .133 .000088 
long*latitude 6.12 ≤ .01 * .0022 
group*polarity*truth .03 .861 .000014 
group*polarity*longitude .13 .717 .000010 
group*truth*longitude 2.15 .153 .00020 
group*polarity*latitude .01 .928 .000000 
group*truth*latitude .22 .641 .000008 
group*long*latitude .0022 .962 .000001 
polarity*truth*longitude .706 .407 .000064 
polarity*truth*latitude 3.16 .085 
•
  .00015 
polarity*long*latitude .07 .784 .000001 
truth*long*latitude 1.83 .185 .000038 
group*polarity*truth*long 5.23 ≤ .05 * .00047 
group*polarity*truth*latitude .07 .789 .000004 
group*polarity*long*latitude .97 .331 .000014 
group*truth*long*latitude .045 .833 .000001 
polarity*truth*long*latitude 1.65 .208 .000026 
group*polarity*truth*long*lat 3.19 .083 .000051 
polarity*truth*latitude .55 .463 .012 
polarity*long*latitude .14 .713 .000089 
 
 
As shown by the means of the two groups (reported in TABLE 29 and TABLE 30 
below), the effect can be more specifically ascribed to the large difference in the 
negativity elicited by the negative conditions between the two groups at the 
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anterior sites, where true negative sentences elicited a more negative deflection 
than false negative sentences of about 2 µV in the dyslexic group, but just about 
0.5 µV in the control group. 
 
TABLE 29. Mean amplitude and difference of true and false negative/affirmative 
conditions at the anterior and posterior electrodes – Control group. 
Longitude Polarity False True Difference 
Anterior affirmative 6.03 7.89 -1.86 
Posterior affirmative 4.09 5.38 -1.28 
Anterior negative 6.67 6.18 .49 
Posterior negative 4.96 3.62 1.34 
 
 
TABLE 30. Mean amplitude and difference of true and false negative/affirmative 
conditions at the anterior and posterior electrodes – Dyslexic group. 
Longitude Polarity False True Difference 
Anterior affirmative 6.14 6.95 -.81 
Posterior affirmative 3.26 3.95 - .68 
Anterior negative 7.30 5.26 2.04 
Posterior negative 4.01 2.58 1.42 
 
 
 
TW 2: 600-1000ms. The results of the ANOVA on the second time interval 
selected are reported in TABLE 31. The time interval between 600 and 1000ms after 
picture onset was mainly characterized the significant group*truth-value effect, 
further qualified by a group*truth-value*longitude interaction. Aside from effects 
involving the group factor, the truth-value*longitude and the polarity*truth effects 
already reported to characterized TW 2 in the control group was found to be 
significant.  
 As in Study 1, the polarity*truth-value effect reflects the larger N400 elicited 
by true and false sentences with opposite polarity. As already mentioned, however, 
while in the control group the effect represents the continuation of the same 
component in TW1, in the dyslexic group the effect was observed to emerge only 
from TW 2 on, around 600ms after picture onset. The truth-value by longitude 
interaction, suggesting participants’ sensitivity to sentence truth-value at this stage, 
is most probably due to the different amplitude of the negativities elicited by 
sentences with opposite truth-value at the anterior sites. As indicated by the 
significant group*truth-value*longitude interaction, however, the effect shows 
important differences between the two groups. In particular, as observable in the 
grand averages and in the means of the effect at the anterior sites, reported in 
TABLE 32, while in the control group the effect can be attributed to the increased 
negativity associated to false sentences relative to true sentences of both polarities, 
  
 
 
 
154 
 
the dyslexic group seems to be characterized by the inverse pattern, resulting in 
more negative going deflections for true sentences in comparison with false 
sentences. A closer look to the grand averages, however, suggests that in the 
dyslexic group the effect could exclusively depend on the more sustained 
negativity elicited by the negative true condition already observed in TW 1 (400-
600ms). Given the lack of a four-way interaction including polarity, however, this 
last consideration results purely speculative. 
 
TABLE 31. ANOVA analysis of ERP data in TW2. 
Effect F (1.30) p-value ges 
group .239 .628 .0054 
polarity 3.71 .063 .0023 
truth .070 .793 .000028 
longitude 12.93 ≤ .001 * .074 
latitude 5.05 ≤ .05 * .0067 
group*polarity .190 .665 .00012 
group*truth 4.96 ≤ .05 * .0020 
group*longitude .30 .587 .0018 
group*latitude .41 .522 .00056 
polarity*truth 21.22 ≤ .005 * .020 
polarity*longitude .058 .811 .0000063 
truth*longitude 4.63 ≤ .05 * .00049 
polarity*latitude 1.44 .238 .000099 
truth*latitude 1.40 .245 .00011 
longitude*latitude 3.65 .065 
•
 .0014 
group*polarity*truth .0001 .991 .0000001 
group*polarity*longitude .11 .732 .000012 
group*truth*longitude 6.52 ≤.05 * .00069 
group*polarity*latitude .00014 .99 .0000000 
group*truth*latitude 2.26 .142 .00017 
group*long*latitude .72 .402 .00028 
polarity*truth*longitude .044 .834 .0000053 
polarity*truth*latitude 3.05 .09 .00018 
polarity*long*latitude 3.02 .092 .000083 
truth*long*latitude 3.40 .075 
•
 .00011 
group*polarity*truth*long 1.63 .21 .00019 
group*polarity*truth*lat 1.05 .313 .000063 
group*polarity*long*lat .36 .551 .0000100 
group*truth*long*latitude .31 .581 .0000105 
polarity*truth*long*lat 2.65 .113 .000091 
group*polarity*truth*long*lat 2.63 .114 .0000909 
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TABLE 32. Group*truth*longitude interaction (TW2 600-1000ms). 
Group  Longitude False True Difference 
Control  Anterior 6.35 7.03 -.68 
Dyslexic Anterior 6.72 6.106 .61 
Control  Posterior 4.52 4.49 .02 
Dyslexic Posterior 3.63 3.26 .36 
 
 
 
TW 3: 1000-1400ms. Main results of the factorial analysis on TW 3 are reported 
in TABLE 33 below. The only effect involving the factor group is the interaction 
group*truth-value*longitude, for which the means (reported in TABLE 34 below) 
suggest an interpretation similar to the one given for TW2 (600-1000ms). As in 
Study 1, the truth-value*longitude*latitude emerges without any interaction with 
the group factor, confirming a major difference between conditions with opposite 
truth-value in the anterior left quadrant. In addition, a significant 
polarity*longitude*latitude, unreported in Study 1, was observed. This latter 
effect is probably due to the difference between affirmative and negative 
conditions in the anterior left quadrant, which appears to be even more 
pronounced in the dyslexic group than in the control group, where it does not 
reach statistical significance. To conclude, the polarity*truth effect discussed in 
TW2 effect approximates significance; even adding the dyslexic group in the 
design, however, this latter effect results only marginal in this time window. A 
more in-depth analysis of this effect in the three time windows selected is 
provided by the analysis at the CP cluster reported below. 
 
 
TABLE 33. ANOVA analysis of the ERP data in TW3. 
 
Effect F (1,30) p-value ges 
group .57 .455 .012 
polarity 3.68 .064 
•
 .0039 
truth .31 .58 .00026 
longitude 34.38 ≤ .05 * .15 
latitude 17.03 ≤ .001 * .018 
group*polarity .27 .606 .00028 
group*truth 2.45 .127 .0020 
group*longitude .017 .896 .000094 
group*latitude 1.40 .245 .0015 
polarity*truth 3.81 .06 
•
 .0061 
polarity*longitude 2.38 .133 .00046 
truth*longitude 2.65 .113 .00044 
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polarity*latitude .79 .379 .00009 
truth*latitude .84 .366 .00014 
longitude*latitude 1.22 .278 .00078 
group*polarity*truth .41 .525 .00067 
group*polarity*longitude .07 .792 .000013 
group*truth*longitude 4.26 ≤ .05 * .00071 
group*polarity*latitude .043 .836 .000049 
group*truth*latitude 3.79 .06 
•
 .00065 
group*long*latitude 1.00 .323 .00065 
polarity*truth*longitude .049 .827 .0000055 
polarity*truth*latitude .53 .47 .000042 
polarity*long*latitude 4.33  ≤.05 * .00030 
truth*long*latitude 5.74  ≤ .05 * .00038 
group*polarity*truth*long .74 .393 .000085 
group*polarity*truth*lat 1.49 .231 .00011 
group*polarity*long*lat .28 .594 2.01 
group*truth*long*lat .74 .395 4.96 
polarity*truth*long*lat 2.29 .14 .00018 
group*polarity*truth*long*lat 2.75 .107 .00021 
polarity*truth*latitude .57 .46 .012 
polarity*long*latitude 3.68 .06 
•
 .0039 
 
 
TABLE 34. Group*truth*longitude interaction (TW 3 1000-14000ms). 
 
Group  Longitude False True Difference 
Control  Anterior 5.48 6.23 - .75 
Dyslexic Anterior 5.23 4.71 .52 
Control  Posterior 2.28 2.36 - .076 
Dyslexic Posterior 1.40 1.14 .25 
 
 
4.2.2.2  Centro-parietal cluster analysis 
 
The ANOVAs on the four channels of electrodes revealed no significant 
differences between the two groups with respect to the polarity*truth-value 
interaction that characterized the first stages of interpretation in the control group 
(see EEG analysis, STUDY 1). To further verify the similarity of the N400-like 
effect in the two groups, a series of the t-tests was performed on a centro-parietal 
cluster of electrodes (including the six electrodes Cz, Pz, CP1, CP2, P3, and P4). A 
t-test every 100ms time intervals included from 500 to 1400ms after picture onset 
was run. The results of the analysis are reported in TABLE 35. 
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TABLE 35. Polarity by truth-value effect at the CP cluster.  
Time  
interval 
Controls 
(mean) 
Dyslexics 
(mean) 
  t (1,30) p-value 
500, 600ms -1.126 -1.053 -.168 .867 
600,700ms -1.301 -1.340 .066 .947 
700,800ms -1.279 -1.622 .516 .609 
800,900ms -1.573 -1.517 -.076 .939 
900,1000ms -1.576 -.940 -.886 .382 
1000,1100ms -1.360 -.861 -.748 .460 
1100,1200ms -1.002 -.924 -.097 .923 
1300,1400ms -.683 -.957 .322 .750 
 
 
The t-tests did not show any significant difference in the elicitation of the N400 in 
dyslexic and control subjects on the average effect determined by match-mismatch 
relationship between the sentence and the picture, independently from the presence 
of negation. As shown by the grand averages of the effect at the CP cluster, 
reported in FIGURE 9, in addition, the effect had similar amplitude and latency in 
the two groups, starting from around 400ms and lasting until around 1450ms after 
picture onset. As already observed in the four quadrant analysis, however, the 
dyslexic group shows a large effect of truth-value already in an early time window.  
 
FIGURE 9. Polarity by truth-value effect at the CP cluster.
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In addition, the qualitative inspection of the grand-averages of the dyslexic group 
shows that the effects of truth-value is not perfectly reversed in the 400-600ms 
interval, as it conversely happens in the control group. While for the control group, 
in fact, negative true and affirmative false sentences appear indistinguishable on 
CP sites between 400 and 600ms, for the dyslexics an early and large truth-value 
effect is reported for negative sentences (with true sentences resulting more 
negative than false, both in cento-parietal and, even more, at frontal sites), but no 
difference between affirmative sentences with opposite truth-value emerges before 
600ms after picture onset. This difference makes it likely that the apparent 
similarity of the average polarity by truth/match-mismatch effect in the CP sites of 
the two groups is not likely to be an informative comparison, since it may be due to 
very different patterns in the two groups. This difference makes it likely that the 
apparent similarity of the average match-mismatch effect in the CP sites of the two 
groups is not likely to be an informative comparison, since it may be due to very 
different patterns in the two groups. For this reason, we run a further analysis on 
the differential waves that contribute to the polarity by truth-value well known 
effect at centro-parietal sites by separating the component of the effect due to 
negative sentences (negative true minus negative false) from that due to affirmative 
sentences (negative false minus negative true). The plot in FIGURE 10 confirms that 
the composition of the overall effect is different in the two groups in that, 
especially in the first two time windows, the controls show a nice symmetric effect, 
while for dyslexics the effect is very large for negative sentences, but near to 
absent for the affirmative ones.  
 
FIGURE 10. Disaggregated analysis of the polarity by truth effect components 
  at the CP cluster. 
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To test this statistically, we performed separate ANOVAs with a within factor 
polarity (2 levels: negative and affirmative difference wave) and a between factor 
group (2 levels: control and dyslexic). The outcome of the ANOVA, reported in 
TABLE 36 below, shows significant condition by group interactions in the time 
intervals (450, 550ms), (550, 650ms), (750, 850ms), (850, 950ms), (1350, 
1450ms). 
 
TABLE 36. Polarity effect (differential negative and affirmative wave)  
  at the CP cluster. 
 
Time interval Effect F (1,30) p-value ges 
450,550ms dyslexic ≤ .05 * .8673 .0006 
450,550ms control 4.162 .0502 .0467 
450,550ms dys*cont 8.401 .0069 .0899 
550, 560ms dyslexic ≤ .005 * .9476 .0001 
550, 560ms control 1.179 .2862 .0115 
550, 560ms dys*cont 12.413 .0014 .1095 
650, 750ms dyslexic .267 .6094 .0065 
650, 750ms control ≤ .05 * .8522 .0003 
650, 750ms dys*cont 3.572 .0685 .0302 
750, 850ms dyslexic ≤ .01 * .9400 .0001 
750, 850ms control .432 .5158 .0036 
750, 850ms dys*cont 4.967 .0335 .0401 
850, 950ms dyslexic .786 .3824 .0171 
850, 950ms control 1.665 .2068 .0183 
850, 950ms dys*cont 4.522 .0418 .0482 
950, 1050ms dyslexic .560 .4600 .0115 
950, 1050ms control 1.192 .2836 .0147 
950, 1050ms dys*cont 3.640 .0660 .0435 
1050, 1150ms dyslexic ≤ .005 * .9236 .0002 
1050, 1150ms control 1.053 .3131 .0116 
1050, 1150ms dys*cont 1.357 .2532 .0149 
1150, 1250ms dyslexic .103 .7500 .0022 
1150, 1250ms control .668 .4203 .0081 
1150, 1250ms dys*cont 3.462 .0726 .0407 
1250, 1350ms dyslexic .412 .5260 .0096 
1250, 1350ms control 1.028 .3187 .0100 
1250, 1350ms dys*cont 2.956 .0959 .0281 
1350, 1450ms dyslexic .161 .6909 .0040 
1350, 1450ms control 2.387 .1328 .0197 
1350, 1450ms dys*cont 6.602 .0154 .0526 
  
 
  
 
 
 
160 
 
To better qualify the effects in the two early time windows, in addition, separate-
test t-tests on the critical conditions for the first two time windows have been 
performed. 
 
Interval 450-550ms. In the first time window analyzed, paired t-test against zero 
for each condition and group shows that for the controls the effects for affirmatives 
[diff = 1.13 μV, t (20) = 3.34, p ≤ .01] and negatives [diff = 1.12 μV, t (20) = 3.39, 
p ≤ .01] are both significant. On the contrary, for the dyslexic group the effect is 
significant for negative [diff = 1.96 μV, t (10) = 4.49, p ≤ .01], but not for 
affirmative sentences [diff = 0.14, t (10), p < 1]. Paired t-test of the condition effect 
restricted to dyslexic subjects confirms the difference between affirmative and 
negative sentences [t (10) = 3.20, p ≤ .01], while no similar difference emerges for 
the controls. An additional between groups t-test showed that the difference 
between the amplitude of two groups’ effects in the negative sentences did not 
result significant, despite being clearly numerically larger for dyslexics. 
 
Interval 550-650ms. In the second time window, paired t-test against zero for each 
condition and group shows that for controls the effects for affirmative [diff = 1.56 
μV, t (20) = 3.42, p ≤ .01] and negative [diff = 1.03 μV, t (20) = 2.46, p ≤ .05] were 
both significant. As in the previous interval, however, in the dyslexic group the 
effect is significant exclusively for negative sentences [diff = 2.43 μV, t (10) = 
5.40, p ≤ .01], and not for affirmative sentences [diff = 0.25, t (10), < 1]. Paired t-
test of the polarity effect restricted to dyslexic subjects confirmed the difference 
between affirmative and negative sentences [t (10) = 3.06, p ≤ .05], while no 
difference emerged for the controls. An additional between groups t-test on the 
difference between the amplitude of the two groups in the negative sentences 
showed that they were larger in the dyslexic than in the control group [t (30) =2.09, 
p<0.05]. 
 
 
4.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Despite the small dimension of the dyslexic group, the paradigm used allowed the 
identification of statistically significant differences in both working memory 
measures and behavioral and electrophysiological patterns associated to the 
verification of negative sentences at the picture. In line with the previous literature 
on the topic, the results of the working memory tests revealed significantly weaker 
phonological working memory, but intact visuo-spatial memory in the dyslexic 
undergraduate students in comparison with the age-matched controls. Interestingly, 
however, the analysis of the connection between phonological working memory 
capacity and reading and writing skills showed that the memory span measures 
significantly predicts the accuracy in the non-word reading and in the dictation 
under articulatory suppression tasks. Worth noting, however, the correlation 
explains only a limited amount of the variance in the two tasks, suggesting that 
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phonological working memory is not the only factor involved in adults’ dyslexic 
writing and reading performance. The lack of a stronger correlation between the 
two abilities, nevertheless, may also be due to the type of statistical analysis 
performed, which included all subjects, without drawing any group distinction 
(e.g., controls vs. dyslexics/low span vs. high span subjects/other). Alternatively, 
the poor writing and reading may be interpreted to reflect a persistent lack of 
automation of the two skills, deriving from the concurrent inefficiency of the 
phonological working memory with other cognitive processes not investigated in 
the present study. In contrast with previous evidence, in addition, no central 
executive inefficiency was reported in the sample of dyslexic subjects. As we 
realized only after the performance of the participants to this study, however, this 
divergence is most probably attributable to the low sensitivity of the task I used for 
the assessment of central executive functions. The fact that already another study 
adopting a paper-and-pencil dual task failed to find differences between a group of 
Italian dyslexic adults and a group of age-matched control subjects (Ghidoni & 
Angelini, 2007), in fact, suggests that dual tasks of the type adopted in the present 
study do not deal with the aspects of central executive system which have been 
reported to be problematic for dyslexic subjects. A very brief review of the studies 
reporting a central executive impairment in dyslexic subjects, in fact, shows that 
the main deficits in this domain relate to attention sustainability, planning and 
coordination skills, rather than to the ability of concurrently performing two tasks 
crucially depending on different cognitive resources.  
 The results of the sentence-picture verification task are only partially in line 
with the findings reported by Vender & Delfitto (2010) and by Rizzato, Scappini, 
& Cardinaletti (2014). The overall performance of the dyslexic group was 
characterized by slower response times and higher error rates in all conditions in 
comparison with control subjects, indicating that the dyslexic participants 
experienced more difficulty in the execution of the task in general, and not only in 
the verification of the negative sentences. Similarly to the control subjects, dyslexic 
subjects exhibited more difficulty in the interpretation of the negative sentences in 
comparison with affirmative sentences, resulting in higher error rates and longer 
response times in the negative conditions in comparison with affirmative 
conditions. Beyond sentence polarity, the performance of the two groups was also 
crucially affected by the interaction between truth-value and polarity. Nevertheless, 
partially different patterns were reported in the two groups in this respect. As for 
affirmatives, in both groups false affirmative sentences were similarly associated to 
higher error rates and longer reaction times in comparison with true affirmative 
sentences. As for the negatives, as we have seen, the two groups showed slightly 
different patterns. With respect to accuracy, the control group reported the well-
known inverse symmetry, with higher error rates for true than for false negative 
sentences; the dyslexic group, on the contrary, reported no difference in the 
accuracy for the two negative conditions. With respect to reaction times, 
differently, the dyslexic group was characterized by a pronounced difference 
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between true and false negative sentences (with the former being interpreted slower 
than the latter), in comparison with non-dyslexic adults.  
 This pattern of data does thus not entirely support the hypothesis of a specific 
difficulty with negative sentences but speaks about an overall difficulty of 
dyslexics in the execution of the task. This latter hypothesis is supported also by 
the results of the regression analysis performed to evaluate the influence of 
working memory capacity on the interpretation of affirmative and negative 
sentences. As said, the statistical analysis reported a significant correlation between 
the phonological component of WM and the behavioral measures (accuracy, 
reaction times) of all four experimental conditions. Contrary to Vender (2011)’s 
hypothesis, however, the lack of a difference in the correlation between affirmative 
and negative conditions suggests that the working memory involvement may be 
mostly due to the working memory load of the experimental task (requiring the 
subjects to remember the sentence until the presentation of the picture), rather than 
to different processing cost associated to interpretation of the two types of 
sentences. 
 The analysis of the ERPs elicited by the presentation of the picture provided not 
very clear information about the processing of negative sentences in developmental 
dyslexia either. To start with, as we have seen, the four quadrants analysis revealed 
a complex interaction between group, longitude, polarity and truth-value in the first 
of the time windows we considered (400-600ms). In particular, while in the control 
group the first processing stages appeared to be exclusively determined by the 
match-mismatch between the sentence and the picture (see the Discussion of the 
Study 1, § 3.3), eliciting a N400-like component at posterior sites symmetric for 
affirmative and negative sentences consistent with the predictions of the two-stage 
hypothesis, the dyslexic group showed different effects for affirmative and 
negative conditions already at this stage. More precisely, while true negative 
sentences were found to elicit a long standing broad distributed negativity 
(emerging about 400ms after picture onset and presenting its maximal amplitude at 
frontal sites) in comparison with false negative sentences, no similar effects were 
found when the picture was following the affirmative sentences. This effect is hard 
to qualify in terms of well known ERP components, and it is also hard to relate to 
the frontal effect emerging as a function of truth-value found in later time windows 
for control subjects (see STUDY 1). This latter effect, in fact, was characterized by 
an opposite voltage polarity (a larger negativity for false sentences with respect to 
true ones), and characterized both affirmative and negative sentences. The centro-
parietal analysis detailed at the level of the specific contributions to the overall 
N400-like effects by affirmative and negative conditions showed a further early 
difference between the sentence-picture matching after the presentation of 
affirmative and negative sentences. The first time window we considered (400-
600ms), in fact, highlighted a very different pattern for the two groups of subjects: 
differently from controls, dyslexic subjects presented a delayed N400-like effect 
for affirmative sentences (which was found to emerge only after around 600ms), 
but showed an earlier and large effect for negative sentences, which was found to 
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be even larger than that observed in the control group in 550-650ms interval. Even 
if the small number of subjects, the limited number of frontal recording sites in our 
experimental setup, and the unexpected topography of the effect make it very 
difficult to give a clear functional interpretation of this early effect, the difference 
in timing on the onset of the effects which associated to affirmative and negative 
sentences in the two groups of subjects allow to make some speculative 
considerations. The early difference between affirmative and negative sentences, 
on the one hand, and between true and false negative conditions, on the other, in 
fact, suggests that dyslexic subjects’ interpretation of negative sentences may rely 
on different interpretative and/or cognitive processes with respect to those 
predicted by the two-step simulation hypothesis. In particular, while in non-
dyslexic subjects the first stage of interpretation was mainly concerned with the 
comparison between the ‘content’ of the sentence and the picture, without 
considering whether that content has to be negated or not to obtain the proper 
meaning of the sentence, the dyslexic subjects do not seem to engage in a similar 
process, as confirmed by the complete absence of the N400 match-mismatch effect 
for affirmative sentences. Among the two negative sentences, in addition, the large 
and early negativity elicited by true negatives suggests that this latter sentences 
may be treated somehow differently with respect to the other types of sentences 
tested. The anterior distribution of the effect, together with its sustained latency, 
suggests that the effect may represent an instance of the ‘anterior sustained 
negativity’ typically associated, as we mentioned, to interpretive difficulties, 
conceptual violations and, more in general, to the discourse model elaboration (see 
§ 2.3.2.2 for a review). This latter explanation would be consistent both with the 
observation of the particularly longer response times reported for true negative 
sentences in comparison with false negative sentences, and with the hypothesis, 
suggested in the Discussion of the Study 1 (§ 3.3), that true negative sentences may 
be characterized by a higher pragmatic sensitivity with respect to false negative 
sentences. In this view, the effect may reflect the re-computation of the discourse 
model determined by the use of a negative sentence to express correct information, 
unexpected under the pragmatic context provided by the experimental task. Worth 
noting, however, if this were the case, it would imply that the dyslexic participants 
could have processed the actual meaning of the negative sentences already at 
around 400-500ms after picture onset, a hypothesis which results in a clear contrast 
not only with the two-step simulation model of the negation, but also with the well-
known processing limitation of dyslexic subjects. As for the later time windows, 
since the very large differences between the two groups observed in the very first 
stages of sentence verification suggests not to try to further elaborate the 
comparison between the two groups at later stages of processing, we will limit our 
observation to the consideration that the emergence of a truth-value effect in the 
second and third time windows analyzed indicates that the dyslexic participants 
have finally processed the truth-value of the sentence (as indeed confirmed by the 
above-chance accuracy level). Given the significant difference in both accuracy 
and reaction times, however, the different strategy adopted by the dyslexic group 
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has to be considered less functional than the one used by the control group in both 
the affirmative and the negative conditions. 
 To sum up, the results of the present study do not provide confirmation to 
Vender (2011)’s hypothesis, according to which the interpretation of negative 
sentences would crucially depend on working memory resources. Despite of the 
significant differences in the phonological working memory, in fact, no indication 
of increased processing cost for the interpretation of negative sentences in 
comparison with affirmative sentences was reported. The analysis of the behavioral 
data, on the contrary, indicates that dyslexic subjects experienced a more general 
difficulty in all experimental conditions, very likely deriving from the working 
memory load associated with the execution of the experimental task. Moreover, the 
analysis of the ERPs and, in particular, the observation in the dyslexic group of (a) 
a crucial lack of the N400 effect characterizing the first stage of sentence 
verification in the control group, and (b) the emergence of an early polarity effect, 
unreported in the control group, suggests that dyslexic adults may rely on different 
cognitive strategies in the interpretation of both affirmative and negative sentence 
in sentence-picture verification tasks of the type proposed here. Worth noting, this 
latter hypothesis is at variance, at least to some extent, with the predictions of the 
two-step simulation hypothesis by Kaup and colleagues, according to which the 
interpretation of the negative sentences necessarily requires the initial simulation of 
the negated state of affairs. Further investigation is however needed to better 
determine the cognitive process underlying the interpretation of negative sentences 
in adults with developmental dyslexia, especially with reference to a detailed 
cognitive analysis of the possible strategies that can be adopted for solving tasks of 
the type implemented here.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A.  
Experimental stimuli 
 
Sentences 
For brevity convenience, we report only one of the four lists used in the experiment 
to counterbalance items and conditions trough the so-called ‘Latin-square 
distribution’. 
Practice trials 
 
Winnie the Pooh non sta portando una torta. 
Paperina non sta cuocendo una frittata. 
Winnie Pooh non sta spedendo una lettera. 
Paperino non sta guidando un’auto. 
Tigro non sta scavando una buca. 
Paperina non sta leggendo un libro. 
Paperino non sta lanciando un vaso. 
Tigro sta guardando una farfalla. 
 
 
Winnie the Pooh is not bringing a cake. 
Daisy is not cooking an omelet. 
Winnie the Pooh is not sending a letter. 
Donald Duck is not driving a car. 
Tigro is not digging a hole. 
Daisy is not reading a book. 
Donald Duck is not throwing a vase. 
Tigro is looking at a butterfly. 
Block 1 
 
Alice sta abbracciando una bambola. 
La Sirenetta non sta acchiappando un 
pesciolino. 
Lisa sta aggiustando un aereoplanino.  
La bambina non sta aprendo un ombrello. 
Paperina sta incollando delle fotografie. 
Jasmine non sta attraversando un ponte. 
Marge sta bevendo una bibita. 
Il poliziotto non sta calciando una sedia. 
La nonna sta chiudendo una porta. 
Il topo non sta contando le carte. 
Pippo sta cuocendo del pesce. 
Grande Puffo non sta disegnando una 
principessa. 
Spiderman sta gettando una rete. 
Trilli non sta guardando l'orologio.  
Cenerentola sta indossando una collana. 
Capitan Uncino non sta lavando dei piatti. 
Winnie the Pooh sta mangiando del miele. 
L’indiano non sta montando una tenda. 
Semola sta perdendo le chiavi. 
Mike non sta portando un cestino. 
Biancaneve sta preparando una torta. 
Nonna Papera non sta pulendo gli occhiali. 
Alice is hugging a doll. 
The Little Mermaid is not catching a fish. 
 
Lisa is fixing a toy airplane. 
The girl is not opening an umbrella. 
Daisy is pasting some photos. 
 Jasmine is not going through a bridge. 
Marge is drinking a soft drink. 
The policeman is not kicking a chair. 
The grandmother is closing a door. 
The mouse is not counting cards. 
Goofy is cooking some fish. 
Papa Smurf is not drawing a princess. 
 
Spiderman is throwing a net. 
Tinker Bell is not looking at the clock. 
Cinderella is wearing a necklace. 
Captain Hook is not washing the dishes. 
Winnie the Pooh is eating some honey. 
The indian is not mounting a tent. 
Arthur is losing the keys. 
Mike is not carrying a basket. 
Snow White is preparing a cake. 
Grandma Duck is not cleaning the 
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Geppetto sta rompendo un vetro. 
La scimmia non sta sbucciando una banana. 
Asterix sta scavando una buca. 
Titti non sta sognando un'isola. 
Duffy Duck sta strappando un cartellone. 
Little John non sta tagliando della legna. 
Il principe sta tirando una freccia. 
Pluto non sta saltando un ostacolo. 
 
glasses. 
Geppetto is breaking a glass. 
The monkey is peeling a banana. 
Asterix is digging a hole. 
Tweety is not dreaming island. 
Daffy Duck is ripping a billboard. 
Little John is not cutting wood. 
The prince is pulling an arrow. 
Pluto is not jumping an obstacle. 
 
Block 2 
 
Bart sta abbracciando un orsacchiotto. 
Aladdin non sta accarezzando un fiore. 
Spugna sta alzando le mani. 
Little John non sta bevendo dell'acqua. 
Winnie the Pooh sta cancellando un disegno. 
Grande Puffo non sta colorando delle uova. 
La scimmia sta costruendo una capanna. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta facendo un 
panino. 
Pippo sta gonfiando un salvagente. 
Il gatto non sta guardando la televisione. 
Bugs Bunny sta guidando la macchina. 
Mago Merlino non sta lanciando un sasso. 
Paperina sta lavando i panni. 
Biancaneve non sta leggendo un libro. 
Geppetto sta mordendo una mela. 
Aurora non sta pestando una pozzanghera. 
Titti sta piantando un chiodo. 
Il coniglio non sta raccogliendo delle 
conchiglie. 
Nonna Papera sta riempiendo una bottiglia. 
Topolino non sta rincorrendo un aquilone. 
Obelix sta riparando un arco. 
Il pagliaccio non sta saltando una corda. 
Sebastian sta scrivendo il diario. 
L’indiano non sta spegnendo il fuoco. 
Spiderman sta spezzando una catena. 
Mike non sta spingendo un pacco. 
Il poliziotto sta strappando un giornale. 
Trilli non sta suonando dei campanellini. 
Cenerentola sta tagliando delle carote. 
Marge non sta mostrando una medaglia. 
Bart is hugging a teddy bear. 
Aladdin is not caressing a flower. 
Sponge is raising his hands. 
Little John is not drinking some water. 
Winnie the Pooh is erasing a drawing. 
Papa Smurf is not coloring some eggs. 
The monkey is building a hut. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not making a 
sandwich. 
Goofy is inflating a life preserver. 
The cat is not watching television. 
Bugs Bunny is driving the car. 
Merlin is not throwing a stone. 
Daisy is washing clothes. 
Snow White is not reading a book. 
Geppetto is biting an apple. 
Aurora is not stepping on a puddle. 
Tweety is hammering a nail. 
The rabbit is not collecting shells. 
 
Grandma Duck is filling a bottle. 
Mickey Mouse is not chasing a kite. 
Obelix is repairing a bow. 
The clown is not jumping rope. 
Sebastian is writing the diary. 
The indian is not putting out the fire. 
Spiderman is breaking a chain. 
Mike is pushing a package. 
The policeman is ripping a newspaper. 
Tinker Bell is not playing bells. 
Cinderella is cutting carrots. 
Marge is not showing a medal. 
Bart sta abbracciando un orsacchiotto. 
Aladdin non sta accarezzando un fiore. 
Spugna sta alzando le mani. 
Little John non sta bevendo dell'acqua. 
Winnie the Pooh sta cancellando un disegno. 
Bart is hugging a teddy bear. 
Aladdin is not caressing a flower. 
Sponge is raising his hands. 
Little John is not drinking some water. 
Winnie the Pooh is erasing a drawing. 
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Grande Puffo non sta colorando delle uova. 
La scimmia sta costruendo una capanna. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta facendo un 
panino. 
Pippo sta gonfiando un salvagente. 
Il gatto non sta guardando la televisione. 
Bugs Bunny sta guidando la macchina. 
Mago Merlino non sta lanciando un sasso. 
Paperina sta lavando i panni. 
Biancaneve non sta leggendo un libro. 
Geppetto sta mordendo una mela. 
Aurora non sta pestando una pozzanghera. 
Titti sta piantando un chiodo. 
Il coniglio non sta raccogliendo delle 
conchiglie. 
Nonna Papera sta riempiendo una bottiglia. 
Topolino non sta rincorrendo un aquilone. 
Obelix sta riparando un arco. 
Il pagliaccio non sta saltando una corda. 
Sebastian sta scrivendo il diario. 
L’indiano non sta spegnendo il fuoco. 
Spiderman sta spezzando una catena. 
Mike non sta spingendo un pacco. 
Il poliziotto sta strappando un giornale. 
Trilli non sta suonando dei campanellini. 
Cenerentola sta tagliando delle carote. 
Marge non sta mostrando una medaglia. 
Papa Smurf is not coloring some eggs. 
The monkey is building a hut. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not making a 
sandwich. 
Goofy is inflating a life preserver. 
The cat is not watching television. 
Bugs Bunny is driving the car. 
Merlin is not throwing a stone. 
Daisy is washing clothes. 
Snow White is not reading a book. 
Geppetto is biting an apple. 
Aurora is not stepping on a puddle. 
Tweety is hammering a nail. 
The rabbit is not collecting shells. 
 
Grandma Duck is filling a bottle. 
Mickey Mouse is not chasing a kite. 
Obelix is repairing a bow. 
The clown is not jumping rope. 
Sebastian is writing the diary. 
The indian is not putting out the fire. 
Spiderman is breaking a chain. 
Mike is pushing a package. 
The policeman is ripping a newspaper. 
Tinker Bell is not playing bells. 
Cinderella is cutting carrots. 
Marge is not showing a medal. 
 
Block 3 
 
Sully sta abbracciando una bambola. 
Marge non sta accendendo la luce. 
Little John sta aggiustando un vestito. 
Bugs Bunny non sta alzando una bandiera. 
Peter Pan sta aprendo una finestra. 
Batman non sta attraversando la strada. 
Asterix sta bevendo una bibita. 
Il gatto non sta calciando un pallone. 
La bambina sta chiudendo una valigia. 
Il ladro non sta contando delle monetine. 
Puffetta sta cuocendo del pollo. 
Winnie the Pooh non sta dipingendo una 
parete. 
La Sirenetta sta disegnando una casa. 
Silvestro non sta gettando la spazzatura. 
Alice sta guardando l'orologio. 
Paperino non sta incollando delle figurine. 
Mago Merlino sta indossando un cappello. 
La nonna non sta mangiando del miele. 
 
Sully is hugging a doll. 
Marge is not turning on the light. 
Little John is adjusting a dress. 
Bugs Bunny is not raising a flag. 
Peter Pan is opening a window. 
Batman is not crossing the street. 
Asterix is drinking a soft drink. 
The cat is not kicking a ball. 
The little girl is closing a suitcase. 
The thief is counting some pennies. 
Smurfette is cooking some chicken. 
Winnie the Pooh is not painting a wall. 
 
The Little Mermaid is designing a house. 
Sylvester is not throwing out the garbage. 
Alice is looking at the watch. 
Donald Duck is not pasting some stickers. 
Merlin is wearing a hat. 
The grandmother is not eating some 
honey. 
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Jasmine sta montando una tenda. 
Aurora non sta perdendo un fazzoletto. 
Tarzan sta pestando delle foglie. 
Cenerentola non sta preparando la tavola. 
Brontolo sta pulendo il pavimento. 
Capitan Uncino non sta sbucciando delle 
patate. 
Topolino sta scavando una buca. 
Zio Paperone non sta sognando il mare. 
Lisa sta spegnendo una lampadina. 
Il cow boy non sta tagliando della legna. 
Geppetto sta tirando un carretto. 
Paperina non sta mostrando una coppa. 
Jasmine is mounting a tent. 
Aurora is not losing a handkerchief. 
Tarzan is pounding some leaves. 
Cinderella is not setting the table. 
Grumpy is cleaning the floor. 
Captain Hook is not peeling some 
potatoes. 
Mickey Mouse is digging a hole. 
Uncle Scrooge is not dreaming of the sea. 
Lisa is powering a light bulb. 
The cowboy is not cutting wood. 
Geppetto is pulling a cart. 
Daisy is not showing a cup. 
 
 
Block 4 
 
Brontolo sta accarezzando un uccellino. 
Mago Merlino non sta accendendo una 
candela. 
Grande Puffo sta ascoltando la radio. 
Aurora non sta bevendo dell'acqua. 
Paperina sta cancellando un disegno. 
Sully non sta colorando un’immagine. 
Geppetto sta costruendo un tavolo. 
La bambina non sta dipingendo un quadro. 
Il gatto sta facendo una foto. 
Spugna non sta gonfiando un salvagente. 
Obelix sta guidando una nave. 
Il cow boy non sta lanciando un sasso. 
La matrigna sta lavando dei piatti. 
Silvestro non sta leggendo un cartello. 
Nonna Papera sta mordendo una ciambella. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta raccogliendo 
delle fragoline. 
Robin Hood sta riempiendo un secchio. 
Alice non sta rincorrendo un aquilone. 
Paperino sta riparando un motore. 
Aladdin non sta rovesciando un bicchiere. 
Il poliziotto sta scavalcando un recinto. 
Bart non sta scrivendo il diario. 
Spiderman sta sollevando dei pesi. 
La scimmia non sta spezzando un ramo. 
Duffy Duck sta spingendo un’auto. 
Marge non sta strappando un cartellone. 
Sebastian sta suonando un tamburello. 
Peter Pan non sta tenendo una spada. 
Topolino sta mostrando una medaglia. 
Winnie the Pooh non sta acchiappando una 
farfalla. 
Grumpy is caressing a bird. 
Merlin is not lightening a candle. 
 
Papa Smurf is listening to the radio. 
Aurora is not drinking some water. 
Daisy is erasing a drawing. 
Sully is not coloring a picture. 
Geppetto is building a table. 
The girl is painting a picture. 
The cat is taking a picture. 
Sponge is not inflating a life preserver. 
Obelix is driving a ship. 
The cowboy is not throwing a stone. 
The stepmother is washing some dishes. 
Sylvester is not reading a sign. 
Grandma Duck is biting a donut. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not collecting 
of wild strawberries. 
Robin Hood is filling a bucket. 
Alice is chasing a kite. 
Donald Duck is repairing an engine. 
Aladdin is not spilling a glass. 
The policeman is climbing a fence. 
Bart is writing the diary. 
Spiderman is lifting weights. 
The monkey is not breaking a branch. 
Daffy Duck is pushing a car. 
Marge is not ripping off a billboard. 
Sebastian is playing a tambourine. 
Peter Pan is not holding a sword. 
Mickey Mouse is showing a medal. 
Winnie the Pooh is not catching a 
butterfly. 
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Block 5 
 
Peter Pan sta abbracciando un orsacchiotto. 
Il gatto non sta acchiappando un pesciolino. 
Mago Merlino sta alzando una bandiera. 
Il coniglio non sta aprendo un ombrello. 
Il principe non sta attraversa la strada. 
Pinocchio non sta calciando una sedia. 
Spugna sta chiudendo una valigia. 
Titti non sta cuocendo del pesce. 
Pippo sta gettando la spazzatura. 
Lisa non sta incollando delle fotografie. 
Nonna Papera sta indossando un cappello. 
Homer non sta lavando i panni. 
Brontolo sta mangiando del pollo. 
Grande Puffo non sta montando un mobile. 
 
Cenerentola sta perdendo un fazzoletto. 
Tigro non sta pestando delle foglie. 
La scimmia sta piantando un albero. 
Il pagliaccio non sta portando un regalo. 
La Sirenetta sta rompendo un vaso. 
Bugs Bunny non sta saltando un ostacolo.  
La nonna sta sbucciando delle patate. 
Batman non sta scavando un tunnel. 
Robin Hood sta scavalcando un muretto. 
Sully non sta spegnendo una lampadina. 
Il poliziotto sta spezzando una catena. 
Topolino non sta strappando un giornale. 
 
Aladdin sta suonando dei campanellini. 
Paperina non sta tagliando delle carote. 
Il cow boy sta tenendo un bastone. 
Asterix non sta tirando un carretto. 
 
Peter Pan is hugging a teddy bear. 
The cat is not catching a fish. 
Merlin is raising a flag. 
The rabbit is not opening an umbrella. 
The prince is not crossing the road. 
Pinocchio is not kicking a chair. 
Sponge is closing a suitcase. 
Tweedy is not cooking some fish. 
Goofy is throwing the garbage. 
Lisa is not pasting some photographs. 
Grandma Duck is wearing a hat. 
Homer is not washing clothes. 
Grumpy is eating chicken. 
Papa Smurf is not assembling a piece of 
furniture. 
Cinderella is losing a handkerchief. 
Tigger is not pounding the leaves. 
The monkey is planting a tree. 
The clown is not bringing a gift. 
The Little Mermaid is breaking a vase. 
Bugs Bunny is not jumping an obstacle. 
The grandmother is peeling potatoes. 
Batman is digging a tunnel. 
Robin Hood is climbing over a wall. 
Sully is not turning off a light bulb. 
The policeman is breaking a chain. 
Mickey Mouse is not tearing a 
newspaper. 
Aladdin is ringing bells. 
Daisy is not cutting carrots. 
The cowboy is holding a stick. 
Asterix is not pulling a cart 
 
Block 6 
 
Il principe sta accarezzando un fiore. 
Biancaneve non sta accendendo una candela. 
Mike sta alzando le mani. 
La Sirenetta non sta indossa una collana. 
 
Lisa sta cancellando la lavagna. 
Trilli non sta colorando un'immagine. 
Puffetta sta costruendo un tavolo. 
Geppetto non sta dipingendo una parete. 
Silvestro sta facendo un panino. 
Winnie the Pooh non sta gonfiando un 
The prince is caressing a flower. 
Snow White is not lighting a candle. 
Mike is raising his hands. 
The Little Mermaid is not wearing a 
necklace. 
Lisa is erasing the chalkboard. 
Tinker Bell is not coloring a picture. 
Smurfette is building a table. 
Geppetto is not painting a wall. 
Sylvester is making a sandwich. 
Winnie the Pooh is not blowing up a 
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palloncino. 
Spugna sta guidando una nave. 
Il pagliaccio non sta acchiappando una 
farfalla. 
Il poliziotto sta leggendo un cartello. 
Marge non sta mordendo una ciambella. 
Pluto sta pestando una pozzanghera. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta pulendo gli 
occhiali. 
Semola sta riempiendo un secchio. 
Il topo non sta rincorrendo un topolino. 
Batman sta rompendo un vetro. 
Duffy Duck non sta rovesciando una scatola. 
La scimmia sta saltando la corda. 
Little John non sta disegnando una 
principessa. 
La matrigna non sta scrivendo una lettera. 
Alice non sta sollevando una valigia. 
Asterix sta suonando un tamburello. 
Jasmine non sta chiudendo la porta. 
Zio Paperone sta contando delle monetine. 
Il cow boy non sta attraversando un ponte. 
Paperino sta lanciando una palla. 
Minnie non sta ascoltando la radio. 
 
balloon. 
Sponge is driving a ship. 
The clown is not catching a butterfly. 
 
The policeman is reading a sign. 
Marge is biting a donut. 
Pluto is stepping on a puddle. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not cleaning his 
glasses. 
Arthur is filling a bucket. 
The mouse is not chasing a mouse. 
Batman is breaking a glass. 
Daffy Duck is not knocking over a box. 
The monkey is jumping rope. 
Little John is not drawing a princess. 
 
The stepmother is not writing a letter. 
Alice is picking up a suitcase. 
Asterix is playing a tambourine. 
Jasmine is not closing the door. 
Uncle Scrooge is counting some pennies. 
The cowboy is not going through a 
bridge. 
Donald Duck is launching a ball. 
Minnie is not listening to the radio. 
 
Block 7 
 
Trilli sta aggiustando un vestito. 
Aurora non sta aprendo una finestra. 
Silvestro sta calciando un pallone. 
Alice non sta contando le carte. 
Marge sta cuocendo del pollo. 
Winnie the Pooh non sta disegnando una 
casa. 
Spugna sta gettando una rete. 
Lisa non sta guardando la televisione. 
Grande Puffo sta incollando delle figurine. 
La bambina non sta lanciando una palla. 
La scimmia sta mangiando del pollo. 
Paperino non sta montando un mobile. 
 
Pinocchio sta perdendo le chiavi. 
L’indiano non sta piantando un albero. 
Nonna Papera sta portando un regalo. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta preparando una 
torta. 
Cenerentola sta pulendo il pavimento. 
Brontolo non sta raccogliendo delle 
fragoline. 
Tinker Bell is adjusting a dress. 
Aurora is not opening a window. 
Sylvester is kicking a ball. 
Alice is not counting cards. 
Marge is cooking the chicken. 
Winnie the Pooh is not drawing a 
house. 
Sponge is throwing a net. 
Lisa is not watching television. 
Papa Smurf is pasting some stickers. 
The girl is throwing a ball. 
The monkey is eating the chicken. 
Donald Duck is not assembling a piece 
of furniture. 
Pinocchio is losing the keys. 
The indian is not planting a tree. 
Grandma Duck is bringing a gift. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not preparing 
a cake. 
Cinderella is cleaning the floor. 
Grumpy is not collecting of wild 
strawberries. 
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Il topo sta riparando un motore. 
Robin Hood non sta rovesciando un 
bicchiere. 
Mike sta sbucciando una banana. 
Spiderman non sta scavalcando un muretto. 
Bugs Bunny sta scavando un tunnel. 
Topolino non sta sognando il mare. 
 
Minnie sta sollevando dei pesi. 
Obelix non sta spezzando un ramo. 
Il ladro sta spingendo un’auto. 
Jasmine non sta tenendo un bastone. 
Semola sta tirando una freccia. 
Sebastian non sta ascoltando un disco. 
The mouse is repairing an engine. 
Robin Hood is not spilling a glass. 
 
Mike is peeling a banana. 
Spiderman is not climbing over a wall. 
Bugs Bunny is digging a tunnel. 
Mickey Mouse is not dreaming of the 
sea. 
Minnie is lifting weights. 
Obelix is not breaking a branch. 
The thief is driving a car. 
Jasmine is not holding a stick. 
Arthur is pulling an arrow. 
Sebastian is not listening to a disc. 
 
 
Block 8 
 
Tarzan sta accarezzando un uccellino. 
Il ladro non sta accendendo la luce. 
Winnie the Pooh sta aggiustando un 
aereoplanino. 
Nonna Papera non sta ascoltando un disco. 
Alice sta cancellando la lavagna. 
Il topo non sta preparando la tavola. 
Asterix sta costruendo una capanna. 
Sully non sta dipingendo un quadro. 
Pippo sta facendo una foto. 
La bambina non sta gonfiando un palloncino. 
Marge sta guidando la macchina. 
Paperina non sta colorando delle uova. 
Bart sta leggendo un libro. 
Brontolo non sta mordendo una mela. 
Pinocchio sta piantando un chiodo. 
Cappuccetto Rosso non sta portando un 
cestino. 
Sebastian sta raccogliendo delle conchiglie. 
La matrigna non sta riempie una bottiglia. 
Silvestro sta rincorrendo un topolino. 
Robin Hood non sta riparando un arco. 
Aladdin sta rompendo un vaso. 
Peter Pan non sta rovesciando una scatola. 
Il cow boy sta scavalcando un recinto. 
Il principe non sta scrivendo una lettera. 
Spugna sta sognando un'isola. 
Duffy Duck non sta sollevando una valigia. 
Spiderman sta spegnendo il fuoco. 
Topolino non sta spingendo un pacco. 
Grande Puffo sta mostrando una coppa. 
Semola non sta tenendo una spada. 
Tarzan is caressing a bird. 
The thief is not turning on the light. 
Winnie the Pooh is fixing a toy airplane. 
 
Grandma Duck is not listening to a disc. 
Alice is erasing the blackboard. 
The mouse is not setting the table. 
Asterix is building a hut. 
Sully is not painting a picture. 
Goofy is taking a picture. 
The girl is blowing up a balloon. 
Marge is driving the car. 
Daisy is not coloring some eggs. 
Bart is reading a book. 
Grumpy is not biting an apple. 
Pinocchio is hammering a nail. 
Little Red Riding Hood is not carrying a 
basket. 
Sebastian is collecting shells. 
The stepmother is not filling a bottle. 
Sylvester is chasing a mouse. 
Robin Hood is not repairing a bow. 
Aladdin is breaking a vase. 
Peter Pan is not knocking over a box. 
The cowboy is climbing over a fence. 
The prince is not writing a letter. 
Sponge is dreaming of an island. 
Daffy Duck is not lifting a suitcase. 
Spiderman is putting out the fire. 
Mickey Mouse is not pushing a package. 
Papa Smurf is showing a cup. 
Arthur is not holding a sword. 
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Pictures 
 
The same 240 pictures were used for the four versions of the experiment. In each of 
the four lists, however, every picture was associated to a different kind of sentence.  
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Appendix B. 
Plots of the EEG grand averages. 
 
 
In the following pages, the grand averages of all channels and conditions of the 
three EEG studies performed (the preliminary study with adults, STUDY 1 and 
STUDY 2) are plotted. 
 
 For STUDY 1 and STUDY 2, the grand averages of the three main effects 
analyzed (match-mismatch, truth-value, and polarity) are also reported. 
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